1. The top lines look ok but Conservatives must beware false comfort. Asked whether they support or oppose the Autumn Statement overall, working-class Conservative voters are currently split between supportive, unsure, and hostile. More support it than oppose it – by 40 per cent to 22 per cent – but 38 per cent say they neither support nor oppose it or don’t know. A bit like with the Truss mini-Budget in the following few days, many of them just don’t know what to think.
By 48 per cent to 30 per cent, working-class voters agreed with the relative balance between tax rises and spending cuts; and most agreed with most of the actual measures in the Autumn Statement. (The actual construction of the Autumn Statement speech and its presentation was first rate). While possible to spin this as “2-1 working-class support”, with broader support elsewhere, this would give false comfort; the Party doesn’t carry majority working-class support and the top line hides a worrying picture.
2. Half blame the Government for the Autumn Statement. Asked whether the Autumn Statement was the result of the Government’s own mistakes or the external economic situation, more working-class Conservatives blame the Government than external factors (by 47 per cent to 41 per cent). Of those that said the Autumn Statement was a result of the Government’s mistakes, the majority (71 per cent) said in turn it was basically Liz Truss’ fault.
This is both positive and negative: positive in the sense that Rishi Sunak can credibly claim to be very different to Liz Truss; negative in the sense they “know” this was down to the Conservatives – they have “learned” what happened. This helps explain why the Conservative Party reputation – visible in so many other recent polls – is so bad.
3. Most expect to be personally worse off. By 57 per cent to 15 per cent, working-class Conservatives think the Autumn Statement will leave them worse off. In addition, by 64 per cent to 11 per cent, they think people on “middle incomes” will be worse off; while they’re working-class, they tend to think of themselves (rightly) as being on middle incomes. It’s therefore hard to see where the good news is going to come from.
4. A fifth of them have gone. Throughout the poll, it’s clear there’s an angry fifth of 2019 working-class voters, who it’s reasonable to assume have just gone; they won’t vote Conservative next time, and maybe not again any time soon. These are voters who say they oppose the measures announced overall (22 per cent), who say they’re going to be much poorer, and who generally radiate hostility to the Government.
The next election isn’t a referendum; it doesn’t matter necessarily if more working-class voters support rather than oppose the Autumn Statement (which they do); it matters hugely if the working-class base shrinks – and it looks certain it will very, very likely shrink significantly. In truth, however, these voters were probably lost before the Autumn Statement.
5. Why isn’t it worse? Despite the worrying top line, it clearly could be a lot worse. Why isn’t it? Simply, because Labour have totally failed in their attempts to pin the blame for the severity of the Autumn Statement on the Government. Looking at all voters, by 55 per cent to 28 per cent they say the Autumn Statement was required because of the Government’s own mistakes; but working-class Conservatives only agree by 47 per cent to 41 per cent. This is staggering, but Rachel Reeves’ response explains their problem: so far, Labour have massively over-complicated their response.
They are trying to use Truss’ mini-Budget, and the one that followed, as great teaching moments – desperate to shoehorn as many lessons about the nasty Tories in as possible. Had they stripped it all down and just said “you’re paying for their mistakes” they might have cut through better. That said, there’s an added problem for Labour that working-class voters still aren’t sold on Starmer and somewhat doubt his competence. The situation with Rachel Reeves is different – she remains an unknown.
6. So why isn’t it actually better? You could ask, conversely, why there isn’t greater working-class support for the Autumn Statement overall if there is general support for their policy announcements, visible scepticism about Starmer and Reeves, and an acceptance already they’re going to be poorer? This is where we need to keep looking at the wood not the trees. The bottom line is this: the Conservative Party is unpopular and so, in absolute terms, is Rishi Sunak (although he out-performs the Party). To most voters, there’s been a litany of failure from the Government for some time.
What does this all mean?
The Conservatives took steps to protect the most vulnerable voters, clobbering the better-off to do so. It’s hard to say this was a Autumn Statement for ordinary working-class voters though – the voters who gave the Party its massive 2019 majority. As I’ve written before, most of these voters, would, in America, be defined (and would self-define) as middle-class. Many of them expect to suffer, badly, as a result of the Autumn Statement. While some of the top lines appear encouraging, this will weigh the Government down before long.
Let’s accept there was no alternative for the sake of argument, at least from where the Party found itself after the Truss debacle. Regardless, it’s hard to see how the Government’s economic policies will actively win back working-class support. It’s not a safe bet to assume “stability” and “competence” will be enough to keep them onside, particularly when Labour have so many cards to play countering this view (even if they haven’t played them well yet).