Ukraine has launched its long-awaited spring counter-offensive – so long-awaited, in fact, that it’s coming in early summer. Despite Vladimir Putin’s best efforts to slow down Kyiv’s progress by destroying the Novaya Kakhovka Dam, Ukraine claims to have already liberated four villages in the Donetsk region in the country’s south-east.
Volodymyr Zelensky’s public position remains that the offensive’s objective is the total reclamation of those areas of Ukraine currently under Russian control – including Crimea. But that appears unlikely in the short-term. As David Patrikarakos details, a much more realistic aim is to sever the so-called “land bridge” linking Russia with occupied areas and Crimea.
By splitting Moscow’s forces fighting in the Donbas from those positioned further south, Zelensky aims to disrupt Putin’s ability to intervene militarily in those areas he claims as Russian territory. It would be an essential step towards reclaiming Donetsk and Luhansk for Kyiv for the first time since 2014 – as well as enabling them to threaten Putin’s hold over Crimea.
So far, anyone betting against Ukrainian success in the war will have lost their shirt. Their determination has been an inspiration to us all. Nonetheless, any armchair generals hoping for a front-wide Russian collapse – imagine Germany at the end of the First World War – should temper their optimism. Moscow has had months to construct formidable defences around crucial targets such as Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.
Ukraine’s push is driven not only by the military fundamentals, but political ones. Zelensky needs this offensive to not only fight for his country’s liberation, but to prove to his Western allies that their support for him this last year has not been in vain. The aim is not only to break Russian lines and morale but to prove to the United States that Kyiv remains a worthwhile investment.
Washington has spent over $70 billion in backing Ukraine: the first time a European country has been the top recipient of American foreign aid since the Marshall Plan after the Second World War. It is also far more than the contributions of Britain, Europe, and elsewhere in the world combined. Without Washington’s largesse, Zelensky would be stuffed. Every Churchill needs his Lend Lease.
This was confirmed by the recent Pentagon leaks which revealed worrying deficiencies in Ukraine’s missile supplies. The demands of this spring offensive combined with keeping air defences going have put a severe strain on the country’s ammunition stockpiles, amid fears its allies are unable to replenish stocks as quickly as the Russians. This makes further American aid even more urgent.
The problem for Zelensky is that support for his country’s cause amongst American voters is not what it was. This is especially true among our Republican cousins. Fewer Republicans support financial support to Ukraine than oppose it, by a margin of 38 to 43 per cent. Democrats expect a Ukrainian victory by a 19-point margin. Republicans expect a Russian one, by a 17-point one.
This has implications for the race for the Republican nomination ahead of next year’s Presidential election. Majorities of supporters of Ron DeSantis – the lockdown and Disney-phobic Florida Governor – oppose providing Kyiv with either financial supporters or those fighter jets for which Zelensky yearns. Accordingly, DeSantis described Russia as not “a vital interest to the United States”.
Yet as with so much of the DeSantis campaign, whatever he can do on Ukraine skepticism, the frontrunner can do better: a certain Donald J. Trump. The ex-President has said the war – perhaps correctly – would not have occurred on his watch. He pledges to meet with both Putin and Zelensky upon returning to office – and settle the conflict within 24 hours.
When asked at a recent campaign event if he wanted Russia or Ukraine to emerge victorious, Trump responded that his priority was for “everybody to stop dying”. A noble sentiment, but hardly what Kyiv wants to hear. What will have weighed on Zelensky’s mind more is that such comments received a mighty clap and cheer from the audience.
The question that Ukraine will be asking is that if Republican candidates and voters are this disillusioned with their plight after just over a year of fighting, what on Earth will they be like next November – and in the White House? Are we going to see Trump and DeSantis compete over pledges not to send a dime more to Kyiv? Trump’s grumbles about NATO’s finances need no introduction.
Zelensky needs this counteroffensive to be as successful as possible to try and guard against any wavering American commitment. That will be a tough ask. Barring a Russian collapse, what this summer might show is that talk – both in Ukraine, and amongst Western commentators – that suggestions of Kyiv’s imminently forcing Russia out of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea were rather premature.
So far, support for Ukraine has been a bipartisan issue in Washington, whatever tittle-tattle has emerged from Mar-a-Largo. If Joe Biden remains in the White House, aid to Ukraine will continue. But both Niall Ferguson and Dominic Cummings – two men whose opinions on history and politics I take seriously – suggest a Trump return is an increasingly likely prospect.
As such, expect commentary on the conflict’s future to turn increasingly from what a battlefield triumph looks like, to what sort of resolution could be achieved through diplomacy. Putin’s invasion was partially triggered by Biden’s unwillingness to agree to an American withdrawal from Ukraine. That would not be a red line for Trump, even if negotiations would be against Ukraine’s will.
Of course, Ukrainian territory being handed over to Moscow would send an appalling message. The line has always been that Ukraine’s future is for Kyiv to decide. Yet – as grotesque as it is to suggest – how long can that position be maintained if Washington cuts off aid? With Trump back in the White House, it would be far more likely that we would see Putin re-integrated into the international community than on trial for war crimes. Just look at Bashar Al-Assad.
Europe is unable to take America’s place. Paris, Berlin, and Brussels have always considered the conflict a costly inconvenience. Poland may one day be a great power, but not for a decade or more. This leaves the country which Ukrainians have voted the best performer internationally when it comes to support: the United Kingdom.
Keeping in with the Americans has been the fundamental core of British foreign policy since Suez. For all the babble about “splendid isolation”, we have also been historically more internationalist than our Atlantic cousins. Robbed of the sense of mission provided by the Second World War and the global struggles against Communism and Islamism, they are reverting to their mean. Is Whitehall ready to be left high and dry?
How realistic would our stance on Ukraine remain without American support? Already, Rishi Sunak has stepped back from the hawkishness of Boris Johnson and Liz Truss by prioritising Britain’s role in North Sea and eastern Atlantic over peacocking in the South China Sea. It might be driven by his fondness for spreadsheets, but he has injected a welcome dose of realism back into our foreign policy.
But one of the few areas of continuity between Sunak and his two predecessors is to hug Zelensky tight. We may no longer be speaking loudly and carrying a small stick, but we are still happily sawing off half that stick to send to Kyiv. Doing so is virtuous. But the fact remains: in a pinch, pleasing America will always be more important to us than pleasing Ukraine.
Unlike across the pond, Ukraine remains a cross-party cause in Westminster. Our policy would be unlikely to change much under Keir Starmer (even with the terrifying prospect of David Lammy as Foreign Secretary). So the question bares asking. Our support for Ukraine is noble. But how long would it survive the return of Donald Trump?