Dom Frost is a public affairs consultant for a leading London based communications firm and a member of the Conservatives Together Programme.
A lesson from the British and Dominion Forces’ experience in the Western Desert may be worth relearning today.
In June 1942, the British Eighth Army was defeated by Axis forces at the Battle of Gazala in Libya. Historians debate many causes for this: its overall operational concept, brigade defensive boxes spread too far apart, the failure to integrate Tobruk effectively into the wider operational plan, and a defensive line that did not extend far enough. In simple terms, Rommel, a master of manoeuvre warfare, exploited these weaknesses by cutting through these positions and concentrating his forces against isolated brigade boxes.
At Gazala, the British held overall numerical advantages in men and tanks, but these were dispersed, while Axis forces achieved local superiority at decisive points, particularly during the Cauldron battles. When people think of the battle, they often compare British versus German tanks in endless “top-trumps” debates. This misses the point. Even if the British had possessed better tanks, the outcome would still have been unlikely to change, because British forces were fragmented.
Leaving aside the historical debates, there is a broader lesson that resonates strongly with Britain and government spending priorities today. The misuse of resources through fragmentation and piecemeal attacks failed against a concentration of force. When General Montgomery later took command of the Eighth Army in August 1942, he emphasised concentrating armoured force at decisive points rather than dispersing units in small packets. This change in approach mattered. Fragmentation at Gazala had cost lives and equipment and led to a retreat. That lesson applies just as much today to government spending and our approach to the economy as it did during the war. Britain spends vast sums of money, yet with remarkably limited visible impact.
Total public spending reached around £1.28 trillion last year. Public expenditure rose sharply during the pandemic, peaking above 50 per cent, and has since remained elevated at around 43–45 per cent. Pandemic conditions aside, it is difficult to argue that this scale of spending has delivered improvements in economic performance or everyday life. The British government has replicated the same errors as British forces did during this period in the desert, using costly but fragmented strategies. There are several examples of this from both current and previous governments.
Britain plans to spend up to £1 billion over a decade on the semiconductor sector through a range of different projects, with an initial £200 million between 2023 and 2025. Last summer Liverpool’s net transfer spend was £228 million. At a time when Taiwan’s semiconductor dominance is a major geopolitical vulnerability and China is seeking to gain control of production, it is difficult to believe this level of investment will meaningfully shift the dial. So what is this spending going to achieve?
Similarly, the government has committed up to £22 billion over 25 years to carbon capture, primarily targeted at industrial cluster-based projects. This level of funding commitment is costly and unlikely to have a meaningful impact. Another example is the government’s industrial strategy. £4.3 billion has been earmarked over the next decade to support advanced manufacturing, at least £700 million of additional funding for clean energy supply chains, £520 million for life sciences, and £150 million for the creative industries.
In addition, £86 billion is due to be invested in research and development over four years. This figure seems large but given the size of the British economy (over $4 trillion in nominal terms according to the IMF) and its diversity of sectors, it is hard to see this spending having a meaningful. Moreover, the government does not have a good track record, nor the experience, to direct capital effectively and efficiently. These numbers may make for a good headline, but this collection of figures creates the worst of all worlds, a long-term fiscal commitment that is too small to guarantee success and too thinly spread to have a real impact.
A key perception is that British governments attempt to do everything. The range of economic strategies, from defence to life sciences, is often described as turning Britain into a sector superpower. Ambition is welcome, but not every sector can be a superpower. The result is that Britain spends a great deal in total, but never enough in any one area to achieve a decisive impact, nor is it likely that this capital will reach businesses quickly. Ultimately, no sector feels adequately supported, and no stakeholder is satisfied.
This is not a call for higher taxation to put more money behind every sector. Greater taxation leads to a reduction in economic activity. In essence, the more you tax, the less you get, as it acts as a brake on activity. Look at the current situation in Britain, taxes have risen steadily, the economy has stagnated or is limping along, and yet public spending continues to increase.
This is not how effective organisations operate. When a new CEO takes charge of a struggling business, they do not attempt to excel at everything simultaneously. Instead, they identify a small number of priorities that will make the greatest difference, align the organisation behind them, and concentrate resources accordingly. Other activities are parked as business as usual, and focus is given to the goal.
The British state needs a similar reorientation. That will require political courage and a fundamental rethink of how Whitehall operates, potentially merging or abolishing departments, restructuring and linking budgets, and shifting from fragmented spending strategies towards clearer priorities. Government should focus spending on stronger fiscal incentives that allow private capital to be allocated efficiently rather than doled out by the state.
Montgomery understood that victory required not just resources, but the disciplined use of them.
Fragmentation never worked. Concentration and focus did.
If Britain is willing to relearn that lesson, it may finally move beyond its current expensive and ineffectual approach. The country has the ability and foundations to advance economically in the coming decades, but this will require political leadership that understands a lesson learned the hard way in the Second World War, namely concentrate resources, focus on key strategic objectives, and deploy power decisively.
In essence, pick fewer areas and concentrate force to make a decisive impact.
Dom Frost is a public affairs consultant for a leading London based communications firm and a member of the Conservatives Together Programme.
A lesson from the British and Dominion Forces’ experience in the Western Desert may be worth relearning today.
In June 1942, the British Eighth Army was defeated by Axis forces at the Battle of Gazala in Libya. Historians debate many causes for this: its overall operational concept, brigade defensive boxes spread too far apart, the failure to integrate Tobruk effectively into the wider operational plan, and a defensive line that did not extend far enough. In simple terms, Rommel, a master of manoeuvre warfare, exploited these weaknesses by cutting through these positions and concentrating his forces against isolated brigade boxes.
At Gazala, the British held overall numerical advantages in men and tanks, but these were dispersed, while Axis forces achieved local superiority at decisive points, particularly during the Cauldron battles. When people think of the battle, they often compare British versus German tanks in endless “top-trumps” debates. This misses the point. Even if the British had possessed better tanks, the outcome would still have been unlikely to change, because British forces were fragmented.
Leaving aside the historical debates, there is a broader lesson that resonates strongly with Britain and government spending priorities today. The misuse of resources through fragmentation and piecemeal attacks failed against a concentration of force. When General Montgomery later took command of the Eighth Army in August 1942, he emphasised concentrating armoured force at decisive points rather than dispersing units in small packets. This change in approach mattered. Fragmentation at Gazala had cost lives and equipment and led to a retreat. That lesson applies just as much today to government spending and our approach to the economy as it did during the war. Britain spends vast sums of money, yet with remarkably limited visible impact.
Total public spending reached around £1.28 trillion last year. Public expenditure rose sharply during the pandemic, peaking above 50 per cent, and has since remained elevated at around 43–45 per cent. Pandemic conditions aside, it is difficult to argue that this scale of spending has delivered improvements in economic performance or everyday life. The British government has replicated the same errors as British forces did during this period in the desert, using costly but fragmented strategies. There are several examples of this from both current and previous governments.
Britain plans to spend up to £1 billion over a decade on the semiconductor sector through a range of different projects, with an initial £200 million between 2023 and 2025. Last summer Liverpool’s net transfer spend was £228 million. At a time when Taiwan’s semiconductor dominance is a major geopolitical vulnerability and China is seeking to gain control of production, it is difficult to believe this level of investment will meaningfully shift the dial. So what is this spending going to achieve?
Similarly, the government has committed up to £22 billion over 25 years to carbon capture, primarily targeted at industrial cluster-based projects. This level of funding commitment is costly and unlikely to have a meaningful impact. Another example is the government’s industrial strategy. £4.3 billion has been earmarked over the next decade to support advanced manufacturing, at least £700 million of additional funding for clean energy supply chains, £520 million for life sciences, and £150 million for the creative industries.
In addition, £86 billion is due to be invested in research and development over four years. This figure seems large but given the size of the British economy (over $4 trillion in nominal terms according to the IMF) and its diversity of sectors, it is hard to see this spending having a meaningful. Moreover, the government does not have a good track record, nor the experience, to direct capital effectively and efficiently. These numbers may make for a good headline, but this collection of figures creates the worst of all worlds, a long-term fiscal commitment that is too small to guarantee success and too thinly spread to have a real impact.
A key perception is that British governments attempt to do everything. The range of economic strategies, from defence to life sciences, is often described as turning Britain into a sector superpower. Ambition is welcome, but not every sector can be a superpower. The result is that Britain spends a great deal in total, but never enough in any one area to achieve a decisive impact, nor is it likely that this capital will reach businesses quickly. Ultimately, no sector feels adequately supported, and no stakeholder is satisfied.
This is not a call for higher taxation to put more money behind every sector. Greater taxation leads to a reduction in economic activity. In essence, the more you tax, the less you get, as it acts as a brake on activity. Look at the current situation in Britain, taxes have risen steadily, the economy has stagnated or is limping along, and yet public spending continues to increase.
This is not how effective organisations operate. When a new CEO takes charge of a struggling business, they do not attempt to excel at everything simultaneously. Instead, they identify a small number of priorities that will make the greatest difference, align the organisation behind them, and concentrate resources accordingly. Other activities are parked as business as usual, and focus is given to the goal.
The British state needs a similar reorientation. That will require political courage and a fundamental rethink of how Whitehall operates, potentially merging or abolishing departments, restructuring and linking budgets, and shifting from fragmented spending strategies towards clearer priorities. Government should focus spending on stronger fiscal incentives that allow private capital to be allocated efficiently rather than doled out by the state.
Montgomery understood that victory required not just resources, but the disciplined use of them.
Fragmentation never worked. Concentration and focus did.
If Britain is willing to relearn that lesson, it may finally move beyond its current expensive and ineffectual approach. The country has the ability and foundations to advance economically in the coming decades, but this will require political leadership that understands a lesson learned the hard way in the Second World War, namely concentrate resources, focus on key strategic objectives, and deploy power decisively.
In essence, pick fewer areas and concentrate force to make a decisive impact.