Ukrainians fear that the horrors in Gaza and Israel are hogging the attention their Western backers. Some suspect that Vladimir Putin and his Iranian allies encouraged the Hamas atrocities precisely to open a second front against the democracies.
As is so often the case with international law and institutions, noble ideals bely a necessarily fractious and often shabby reality.
Hard-nosed politicians and commanders, and their legal departments, might be able to mount coherent defences of the IDF. But that won’t necessarily help them in the propaganda battle.
There is a debate to be had about future engagement with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. It can be had without propagandising for its members and making the fight against them look ridiculous.
Putin has tamed his mercenaries, promoted his allies, deposed perceived weak links in the military command, and is building a praetorian guard to safeguard against future threats.
In the wake of what seems to have been a fraught NATO summit, the Defence Secretary’s words are a reminder that public opinion in key nations is not so strongly behind the war as it is in Britain.
Around three quarters of all transatlantic cables in the northern hemisphere pass through or near its waters – yet Dublin spends just 0.2 per cent of GDP on defence.
Nearly two-thirds of Britons favour of greater assistance for refugees, such as the Government increasing employment and English language support.
Meanwhile British and American voters both back supporting Kyiv – but differ from the Ukrainians on what that should look like.
The universally hawkish attitude of British elites rests on shaky assumptions about the progress of the war and America’s priorities.
On paper, the UK has large stockpiles of last-generation tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and other materiel explicitly stockpiled to combat Russian aggression in Europe.
The first article in a two-part mini series by the author on ConservativeHome this week.
An alternative, merely defensive strategy plays into Putin’s hands by prolonging the war and easing political pressure on the Kremlin.
As I crossed the border after three days that I will never forget, I felt a mixture of despair, admiration and optimism.
It was my fourth visit to the country since Russia tried, but failed, to launch a full-scale invasion in February last year. The strength of my commitment to Ukraine grows with each visit.