Adrian Lee is a Solicitor-Advocate in London, specialising in criminal defence, and was twice a Conservative Parliamentary Candidate.
As the war in Ukraine enters its second year, there have been increasing numbers of foreign policy commentators calling for “realism” to be applied by the NATO countries.
Realism, in this context, is far more than an appeal for common sense. Here, it is used to signify a specific school of thought in international relations. Exponents argue that states are the main actors in foreign policies, as opposed to either moral values or individual leaders. The biggest states desire power within their local hemispheres to ensure their self-preservation. Rival power blocs emerge, and on occasion alliances are forged between societies with different values, if it materially benefits them.
Hence, during the height of the Communist China’s Cultural Revolution, the arch realist Henry Kissinger had no moral qualms in laying the foundations for a pact between the U.S.A. and Mao. The aim of realists is peaceful co-existence between the Great Powers, hence Kissinger’s proclamation in the mid-1970s that he expected the USSR to survive for hundreds of years.
Realist strategies were subsequently rejected by the idealist Ronald Reagan, who declared the Soviet Union “evil”, challenged its legitimacy and ultimately won the Cold War.
Currently, most Realists in academia and journalism do not believe that Ukraine can win the war. The Realists range from the outright opponents of Western military aid, to those who adopt pained expressions and fret about the possibilities of escalation. Most emphasise the necessity of forcing Ukraine into a negotiated settlement with Vladimir Putin.
The realism versus idealism debate was at the heart of discussions at the highest level of government in the U.K. in the month of May 1940. On Friday 10th May, the German Wehrmacht launched its blitzkrieg against the West by invading the Low Countries. On the same day, Winston Churchill became Prime Minister. The new War Cabinet included three Conservative members (Churchill, Chamberlain and Halifax) and two Labour (Clement Attlee and Arthur Greenwood), with three other Minsters attending War Cabinet meetings when required (the Conservative Anthony Eden, the socialist A.V. Alexander and the Liberal Leader, Sir Archibald Sinclair).
Within ten days, the Germans had sliced through France, by-passed Paris, and were fast approaching the channel ports. Preparations for the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force were hurriedly being made. On Friday 24th May, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, raised at War Cabinet a telegram received from the French government, suggesting that Britain could contact Roosevelt and ask him to persuade Italy’s Mussolini (still officially neutral) to act as an intermediary in a future negotiated settlement with the Nazis. Halifax said that he would support such a move, so long as Roosevelt maintained the fiction that the idea was entirely his own.
The following day, the War Cabinet met again to discuss a report from the Chiefs of Staff entitled British Strategy in a Certain Eventuality. The Chiefs’ conclusions were bleak. In the event of France collapsing, Britain could continue to resist, but only if the RAF and Royal Navy remained operationally effective. Later, in the afternoon of the 25th, Halifax had a meeting with the Italian Ambassador to discuss the possibility of mediating a general European peace conference.
Sunday 26th May included three War Cabinet meetings and a visit from French Premier, Paul Reynaud. At the first meeting, Halifax raised Italian mediation and remarked “…we must face the fact that it is not so much now a question of imposing a complete defeat upon Germany, but of safeguarding the independence of our own Empire and if possible that of France.” Churchill’s response was forthright: “We must ensure our complete liberty and independence. We must oppose any negotiations which might lead to a derogation of our right and power.” Halifax, the realist, retorted that he was convinced that Britain was not strong enough to face Germany alone. Churchill then went to meet Reynaud for lunch.
The second meeting of the War Cabinet started at 2pm. Churchill opened by revealing that he had told Reynaud that Britain was not prepared to surrender and would rather go down fighting than to be enslaved to Germany. Halifax said that an approach to Italy should be made, and that he believed that Mussolini could persuade Hitler to be more reasonable. Churchill said he thought that any mediation plan would fail and postponed further discussion for a future Cabinet meeting.
At the third meeting of the day, Halifax continued to lobby for his Italian plan. To pacify him, it was agreed that Halifax could draft a communication to Mussolini, which would be discussed the next day.
The negotiation proposal was the second War Cabinet meeting’s main topic on the agenda on Monday 27th. Churchill ensured that Sinclair, the Liberal Leader and anti-appeaser, was present. Essentially, Halifax’s memo suggested that Britain and France jointly ask Roosevelt to get the Italians to organise a peace conference with Germany. However, Halifax said that since drafting the proposal, he had been informed of bad relations between Roosevelt and Mussolini, so perhaps it would be better if we approached the Duce directly ourselves?
The entire War Cabinet rejected the concept of a direct approach to the Italian dictator. The most vocal opponent was Archibald Sinclair, around whom others rallied. Churchill then skilfully entered the discussion and made the case against direct approaches to Mussolini. Such a move, he said, would destroy the prestige of Britain, as well as sap her fighting morale. Churchill continued that he would not join France in requesting terms for ceasefire, but that he would consider any offer received. Halifax was angry that Churchill had completely rejected his proposal out of hand, and said that he resented the suggestion that his approach amounted to suing for peace. For the moment, the question of indirect contact through Roosevelt remained hanging in the wind, but it was clear that Halifax had been rebuffed, and he even threatened to resign as Foreign Secretary.
At the War Cabinet meeting on Tuesday 28th, Halifax returned to the fray. He said that he could not see the harm in pursuing some form of mediation. Churchill replied: “We should get no worse terms if we went on fighting, even if we were beaten, than were open to us now.” Crucially, Chamberlain vocally supported Churchill and argued that any negotiations involved a considerable gamble.
At 6.15pm, Churchill met the Outer Cabinet and, after making a legendary speech, secured their unanimous support for fighting on and rejecting peace talks. By 7pm, when the War Cabinet reconvened, Halifax realised that he was completely isolated. The end came when the telegrams were received from Robert Menzies and Jan Smuts (Prime Ministers of Australia and South Africa) declaring that they would fight on, even if they had to do so alone. The Government then turned its attention to the Dunkirk evacuation.
Winston Churchill rejected Realism in favour of principle and idealism. In May 1940, Britain was fighting for her survival and had no strategy for defeating Germany. Halifax believed that we should cut our loses, explore a deal and retain as much power as we could. Churchill’s approach was pure Micawberism, but without it the Third Reich would have ruled Europe. The following year, the U.K. became increasingly dependent upon support received from America and the Commonwealth. How would we have felt if our benefactors had grown tired of the burden and attempted to force us into a negotiated settlement with Hitler? Would we have been content to cede parts of our territory to pacify a dictator? Thankfully, Britain had the resolve to continue and our allies remained true.
Adrian Lee is a Solicitor-Advocate in London, specialising in criminal defence, and was twice a Conservative Parliamentary Candidate.
As the war in Ukraine enters its second year, there have been increasing numbers of foreign policy commentators calling for “realism” to be applied by the NATO countries.
Realism, in this context, is far more than an appeal for common sense. Here, it is used to signify a specific school of thought in international relations. Exponents argue that states are the main actors in foreign policies, as opposed to either moral values or individual leaders. The biggest states desire power within their local hemispheres to ensure their self-preservation. Rival power blocs emerge, and on occasion alliances are forged between societies with different values, if it materially benefits them.
Hence, during the height of the Communist China’s Cultural Revolution, the arch realist Henry Kissinger had no moral qualms in laying the foundations for a pact between the U.S.A. and Mao. The aim of realists is peaceful co-existence between the Great Powers, hence Kissinger’s proclamation in the mid-1970s that he expected the USSR to survive for hundreds of years.
Realist strategies were subsequently rejected by the idealist Ronald Reagan, who declared the Soviet Union “evil”, challenged its legitimacy and ultimately won the Cold War.
Currently, most Realists in academia and journalism do not believe that Ukraine can win the war. The Realists range from the outright opponents of Western military aid, to those who adopt pained expressions and fret about the possibilities of escalation. Most emphasise the necessity of forcing Ukraine into a negotiated settlement with Vladimir Putin.
The realism versus idealism debate was at the heart of discussions at the highest level of government in the U.K. in the month of May 1940. On Friday 10th May, the German Wehrmacht launched its blitzkrieg against the West by invading the Low Countries. On the same day, Winston Churchill became Prime Minister. The new War Cabinet included three Conservative members (Churchill, Chamberlain and Halifax) and two Labour (Clement Attlee and Arthur Greenwood), with three other Minsters attending War Cabinet meetings when required (the Conservative Anthony Eden, the socialist A.V. Alexander and the Liberal Leader, Sir Archibald Sinclair).
Within ten days, the Germans had sliced through France, by-passed Paris, and were fast approaching the channel ports. Preparations for the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force were hurriedly being made. On Friday 24th May, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, raised at War Cabinet a telegram received from the French government, suggesting that Britain could contact Roosevelt and ask him to persuade Italy’s Mussolini (still officially neutral) to act as an intermediary in a future negotiated settlement with the Nazis. Halifax said that he would support such a move, so long as Roosevelt maintained the fiction that the idea was entirely his own.
The following day, the War Cabinet met again to discuss a report from the Chiefs of Staff entitled British Strategy in a Certain Eventuality. The Chiefs’ conclusions were bleak. In the event of France collapsing, Britain could continue to resist, but only if the RAF and Royal Navy remained operationally effective. Later, in the afternoon of the 25th, Halifax had a meeting with the Italian Ambassador to discuss the possibility of mediating a general European peace conference.
Sunday 26th May included three War Cabinet meetings and a visit from French Premier, Paul Reynaud. At the first meeting, Halifax raised Italian mediation and remarked “…we must face the fact that it is not so much now a question of imposing a complete defeat upon Germany, but of safeguarding the independence of our own Empire and if possible that of France.” Churchill’s response was forthright: “We must ensure our complete liberty and independence. We must oppose any negotiations which might lead to a derogation of our right and power.” Halifax, the realist, retorted that he was convinced that Britain was not strong enough to face Germany alone. Churchill then went to meet Reynaud for lunch.
The second meeting of the War Cabinet started at 2pm. Churchill opened by revealing that he had told Reynaud that Britain was not prepared to surrender and would rather go down fighting than to be enslaved to Germany. Halifax said that an approach to Italy should be made, and that he believed that Mussolini could persuade Hitler to be more reasonable. Churchill said he thought that any mediation plan would fail and postponed further discussion for a future Cabinet meeting.
At the third meeting of the day, Halifax continued to lobby for his Italian plan. To pacify him, it was agreed that Halifax could draft a communication to Mussolini, which would be discussed the next day.
The negotiation proposal was the second War Cabinet meeting’s main topic on the agenda on Monday 27th. Churchill ensured that Sinclair, the Liberal Leader and anti-appeaser, was present. Essentially, Halifax’s memo suggested that Britain and France jointly ask Roosevelt to get the Italians to organise a peace conference with Germany. However, Halifax said that since drafting the proposal, he had been informed of bad relations between Roosevelt and Mussolini, so perhaps it would be better if we approached the Duce directly ourselves?
The entire War Cabinet rejected the concept of a direct approach to the Italian dictator. The most vocal opponent was Archibald Sinclair, around whom others rallied. Churchill then skilfully entered the discussion and made the case against direct approaches to Mussolini. Such a move, he said, would destroy the prestige of Britain, as well as sap her fighting morale. Churchill continued that he would not join France in requesting terms for ceasefire, but that he would consider any offer received. Halifax was angry that Churchill had completely rejected his proposal out of hand, and said that he resented the suggestion that his approach amounted to suing for peace. For the moment, the question of indirect contact through Roosevelt remained hanging in the wind, but it was clear that Halifax had been rebuffed, and he even threatened to resign as Foreign Secretary.
At the War Cabinet meeting on Tuesday 28th, Halifax returned to the fray. He said that he could not see the harm in pursuing some form of mediation. Churchill replied: “We should get no worse terms if we went on fighting, even if we were beaten, than were open to us now.” Crucially, Chamberlain vocally supported Churchill and argued that any negotiations involved a considerable gamble.
At 6.15pm, Churchill met the Outer Cabinet and, after making a legendary speech, secured their unanimous support for fighting on and rejecting peace talks. By 7pm, when the War Cabinet reconvened, Halifax realised that he was completely isolated. The end came when the telegrams were received from Robert Menzies and Jan Smuts (Prime Ministers of Australia and South Africa) declaring that they would fight on, even if they had to do so alone. The Government then turned its attention to the Dunkirk evacuation.
Winston Churchill rejected Realism in favour of principle and idealism. In May 1940, Britain was fighting for her survival and had no strategy for defeating Germany. Halifax believed that we should cut our loses, explore a deal and retain as much power as we could. Churchill’s approach was pure Micawberism, but without it the Third Reich would have ruled Europe. The following year, the U.K. became increasingly dependent upon support received from America and the Commonwealth. How would we have felt if our benefactors had grown tired of the burden and attempted to force us into a negotiated settlement with Hitler? Would we have been content to cede parts of our territory to pacify a dictator? Thankfully, Britain had the resolve to continue and our allies remained true.