Duncan Simpson is Executive Director of the Adam Smith Institute.
Rishi Sunak’s flying visit to Dubai for COP28 was business as usual for such gatherings. Vaunting speeches and costly pledges were made, with the usual combination of rich countries apologising for using their own natural resources, and developing ones requesting further such genuflections.
The Government’s current plans, likely to be shared by any looming Labour administration, will commit us to high levels of public spending to reach the 2050 Net Zero target. Since the total costs over the next 30 years will be vast if such a scheme remains in place, there are more cost-effective options that the Government should prioritise. Top of the list should be accelerating nuclear development.
The UK has a generally positive attitude towards nuclear power, unlike our German cousins, who have recently endured the disastrous experience of shutting down the entirety of their nuclear fleet. But while the UK has an increasingly diverse energy mix, nuclear has long played second fiddle to other forms of energy production.
Most existing sites are currently scheduled to close by 2030. The annual share of electricity provided from nuclear power fell to 14.9 per cent in 2021, a marked decline over the previous 20-year period. Approval for the construction of nuclear power is sclerotic and too often inhibited by government bureaucracy and inaction.
As with many types of infrastructure projects in the UK, the difficulty in getting requisite government support -even tacitly- is a barrier to new nuclear power development. Ostensibly, the Great British Nuclear (GBN) competition – announced in March 2023 – has the principal initial objective of supporting the development of small modular reactors (SMRs) to meet the UK’s statutory Net Zero targets, with the ‘winning’ technologies co-funded by government.
Yet this programme – alongside broader siting and licencing conditions that are both within and separate to GBN – may limit the ability of privately funded nuclear developers to progress at pace. Lengthy and proscriptive competitions may put off potential new suppliers (rather than the more established firms that have long operated in the UK).
This slowness can be seen in several ways, but particularly pertinent is the Government’s reticence to provide support to innovative (Generation IV reactor) technologies, which have little track record. In short, they put time into existing technologies at the expense of more innovative opportunities.
GBN is a good initiative and makes a lot of sense: competitive public tendering often means better results for the taxpayer (especially when the potential outlays could run into billions of pounds). But the approach of the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero should be more ‘technology neutral’. This could mean establishing a contract for difference (CfD) price more widely, rather than the ‘picking winners’ approach taken more recently.
Separately, the UK is at a particular advantage with new types of nuclear fuel that are readily available and do not require additional mining. Sellafield holds around 100 tonnes of plutonium which can be re-used to create mixed oxide (MOX) fuel (a combination of plutonium oxide powder and depleted uranium).
This can – in turn – be used in a growing number of reactor types, such as advanced modular reactors (AMRs). Though they provide a lot less power than the likes of Hinkley, they are far quicker and cheaper to construct, and utilise a lot less space.
Moreover, since nuclear sites are typically owned by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority or other players in the national nuclear network, explicit approval from the Government to acquire or utilise such land is often difficult to obtain. Swift approval (or granting of no objection) therefore needs to take place for acquisition of first and then ideally multiple sites. This is especially vital for firms who are making smaller reactors: just one or two sites might not be economically viable.
But after five or six – and guarantees about pricing – this becomes a better option and therefore could attract more firms who might not otherwise think of the UK as a location in which to build. And in turn, this could mean cheaper electricity for consumers when it’s sold onto the grid.
There’s no reason for the UK to be a laggard on this. To speed things up even more, the UK should introduce a type of mutual recognition of standards for AMR projects, such as by looking to best practice and prolific construction in France and Japan. All of the existing nuclear plants are scheduled to close by 2036 in the UK, so this government and the next must demonstrate urgency on this.
The rights and wrongs of putting Net Zero on to the statute books – and the different methods and costs that go with it – will no doubt be debated for decades to come. And numerous other COPs in the coming years will try and address this. But prioritising swifter approvals, using existing nuclear waste stockpiles for fuel, and embracing the latest technology are vital tools the UK should use to ensure the security of our nuclear supply.
Duncan Simpson is Executive Director of the Adam Smith Institute.
Rishi Sunak’s flying visit to Dubai for COP28 was business as usual for such gatherings. Vaunting speeches and costly pledges were made, with the usual combination of rich countries apologising for using their own natural resources, and developing ones requesting further such genuflections.
The Government’s current plans, likely to be shared by any looming Labour administration, will commit us to high levels of public spending to reach the 2050 Net Zero target. Since the total costs over the next 30 years will be vast if such a scheme remains in place, there are more cost-effective options that the Government should prioritise. Top of the list should be accelerating nuclear development.
The UK has a generally positive attitude towards nuclear power, unlike our German cousins, who have recently endured the disastrous experience of shutting down the entirety of their nuclear fleet. But while the UK has an increasingly diverse energy mix, nuclear has long played second fiddle to other forms of energy production.
Most existing sites are currently scheduled to close by 2030. The annual share of electricity provided from nuclear power fell to 14.9 per cent in 2021, a marked decline over the previous 20-year period. Approval for the construction of nuclear power is sclerotic and too often inhibited by government bureaucracy and inaction.
As with many types of infrastructure projects in the UK, the difficulty in getting requisite government support -even tacitly- is a barrier to new nuclear power development. Ostensibly, the Great British Nuclear (GBN) competition – announced in March 2023 – has the principal initial objective of supporting the development of small modular reactors (SMRs) to meet the UK’s statutory Net Zero targets, with the ‘winning’ technologies co-funded by government.
Yet this programme – alongside broader siting and licencing conditions that are both within and separate to GBN – may limit the ability of privately funded nuclear developers to progress at pace. Lengthy and proscriptive competitions may put off potential new suppliers (rather than the more established firms that have long operated in the UK).
This slowness can be seen in several ways, but particularly pertinent is the Government’s reticence to provide support to innovative (Generation IV reactor) technologies, which have little track record. In short, they put time into existing technologies at the expense of more innovative opportunities.
GBN is a good initiative and makes a lot of sense: competitive public tendering often means better results for the taxpayer (especially when the potential outlays could run into billions of pounds). But the approach of the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero should be more ‘technology neutral’. This could mean establishing a contract for difference (CfD) price more widely, rather than the ‘picking winners’ approach taken more recently.
Separately, the UK is at a particular advantage with new types of nuclear fuel that are readily available and do not require additional mining. Sellafield holds around 100 tonnes of plutonium which can be re-used to create mixed oxide (MOX) fuel (a combination of plutonium oxide powder and depleted uranium).
This can – in turn – be used in a growing number of reactor types, such as advanced modular reactors (AMRs). Though they provide a lot less power than the likes of Hinkley, they are far quicker and cheaper to construct, and utilise a lot less space.
Moreover, since nuclear sites are typically owned by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority or other players in the national nuclear network, explicit approval from the Government to acquire or utilise such land is often difficult to obtain. Swift approval (or granting of no objection) therefore needs to take place for acquisition of first and then ideally multiple sites. This is especially vital for firms who are making smaller reactors: just one or two sites might not be economically viable.
But after five or six – and guarantees about pricing – this becomes a better option and therefore could attract more firms who might not otherwise think of the UK as a location in which to build. And in turn, this could mean cheaper electricity for consumers when it’s sold onto the grid.
There’s no reason for the UK to be a laggard on this. To speed things up even more, the UK should introduce a type of mutual recognition of standards for AMR projects, such as by looking to best practice and prolific construction in France and Japan. All of the existing nuclear plants are scheduled to close by 2036 in the UK, so this government and the next must demonstrate urgency on this.
The rights and wrongs of putting Net Zero on to the statute books – and the different methods and costs that go with it – will no doubt be debated for decades to come. And numerous other COPs in the coming years will try and address this. But prioritising swifter approvals, using existing nuclear waste stockpiles for fuel, and embracing the latest technology are vital tools the UK should use to ensure the security of our nuclear supply.