Mark Pritchard is MP for the Wrekin.
Greenland is of geo-political importance to all NATO member states, not just the USA and Denmark. Donald Trump’s observations about increased Russian and Chinese military activity and influence operations in the Arctic region are a true assessment, and the President is right to remind Denmark, Greenland and other NATO members of these live threats.
The United States’ national security is NATO’s national security. The Greenland Question is one of the best examples of why NATO’s ‘collective security’ should be viewed as indivisible. Trump’s intervention is a timely reminder (irrespective of whether that was his primary intention).
The US already has a military base on Greenland: Pituffik Space Base, formerly known as Thule air base, which at its height billeted nearly ten thousand US military personnel. Today, that figure is closer to two hundred. When I visited the base some years ago, it was nearer five hundred, both deployments well below the United States’s previous seven air force bases, and US naval vessels routinely berthed in Greenland’s limited ports.
Trump’s call for a larger military presence on Greenland is needed and overdue. But Department of War records reveal the four decades long draw down of the US military presence in Greenland was entirely a US decision – not a decision taken in Copenhagen or Nuuk.
Washington is right that Greenland’s security has not been a strategic priority for NATO for decades. I personally recall landing on a snowy military air strip, some years ago, courtesy of the Royal Danish Air Force, at Station North on the most northerly tip of Greenland, well above the Arctic Circle, to find NATO’s border guarded by two Danish soldiers and a four year-old German shepherd dog named Max.
Thankfully, Denmark’s military presence on Greenland (the world’s largest island) has increased markedly in recent years, with rotating NATO personnel, oftentimes using Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) air and naval assets, to guard Greenland’s airspace and its waters.
The call for a greater military presence on Greenland is a call that should be heeded by all NATO members, especially NATO’s Arctic members, who should make the case to Trump that additional military deployments to Greenland should be by consent, and agreed through NATO diplomacy, with the outcome being a joint US/NATO deployment being agreed, rather than a US only military deployment.
The US has always taken the lead in Greenland. Going back to the early 1940s, the US Coastguard beat the Germans to establish an airfield in the south of the island; the US accelerated its military activities further through the joint Greenland Defence Agreement signed in 1951, leading to the number of bases expanding from three to seven air bases the following year.
An updated and new defence agreement between the US, NATO, Denmark and Greenland is possible; perhaps a revised defence framework or compact, working alongside the existing US/Danish joint defence agreement. As the dealmaker-in-chief, Trump needs to ensure everyone wins, Greenlanders most of all. The 1951 agreement also makes it quite clear, in Articles IV, X, and XIII, that all NATO members are able to contribute to defending Greenland. The US does not need to go it alone.
Trump does not want to invade Greenland, less so see the break-up of NATO, but Denmark and like-minded allies need quickly to engage in innovative diplomacy, co-lead the national security narrative, and work with him to find common ground.
The President’s approach, as often is the case, is to launch an oral blitzkrieg and see who’s left standing. He then makes his real move having weakened and confused his likely opponents – friend and foe alike. All EU and NATO capitals should head to Copenhagen, Nuuk, and Washington DC to find common cause and work on a comprehensive political, diplomatic, military and economic deal that works for everyone.
Trump is right to say the Arctic and High North is critical to US national security, but he also knows ‘America First’ does not need to mean ‘America Alone’. The USA is safer because of its NATO membership, not weaker. The United States is neither omnipresent nor omnipotent; that is why NATO alliances and allies will always matter to the United States. Trump gets that, despite his sometimes unorthodox rhetorical flourishes.
Greenland is also critical to America’s Pacific defence, with the Arctic being viewed as a ‘strategic chokepoint’ and integral to the execution of US Indo-Pacific military operations. This is more feasible as the Arctic’s ice mass recedes, with previously unnavigable shipping lanes opening up to naval, commercial, and leisure shipping.
The importance of US security considerations in the Arctic and High North was also highlighted under the Biden Administration in the National Strategy for the Arctic Region (2022) and the Department of Defense Arctic Strategy (2024). But it is Trump who is seeking to act, turning strategy, along with his own recently published US National Security Strategy, into the strategic positioning of US military assets.
Another strand to Trump’s arctic strategy is his Golden Dome initiative, a global and multi-layered missile defence system, which includes updating early warning systems in Greenland, as well as ballistic and hypersonic missile interceptors. Trump views Greenland as a ‘must have’ for US nuclear defence.
He also has his eye on Greenland’s minerals. The best way forward, so that all NATO members win, is for a possible tri/bi-lateral commercial agreement between the Danish/US/Greenlandic governments. Greenland’s government has already made it clear that it is ‘open for business’.
Beyond that, Trump might struggle to find long-term US investors given the lack of roads, rail, and even port infrastructure needed to support mining operations.
Protecting Greenland’s pristine environment and eco-systems, as well as respecting the local customs and practices of Greenland’s Inuit communities, will add to future investment decisions. Mining investment is capital-intensive and usually has a long lead time in returning profitable revenues on investments. Even if a deal is struck, without government support, finding investors might be harder than the President might think.
What is clear is that extracting critical minerals from Greenland, sustainably, would be beneficial for all NATO members, and help reduce an over-reliance on supplies from more geo-politically complex parts of the world. Is this where defence and minerals might meet?
Any discussion on improving Greenland’s defence invariably raises the question of ‘Who pays?’. Trump’s past declarations on NATO members needing to fund more is likely unchanged with Greenland, whatever Trump’s unilateral and muscular ‘go it alone’ statements. But with NATO operations and costs already stretched, not least with NATO’s ongoing support for Ukraine, this is likely to be an additional unwelcome challenge
Whatever the outcome of negotiations between Marco Rubio, the US Secretary of State, and the Danish and Greenlandic governments later this week, the US is still likely to take the lead, meaning Trump will indeed expect recompense – and on past form, payment is likely due in the form of a US/Denmark/Greenland critical minerals deal.
One fond memory when visiting Thule air base was watching a white arctic fox dash across Thule’s snow covered runway. These hardy mammals are renowned for their unique hunting style, called ‘snow ambushing’. NATO members, led by Denmark, need to quickly agree a joint way forward with Trump, and avoid their very own ‘snow ambush’.
Mark Pritchard is MP for the Wrekin.
Greenland is of geo-political importance to all NATO member states, not just the USA and Denmark. Donald Trump’s observations about increased Russian and Chinese military activity and influence operations in the Arctic region are a true assessment, and the President is right to remind Denmark, Greenland and other NATO members of these live threats.
The United States’ national security is NATO’s national security. The Greenland Question is one of the best examples of why NATO’s ‘collective security’ should be viewed as indivisible. Trump’s intervention is a timely reminder (irrespective of whether that was his primary intention).
The US already has a military base on Greenland: Pituffik Space Base, formerly known as Thule air base, which at its height billeted nearly ten thousand US military personnel. Today, that figure is closer to two hundred. When I visited the base some years ago, it was nearer five hundred, both deployments well below the United States’s previous seven air force bases, and US naval vessels routinely berthed in Greenland’s limited ports.
Trump’s call for a larger military presence on Greenland is needed and overdue. But Department of War records reveal the four decades long draw down of the US military presence in Greenland was entirely a US decision – not a decision taken in Copenhagen or Nuuk.
Washington is right that Greenland’s security has not been a strategic priority for NATO for decades. I personally recall landing on a snowy military air strip, some years ago, courtesy of the Royal Danish Air Force, at Station North on the most northerly tip of Greenland, well above the Arctic Circle, to find NATO’s border guarded by two Danish soldiers and a four year-old German shepherd dog named Max.
Thankfully, Denmark’s military presence on Greenland (the world’s largest island) has increased markedly in recent years, with rotating NATO personnel, oftentimes using Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) air and naval assets, to guard Greenland’s airspace and its waters.
The call for a greater military presence on Greenland is a call that should be heeded by all NATO members, especially NATO’s Arctic members, who should make the case to Trump that additional military deployments to Greenland should be by consent, and agreed through NATO diplomacy, with the outcome being a joint US/NATO deployment being agreed, rather than a US only military deployment.
The US has always taken the lead in Greenland. Going back to the early 1940s, the US Coastguard beat the Germans to establish an airfield in the south of the island; the US accelerated its military activities further through the joint Greenland Defence Agreement signed in 1951, leading to the number of bases expanding from three to seven air bases the following year.
An updated and new defence agreement between the US, NATO, Denmark and Greenland is possible; perhaps a revised defence framework or compact, working alongside the existing US/Danish joint defence agreement. As the dealmaker-in-chief, Trump needs to ensure everyone wins, Greenlanders most of all. The 1951 agreement also makes it quite clear, in Articles IV, X, and XIII, that all NATO members are able to contribute to defending Greenland. The US does not need to go it alone.
Trump does not want to invade Greenland, less so see the break-up of NATO, but Denmark and like-minded allies need quickly to engage in innovative diplomacy, co-lead the national security narrative, and work with him to find common ground.
The President’s approach, as often is the case, is to launch an oral blitzkrieg and see who’s left standing. He then makes his real move having weakened and confused his likely opponents – friend and foe alike. All EU and NATO capitals should head to Copenhagen, Nuuk, and Washington DC to find common cause and work on a comprehensive political, diplomatic, military and economic deal that works for everyone.
Trump is right to say the Arctic and High North is critical to US national security, but he also knows ‘America First’ does not need to mean ‘America Alone’. The USA is safer because of its NATO membership, not weaker. The United States is neither omnipresent nor omnipotent; that is why NATO alliances and allies will always matter to the United States. Trump gets that, despite his sometimes unorthodox rhetorical flourishes.
Greenland is also critical to America’s Pacific defence, with the Arctic being viewed as a ‘strategic chokepoint’ and integral to the execution of US Indo-Pacific military operations. This is more feasible as the Arctic’s ice mass recedes, with previously unnavigable shipping lanes opening up to naval, commercial, and leisure shipping.
The importance of US security considerations in the Arctic and High North was also highlighted under the Biden Administration in the National Strategy for the Arctic Region (2022) and the Department of Defense Arctic Strategy (2024). But it is Trump who is seeking to act, turning strategy, along with his own recently published US National Security Strategy, into the strategic positioning of US military assets.
Another strand to Trump’s arctic strategy is his Golden Dome initiative, a global and multi-layered missile defence system, which includes updating early warning systems in Greenland, as well as ballistic and hypersonic missile interceptors. Trump views Greenland as a ‘must have’ for US nuclear defence.
He also has his eye on Greenland’s minerals. The best way forward, so that all NATO members win, is for a possible tri/bi-lateral commercial agreement between the Danish/US/Greenlandic governments. Greenland’s government has already made it clear that it is ‘open for business’.
Beyond that, Trump might struggle to find long-term US investors given the lack of roads, rail, and even port infrastructure needed to support mining operations.
Protecting Greenland’s pristine environment and eco-systems, as well as respecting the local customs and practices of Greenland’s Inuit communities, will add to future investment decisions. Mining investment is capital-intensive and usually has a long lead time in returning profitable revenues on investments. Even if a deal is struck, without government support, finding investors might be harder than the President might think.
What is clear is that extracting critical minerals from Greenland, sustainably, would be beneficial for all NATO members, and help reduce an over-reliance on supplies from more geo-politically complex parts of the world. Is this where defence and minerals might meet?
Any discussion on improving Greenland’s defence invariably raises the question of ‘Who pays?’. Trump’s past declarations on NATO members needing to fund more is likely unchanged with Greenland, whatever Trump’s unilateral and muscular ‘go it alone’ statements. But with NATO operations and costs already stretched, not least with NATO’s ongoing support for Ukraine, this is likely to be an additional unwelcome challenge
Whatever the outcome of negotiations between Marco Rubio, the US Secretary of State, and the Danish and Greenlandic governments later this week, the US is still likely to take the lead, meaning Trump will indeed expect recompense – and on past form, payment is likely due in the form of a US/Denmark/Greenland critical minerals deal.
One fond memory when visiting Thule air base was watching a white arctic fox dash across Thule’s snow covered runway. These hardy mammals are renowned for their unique hunting style, called ‘snow ambushing’. NATO members, led by Denmark, need to quickly agree a joint way forward with Trump, and avoid their very own ‘snow ambush’.