David Snoxell has been Coordinator of the Chagos Islands (BIOT) APPG since 2008. He was British High Commissioner to Mauritius, 2000-04, and Deputy Commissioner of the BIOT, 1995-7.
My last Chagos piece, one year ago on 28 December 2022, expressed the hope that 2023 would be my final post and that a satisfactory conclusion to the UK/Mauritius negotiations announced in a statement on 3 November 2022 would be reached. Why the hold-up?
This statement said that negotiations on the exercise of sovereignty over BIOT/Chagos Archipelago would take into account relevant legal proceedings to secure an agreement based on international law and concluded that “The UK and Mauritius have agreed to engage in constructive negotiations, with a view to arriving at an agreement by early next year”. Since then, the UK has held seven negotiating sessions with Mauritius and four online consultations with various Chagossian groups.
The target of an agreement by early 2023 was always to my mind overly ambitious. Whilst the negotiations primarily addressed the exercise of sovereignty and the long-term future of the UK/US base on Diego Garcia, the agenda also included “bilateral cooperation on a range of other issues”. Although confidential, some ideas of progress can be gleaned from repetitive updates to Parliament.
On 17 March 2023 the Foreign Secretary, in a written ministerial statement announced that “These discussions have built understanding between the two sides, and covered issues relating to ensuring the continued effective operation of the joint UK/US military base on Diego Garcia; resettlement of the former inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago; strengthening our cooperation on a range of issues such as environmental and marine protection, improving security and tackling illegal activities in the region. The UK and Mauritius have taken stock of negotiations and agreed next steps. The two Prime Ministers spoke on 14 February, welcomed the progress to date and agreed to continue negotiations, with a view to arriving at an agreement in the coming months.”
To an oral question on 13 June 2023 the Foreign Secretary replied “I am not able to give a date or a projected date of when we will conclude these negotiations. We want to ensure that we conclude them successfully. Our shared objective is to ensure the continued effective operation of the joint UK-US defence facility on Diego Garcia, protecting the vital role it plays in both regional and global security.”
Clearly, the negotiations have US backing. In answer on 22 June 2023, the Foreign Office announced, “The US fully supports the process of bilateral negotiations between the UK and Mauritius on the exercise of sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago”. This was confirmed recently by Anthony Blinken when he met David Cameron on 7 December 2023 with Blinken telling the Press “This is a bilateral matter for the UK and Mauritius to work out and we support their engagement to resolve the differences”.
This is the most likely cause for delay in reaching an agreement on the future arrangements for the base. When the UK excised these islands, it was on condition they would be “returned when no longer needed for defence purposes” (under the Lancaster House Agreement 1965). The Outer Islands have never been a defence requirement.
There is therefore no difficulty with the UK returning the 55 Outer Islands, many of which are over 100 miles from Diego Garcia. This proposal nearly came to fruition in 2002 had it not been for 9/11 in 2001.
Confidence is at the heart of achieving a satisfactory solution. Mauritius has made its support for the base clear by offering a 99-year lease. Although the Mauritian government holds firmly to its position that per international law it must exercise full sovereign rights over the territory, the use of the term “exercise of sovereignty” in the 2022 joint statement would not rule out an interim solution whereby the UK administers Diego Garcia on behalf of Mauritius for a defined period, say until 2036 when the 1966 UK/US agreement comes to an end.
Alternatively, all islands could be subject now to Mauritian law but with jurisdiction over the base and UK and US personnel governed by visiting forces agreements as is standard practice elsewhere. Others have suggested an arrangement such as the sovereign base agreement that the UK holds with Cyprus. The bilateral talks have likely discussed these possible solutions.
The security of the Indian Ocean is not called into question by these talks. China does not represent a present threat in the area, and it may never be. Mauritius recently allowed India to build an airfield on its island of Agalega to extend the range of Indian maritime patrol aircraft. Together with the French base on Reunion (130 miles from Mauritius) and the UK/US on Diego Garcia, the Indian Ocean remains an area dominated by Western and regional players.
The potential for an alliance comprising UK, US, Mauritius, France, Australia, and India would act as a bulwark in the Indian Ocean against supposed Chinese threats and would moreover reflect the objectives of the UK’s 2021 updated defence review published on 13 March 2023 with its core tenet of the UK’s approach in the Indo-Pacific that “territorial integrity is respected and disputes resolved”.
Nonetheless, in a clear attempt to destabilise the negotiations, the press has reported alarmist claims by a few politicians and academics in the US and UK, that Mauritius would hand the islands over to China for a military base, and/or that Britain is breaking off the negotiations. But where is the evidence? As a member of the Commonwealth, Mauritius’ closest ties have long been with India, and it maintains excellent relations with the UK, US, and France. It is inconceivable that Mauritius would prioritise future relations with China over any agreement with the UK/US concerning Diego Garcia.
The UK’s claim to sovereignty over the islands was backed by a Policy Exchange Report in November 2023. But the report is flawed, ignoring as it does that the claim is invalidated by the customary international law norm of self-determination which applied in 1965 when the UK detached the Chagos Islands from the colony of Mauritius.
An analogy often made with Falklands and Gibraltar is false since Chagos was always part of Mauritius. Self-determination belongs collectively to all Mauritians, whether in Mauritius, Chagos, Agalega or Rodrigues. In contrast, the right of the inhabitants of Gibraltar and Falklands to decide their own future is independent of what Spain and Argentina may think.
In 2019 the ICJ ruled that detachment had been illegal and that Chagos remained part of Mauritius. This was confirmed by a judgement of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) on 28 April 2023. For the UK, an architect of international law and a founding father of the UN system, a negotiated settlement to this long-standing dispute is inescapable. Otherwise, we stand accused of double standards over our support for Ukraine and territorial disputes in the South China Sea and elsewhere.
Most members of the Chagos Islands APPG support the current UK/Mauritius negotiations to reach an overall settlement of all issues. Importantly, the APPG has always advocated the right of Chagossians to return to the islands and to resettle, irrespective of how many may wish to do so permanently. Mauritius has offered to facilitate and contribute financially to resettlement of Chagossians wherever they live in the world while the UK government has firmly opposed resettlement since 2016.
When I was British High Commissioner to Mauritius, I concluded the problems of Chagos could be resolved but that it would require a negotiated settlement with Mauritius and provision for resettlement of Chagossians who wanted to return. After retirement, I had a letter published in The Times in 2007 which asked, “Is it not time that HMG brought together Chagossian leaders, Mauritius and the US to sort out this relic of the Cold War and rectify one of the worst violations of fundamental human rights perpetrated by the UK in the twentieth century?”
David Snoxell has been Coordinator of the Chagos Islands (BIOT) APPG since 2008. He was British High Commissioner to Mauritius, 2000-04, and Deputy Commissioner of the BIOT, 1995-7.
My last Chagos piece, one year ago on 28 December 2022, expressed the hope that 2023 would be my final post and that a satisfactory conclusion to the UK/Mauritius negotiations announced in a statement on 3 November 2022 would be reached. Why the hold-up?
This statement said that negotiations on the exercise of sovereignty over BIOT/Chagos Archipelago would take into account relevant legal proceedings to secure an agreement based on international law and concluded that “The UK and Mauritius have agreed to engage in constructive negotiations, with a view to arriving at an agreement by early next year”. Since then, the UK has held seven negotiating sessions with Mauritius and four online consultations with various Chagossian groups.
The target of an agreement by early 2023 was always to my mind overly ambitious. Whilst the negotiations primarily addressed the exercise of sovereignty and the long-term future of the UK/US base on Diego Garcia, the agenda also included “bilateral cooperation on a range of other issues”. Although confidential, some ideas of progress can be gleaned from repetitive updates to Parliament.
On 17 March 2023 the Foreign Secretary, in a written ministerial statement announced that “These discussions have built understanding between the two sides, and covered issues relating to ensuring the continued effective operation of the joint UK/US military base on Diego Garcia; resettlement of the former inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago; strengthening our cooperation on a range of issues such as environmental and marine protection, improving security and tackling illegal activities in the region. The UK and Mauritius have taken stock of negotiations and agreed next steps. The two Prime Ministers spoke on 14 February, welcomed the progress to date and agreed to continue negotiations, with a view to arriving at an agreement in the coming months.”
To an oral question on 13 June 2023 the Foreign Secretary replied “I am not able to give a date or a projected date of when we will conclude these negotiations. We want to ensure that we conclude them successfully. Our shared objective is to ensure the continued effective operation of the joint UK-US defence facility on Diego Garcia, protecting the vital role it plays in both regional and global security.”
Clearly, the negotiations have US backing. In answer on 22 June 2023, the Foreign Office announced, “The US fully supports the process of bilateral negotiations between the UK and Mauritius on the exercise of sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago”. This was confirmed recently by Anthony Blinken when he met David Cameron on 7 December 2023 with Blinken telling the Press “This is a bilateral matter for the UK and Mauritius to work out and we support their engagement to resolve the differences”.
This is the most likely cause for delay in reaching an agreement on the future arrangements for the base. When the UK excised these islands, it was on condition they would be “returned when no longer needed for defence purposes” (under the Lancaster House Agreement 1965). The Outer Islands have never been a defence requirement.
There is therefore no difficulty with the UK returning the 55 Outer Islands, many of which are over 100 miles from Diego Garcia. This proposal nearly came to fruition in 2002 had it not been for 9/11 in 2001.
Confidence is at the heart of achieving a satisfactory solution. Mauritius has made its support for the base clear by offering a 99-year lease. Although the Mauritian government holds firmly to its position that per international law it must exercise full sovereign rights over the territory, the use of the term “exercise of sovereignty” in the 2022 joint statement would not rule out an interim solution whereby the UK administers Diego Garcia on behalf of Mauritius for a defined period, say until 2036 when the 1966 UK/US agreement comes to an end.
Alternatively, all islands could be subject now to Mauritian law but with jurisdiction over the base and UK and US personnel governed by visiting forces agreements as is standard practice elsewhere. Others have suggested an arrangement such as the sovereign base agreement that the UK holds with Cyprus. The bilateral talks have likely discussed these possible solutions.
The security of the Indian Ocean is not called into question by these talks. China does not represent a present threat in the area, and it may never be. Mauritius recently allowed India to build an airfield on its island of Agalega to extend the range of Indian maritime patrol aircraft. Together with the French base on Reunion (130 miles from Mauritius) and the UK/US on Diego Garcia, the Indian Ocean remains an area dominated by Western and regional players.
The potential for an alliance comprising UK, US, Mauritius, France, Australia, and India would act as a bulwark in the Indian Ocean against supposed Chinese threats and would moreover reflect the objectives of the UK’s 2021 updated defence review published on 13 March 2023 with its core tenet of the UK’s approach in the Indo-Pacific that “territorial integrity is respected and disputes resolved”.
Nonetheless, in a clear attempt to destabilise the negotiations, the press has reported alarmist claims by a few politicians and academics in the US and UK, that Mauritius would hand the islands over to China for a military base, and/or that Britain is breaking off the negotiations. But where is the evidence? As a member of the Commonwealth, Mauritius’ closest ties have long been with India, and it maintains excellent relations with the UK, US, and France. It is inconceivable that Mauritius would prioritise future relations with China over any agreement with the UK/US concerning Diego Garcia.
The UK’s claim to sovereignty over the islands was backed by a Policy Exchange Report in November 2023. But the report is flawed, ignoring as it does that the claim is invalidated by the customary international law norm of self-determination which applied in 1965 when the UK detached the Chagos Islands from the colony of Mauritius.
An analogy often made with Falklands and Gibraltar is false since Chagos was always part of Mauritius. Self-determination belongs collectively to all Mauritians, whether in Mauritius, Chagos, Agalega or Rodrigues. In contrast, the right of the inhabitants of Gibraltar and Falklands to decide their own future is independent of what Spain and Argentina may think.
In 2019 the ICJ ruled that detachment had been illegal and that Chagos remained part of Mauritius. This was confirmed by a judgement of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) on 28 April 2023. For the UK, an architect of international law and a founding father of the UN system, a negotiated settlement to this long-standing dispute is inescapable. Otherwise, we stand accused of double standards over our support for Ukraine and territorial disputes in the South China Sea and elsewhere.
Most members of the Chagos Islands APPG support the current UK/Mauritius negotiations to reach an overall settlement of all issues. Importantly, the APPG has always advocated the right of Chagossians to return to the islands and to resettle, irrespective of how many may wish to do so permanently. Mauritius has offered to facilitate and contribute financially to resettlement of Chagossians wherever they live in the world while the UK government has firmly opposed resettlement since 2016.
When I was British High Commissioner to Mauritius, I concluded the problems of Chagos could be resolved but that it would require a negotiated settlement with Mauritius and provision for resettlement of Chagossians who wanted to return. After retirement, I had a letter published in The Times in 2007 which asked, “Is it not time that HMG brought together Chagossian leaders, Mauritius and the US to sort out this relic of the Cold War and rectify one of the worst violations of fundamental human rights perpetrated by the UK in the twentieth century?”