OUT: How Brexit got done and the Tories were undone by Tim Shipman
Tim Shipman’s latest book, the final volume in a quartet devoted to British politics from the 2016 referendum to the present day, is 900 pages long. Is it possible, one wonders before opening it, to have too much of a good thing?
In this case, the answer, rather unexpectedly, is “no”. Shipman’s method is to “give everybody a fair shout”, as he put it when interviewed by ConHome in November 2016.
That is one reason why so many actors in the Brexit drama are willing to talk to him. He is a reporter who takes them seriously enough to try to reproduce with reasonable fidelity whatever evidence they offer, even if it does not fit with what other witnesses have said, or with Shipman’s own preconceptions.
It does, however, have to be interesting enough to earn its place in a long report for The Sunday Times, or an even longer book.
Columnists are inclined to select the evidence which shows they were right all along. So too campaigners, which is one reason why almost nothing which one could dignify with the word “debate” took place during the referendum.
When one utters the word “Boris”, many educated minds snap shut. People already know what they think about him, or at least what they are meant to think about him: the opinion which it is correct in their circle to hold.
Shipman writes on page 889:
“This sequence of books is ostensibly about Brexit and the impact it had on British politics and British politicians, but at heart it is the story of Boris Johnson. ‘The central figure is Boris, inescapably,’ said Michael Gove. It is difficult to imagine Brexit happening without Gove or Dominic Cummings; it is impossible to do so without Boris.”
So it matters that as a reporter, Shipman is prepared to give Johnson “a fair shout”, and to avoid the mistake made both by those who loathe him, and those who idolise him:
“Those who saw him as a blunderer assumed he was a populist cipher for Cummings… Those who liked Johnson, but disliked what he did, assumed he would do the right thing if only his head was not turned by Cummings.”
The volume opens with Johnson becoming Prime Minister on 24th July 2019 and bringing Cummings and others from the Vote Leave team into Downing Street in order to get Brexit done.
Theresa May, an honourable woman, had failed to gain a Commons majority for her Brexit deal, and most MPs appeared keener to find some way to remain in the EU.
She had inadvertently created the conditions for a successful rebellion against Parliament, if only someone could be found with the qualities needed to lead it.
Johnson and Cummings are insurgents of genius. During the second half of 2019 they mounted a rebellion against the House of Commons which culminated in the Conservative general election victory in December of that year.
Shipman casts much new light on this process, and also draws, with proper attribution, on the various books which have already been published about it, including my own.
His style is sometimes vulgar, which probably makes him more attuned to the vulgarities of politics than a fine writer would be. He is immensely industrious, and immensely keen to get stories, which again are qualities which might be missing in a fine writer.
The insurgents needed to be outrageous enough to provoke their opponents into error, including the blunder of agreeing to a general election in which the opponents would stand on a platform of defying the people’s will.
But Johnson and Cummings also had to be cautious enough to keep key figures such as Geoffrey Cox, the Attorney General, on side.
Prorogation of Parliament for five weeks was one of the outrageous provocations which Johnson and Cummings decided to make. On 13 August they had Cox to “a fish supper in Johnson’s Downing Street flat”, to sound him out about prorogation.
Cox later told friends, “You can’t just ask a lawyer over dinner. It’s like asking a doctor, ‘Have I got cancer?'”
But he did give advice over dinner. In his view, prorogation was lawful, but he warned that having appeared before the Supreme Court on numerous occasions, he could not rule out “the real litigation risk that we would be incurring”.
Later on, he warned that it was essential he be asked to give advice in writing, which could be shown to the Supreme Court when it asked the Government to explain why it had acted as it did. As Shipman explains,
“Cox believed it would have been perfectly possible to make a nakedly political argument that prorogation was necessary to give breathing space to enable Johnson to get a deal, to allow ministers to travel to Brussels, Berlin and Paris. If such a justification had been made, with supporting paperwork, it would have forced the court to rule on what was a good political reason for doing something and what was a bad political reason, a potential minefield for the judiciary.”
But except on a narrow point to do with Northern Ireland, Cox was not asked for written advice. Johnson preferred to proceed by informal means, which his opponents naturally found highly improper, and which some readers of this review may take as yet more proof that the man is a scoundrel, a charlatan, a disgrace to British politics.
A strength of Shipman’s account is that he does not indulge in such moralising, but goes on reporting, as well as he can, what happened.
On the other side of the argument, Oliver Letwin was sounding out the Speaker, John Bercow, about whether it would be possible for Johnson’s opponents to take control of the Order Paper using Standing Order 24, an unconventional and in the view of many authorities improper way of proceeding.
Bercow said he thought it would be possible, but wanted first “to see what you’ve got by way of numbers and who the people are”.
Letwin was ready for this, and replied: “If there were, say, a number of prominent figures from the other side, the chair of a select committee…”
Bercow took this, rightly, as a reference to Hilary Benn, and replied: “That would be highly relevant. That would be eminently respectable.”
As Shipman says, Bercow had given “effectively a green light” for Letwin, Benn and the rest to take on the Government. Once again, we get no editorialising from Shipman, but the facts, as far as he can establish them, in order to enable readers to make up their own minds about this collusion between the Speaker and Johnson’s opponents.
Not long after Johnson had led the Conservatives to victory, and got Brexit done, Cummings started a new insurgency. In addition to his usual targets – useless officials, useless ministers, useless Tory MPs – he decided to go for the useless Prime Minister, even though the PM had just stood by him during the Barnard Castle affair.
By November 2020, relations between the two men were so bad that Cummings left Downing Street carrying a cardboard box, after which he pursued his anti-Johnson campaign from without. There must be more to be discovered about the jealousies operating here.
Shipman does not pretend that a full history of these events can yet be written: “The accounts of the Johnson and Vote Leave camps, forever adversaries after this week, are irreconcilable.”
But Shipman’s book does bring out the extraordinary ineptitude with which Johnson defended himself. The Owen Paterson debacle, the partygate allegations and at the end the Chris Pincher affair all demonstrated in a most embarrassing way his capacity for taking up positions which would almost immediately prove indefensible.
Johnson judged the Ukraine situation better and faster than any other western leader. Here the courage, boldness and imagination with which he loves to flout lily-livered conventional wisdom were just what was needed. So too with the vaccine task force, operating as a improvised group of brilliant people outside the structures of Whitehall.
In Downing Street – how easy it is to write this as a mere book reviewer – he was not conventional enough. He never admitted that he needed, as a matter of self-preservation, to find, appoint and respect a sober, astute, experienced chief of staff who would think through dangers like partygate for him and work out a defensible line to be promulgated by Johnson in the Commons and on social media, and by other ministers on the morning round.
It occurs to me that during his three years in Downing Street we saw too much of him. He is so good at making in a few minutes a short but eloquent video clip on any subject under the sun – New Year’s greetings to an obscure religion if nothing else is to hand – that he overdid it.
Franklin D Roosevelt discovered he could bypass a predominantly hostile press by giving the radio addresses which came to be known as his fireside chats. But he took care not to overdo it: in 12 years and one month as President, he delivered only 30 fireside chats, each of which took “four or five days of long, overtime work” to prepare.
Johnson was almost never off the airwaves, and also provided an unceasing flow of arresting images. It was impressive, but it was too much, and may have led him to believe that as long as he could communicate directly with the public, he could neglect Conservative MPs.
In 20 or 30 years’ time, one trusts that some writer will do for Johnson what Charles Moore has done for Margaret Thatcher: provide an authoritative and incisive account after talking to everyone and reading the official papers. One envies whichever biographer gets hold of Johnson’s annotations on those papers.
Shipman’s account is at present the best we have got, and he also recounts with vivacity the prime ministerships of Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak. But the first edition of this book has one glaring deficiency: there is no index.