Thomas Nurcombe is a Researcher at the Coalition for Global Prosperity.
It has almost been three years since Russian forces invaded Ukraine during its so-called “special military operation”.
It brought large-scale war back to Europe and put the entire rules-based international order on very shaky ground. Hundreds of thousands of Russian troops have sought to realise Vladimir Putin’s imperial ambitions, but Ukraine has remained steadfast in its resolve. The UK has been one of Ukraine’s staunchest defenders, providing around £10 billion in military aid to Ukraine, including anti-tank missiles, defensive weapons, ammunition, and Storm Shadow missiles.
But, we should not operate with tunnel vision, ignoring the Russian presence in other areas of the world which poses great challenges to the future of global stability and help to support its war effort. The Kremlin, as shown through its 2023 Foreign Policy Concept, is determined to gain supporters for its anti-Western worldview, spanning Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean.
It outlines Moscow’s desire to expand security, military, and economic cooperation with the developing world as an avenue to undermine the West, build an anti-Western coalition, and secure a route for Russia to achieve its broad foreign policy aims, such as the domination of the post-Soviet space.
It is Russian paramilitary groups that are driving this ambition forward. Across Africa and the Middle East, they secure regimes, undermine democratic practices, increase corruption, gain an economic hold on critical resources, and direct the trajectory of states.
One notable example of this was in the Central African Republic, where the nation’s president signed an agreement for the support of Wagner Group to provide security for his government in the face of rebel groups trying to take power. Later, through vote-rigging, bribery, and intimidation, Wagner Group successfully secured the president’s re-election, abolished term limits, and made him a stooge of the Kremlin. Indeed, the President secured a 95 per cent vote share, with turnout as low as 10 per cent.
Russian influence in countries like the CAR is helping to fund its war in Ukraine. In exchange for supporting regimes, Moscow gains exclusive rights to mining activities, such as for diamonds and gold, helping Putin’s regime to avoid the negative impact of international sanctions. Between the start of the Russian invasion and December 2023, the Kremlin earned over $2.5 billion from gold extraction in the Central Africa Republic, Sudan, and Mali alone.
As the continent holds 30 per cent of the world’s mineral resources which are so critical for the future global economy, the value to the Kremlin of its influence in Africa will only increase, much to the detriment of Kyiv. Russia’s war machine would be funded by its malign influence.
As well as supporting Ukraine with ammunition, the UK must look at how our foreign policy can also stem Russian influence across the developing world. Central to this is tackling the causes of instability and fragility, which provide the pathway for Russia to impose its will and extract concessions to support its military.
The first step is addressing poverty. Poverty and a lack of opportunities provide a source for coups that destabilise governments and countries, and leave doors open for Russia’s intelligence services and paramilitaries to prop up regimes.
Joining rebel groups, participating in coups, or undertaking extremist activity are often caused by the lack of alternatives. Indeed, up to 92 per cent of those involved in religious violence in West Africa previously said that poverty and unemployment were important factors in their activities.
Alongside poverty being a driver of instability, much of Africa’s violence and extremism take place in countries and regions with weak governance and institutions. The reduction in satisfaction levels with democracy has led to an increased attraction to military or authoritarian rule, which Russia is happy to support.
Indeed, the median Freedom House score—which measures people’s access to political rights and civil liberties—for African countries where Russia has been most active is 22, demonstrating how the weakness of and lack of representation in governance and institutions drives Russian influence. For reference, the UK’s Freedom House score is 91 while Syria’s was one under Bashar al-Assad.
The UK has to see international development as a key part of the strategy against Russia. Strong and effective development spending aimed toward government and institutions is critical, strengthening both public trust in governance and increasing private capital inflows to support job creation. It is this that stabilises nations and makes it far harder for the Kremlin to exploit political and economic fragility for their own gain.
Unfortunately, successive governments have failed to appreciate this. In 2019—the final year of the UK’s 0.7 per cent commitment—ODA spent on government, institutions, and civil society stood at £1.3 billion. However, by 2023, this had halved to £660 million.
Long-term stability will make it difficult for Russia to achieve its foreign policy aims in the developing world and extract the resources for its war effort. As a recent report from the Coalition for Global Prosperity, Development in the Pre-War Era outlines, investing in development is an investment for the longevity of the rules-based international order, an investment for our security, an investment for our own prosperity, and an investment against Russia’s malign activities.
It is also, fundamentally, an investment to support Ukraine.
The full report is available here.
Thomas Nurcombe is a Researcher at the Coalition for Global Prosperity.
It has almost been three years since Russian forces invaded Ukraine during its so-called “special military operation”.
It brought large-scale war back to Europe and put the entire rules-based international order on very shaky ground. Hundreds of thousands of Russian troops have sought to realise Vladimir Putin’s imperial ambitions, but Ukraine has remained steadfast in its resolve. The UK has been one of Ukraine’s staunchest defenders, providing around £10 billion in military aid to Ukraine, including anti-tank missiles, defensive weapons, ammunition, and Storm Shadow missiles.
But, we should not operate with tunnel vision, ignoring the Russian presence in other areas of the world which poses great challenges to the future of global stability and help to support its war effort. The Kremlin, as shown through its 2023 Foreign Policy Concept, is determined to gain supporters for its anti-Western worldview, spanning Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean.
It outlines Moscow’s desire to expand security, military, and economic cooperation with the developing world as an avenue to undermine the West, build an anti-Western coalition, and secure a route for Russia to achieve its broad foreign policy aims, such as the domination of the post-Soviet space.
It is Russian paramilitary groups that are driving this ambition forward. Across Africa and the Middle East, they secure regimes, undermine democratic practices, increase corruption, gain an economic hold on critical resources, and direct the trajectory of states.
One notable example of this was in the Central African Republic, where the nation’s president signed an agreement for the support of Wagner Group to provide security for his government in the face of rebel groups trying to take power. Later, through vote-rigging, bribery, and intimidation, Wagner Group successfully secured the president’s re-election, abolished term limits, and made him a stooge of the Kremlin. Indeed, the President secured a 95 per cent vote share, with turnout as low as 10 per cent.
Russian influence in countries like the CAR is helping to fund its war in Ukraine. In exchange for supporting regimes, Moscow gains exclusive rights to mining activities, such as for diamonds and gold, helping Putin’s regime to avoid the negative impact of international sanctions. Between the start of the Russian invasion and December 2023, the Kremlin earned over $2.5 billion from gold extraction in the Central Africa Republic, Sudan, and Mali alone.
As the continent holds 30 per cent of the world’s mineral resources which are so critical for the future global economy, the value to the Kremlin of its influence in Africa will only increase, much to the detriment of Kyiv. Russia’s war machine would be funded by its malign influence.
As well as supporting Ukraine with ammunition, the UK must look at how our foreign policy can also stem Russian influence across the developing world. Central to this is tackling the causes of instability and fragility, which provide the pathway for Russia to impose its will and extract concessions to support its military.
The first step is addressing poverty. Poverty and a lack of opportunities provide a source for coups that destabilise governments and countries, and leave doors open for Russia’s intelligence services and paramilitaries to prop up regimes.
Joining rebel groups, participating in coups, or undertaking extremist activity are often caused by the lack of alternatives. Indeed, up to 92 per cent of those involved in religious violence in West Africa previously said that poverty and unemployment were important factors in their activities.
Alongside poverty being a driver of instability, much of Africa’s violence and extremism take place in countries and regions with weak governance and institutions. The reduction in satisfaction levels with democracy has led to an increased attraction to military or authoritarian rule, which Russia is happy to support.
Indeed, the median Freedom House score—which measures people’s access to political rights and civil liberties—for African countries where Russia has been most active is 22, demonstrating how the weakness of and lack of representation in governance and institutions drives Russian influence. For reference, the UK’s Freedom House score is 91 while Syria’s was one under Bashar al-Assad.
The UK has to see international development as a key part of the strategy against Russia. Strong and effective development spending aimed toward government and institutions is critical, strengthening both public trust in governance and increasing private capital inflows to support job creation. It is this that stabilises nations and makes it far harder for the Kremlin to exploit political and economic fragility for their own gain.
Unfortunately, successive governments have failed to appreciate this. In 2019—the final year of the UK’s 0.7 per cent commitment—ODA spent on government, institutions, and civil society stood at £1.3 billion. However, by 2023, this had halved to £660 million.
Long-term stability will make it difficult for Russia to achieve its foreign policy aims in the developing world and extract the resources for its war effort. As a recent report from the Coalition for Global Prosperity, Development in the Pre-War Era outlines, investing in development is an investment for the longevity of the rules-based international order, an investment for our security, an investment for our own prosperity, and an investment against Russia’s malign activities.
It is also, fundamentally, an investment to support Ukraine.
The full report is available here.