Mark Wegierski is a Toronto-based, Canadian writer and historical researcher. He has been published in The Hill Times (Ottawa), Calgary Herald, and Ottawa Citizen, among other publications.
On February 29 Brian Mulroney, the 18th prime minister of Canada, died. There is growing interest in the United Kingdom in the near-extinction of his Progressive Conservative Party (after winning a handsome majority at the previous election) – but what lessons does history actually have to teach the British Tories?
It had appeared, in the summer of 1987, that Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative federal government was headed for one of the worst defeats in Canadian political history. In many of the 1986 and 1987 polls, the federal PCs stood at about a quarter of committed popular support, behind both the Liberals and the New Democratic Party (NDP), Canada’s social democrats. Indeed, the NDP had temporarily surged into first place.
Despite the early hopes placed on him, and his overwhelming majority (won in 1984), Mulroney was being buffeted about almost continuously by major and minor crises and scandals, and it could be argued had failed to develop any coherent or consistent public policy. It appeared that he had alienated or offended virtually every region, province, or interest group in Canada.
Sometimes, it looked as if his only true supporters were his business pals, for whose benefit he appeared to make most of his personal exertions, and his government seemed, in many important areas, incapable of formulating and implementing serious policy decisions, let alone winning popular support for them.
In almost every area, Mulroney gave the impression of having little agenda beyond maintaining, or strengthening, the status-quo of the previous federal Liberal governments.
He did, however, appear to have a real interest in free trade. Throughout most of Canadian history, the Tories had opposed free trade with the United States, while the Liberals had championed it. In the 1980s, however, the roles were reversed.
Indeed John Turner, the Liberal contender in 1988 (who expressed considerable patriotic sentiments, and was often perceived as a “right-wing Liberal”) could be seen as, comparatively speaking, more traditionalist and conservative on this score than Mulroney.
The Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, ironically, gave Mulroney the one, perfect issue, on which to wage the election of 1988. A simple issue, appealing to a combination of people’s fear and greed, it became the centrepiece of his efforts. The prime minister was able to win a strong majority in the federal election of November 21, 1988.
Of course, it could be argued that the true time of reckoning came in 1993, when the federal PCs were reduced to just two seats. Their coalition was torn apart, caught in a pincer between the Reform Party in Western Canada and the Bloc Québécois in Quebec, whilst Ontario voted heavily for the Liberal Party.
Presumably, Mulroney did not try for a third term because he sensed that a humiliating defeat was in the offing. Kim Campbell, his successor, proved a lacklustre prime minister, whilst the country was in recession. But his own policy failures, especially on the constitution and tax, were also to blame.
In 1987, Mulroney had brokered the Meech Lake Accord, a deal with the provinces which aimed to finally break Canada’s constitutional stalemate, which had been rolling since Pierre Trudeau had passed the Constitution Act in 1982. Quebec objected to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which allegedly undermined the its collective rights to uphold Quebec as a French-speaking and culturally distinctive province.
The central statement of the Meech Lake Accord was the recognition of Quebec as “a distinct society”. In return, Quebec would accede to the Constitution Act. But after three years of debate the deal was sunk, blocked by two smaller provinces and a perceived as a groundswell of popular resistance to it in most of English-speaking Canada, which united left and right.
Following this serious setback, Mulroney negotiated the Charlottetown Agreements of 1992. However, when put to a general, countrywide referendum in late 1992, they were rejected – and the PCs foundations in Quebec fatally undermined.
Meanwhile, near the end of his second term Mulroney had brought in the Goods & Services Tax (GST), the Canadian equivalent of the VAT (value-added tax). Set at seven per cent, it was applied to virtually all economic transactions in Canadian society. The Liberal contender in the 1993 election, Jean Chretien, explicitly promised to abolish the GST. (However, he never did so, and the revenue from the GST was doubtless a major element in the federal Liberals’ ability to have huge government spending but also to eventually balance the federal budget.)
During his premiership, Mulroney was plagued by a terrible combination: he was attacked by the media as both “sleazy” and “hard right” – while actually he was mostly a small-l liberal; for example, he raised immigration to the unprecedented level of about a quarter-million persons a year.
His “strong leadership” was mainly used to suppress any small-c conservatism in the federal Progressive Conservative Party. Indeed, Mulroney once said snidely that all the ideological conservatives in Canada could easily fit into a phone-booth.
In 1993, Mulroney left office with his popularity in the single digits. However, the rise of the Reform Party and the Bloc was somewhat unexpected. In 1993, Reform won 52 seats (all but 1 from Western Canada), and the Bloc won 54 seats in Quebec, thus becoming the Official Opposition. The Liberals won a strong majority.
Commentators in the UK, suggesting that the Conservative Party will be virtually wiped out in the forthcoming general election, are starting to invite parallels with the Canadian election of 1993. There is certainly some cleverness in Nigel Farage choosing the name “Reform” for his anti-system opposition movement.
However, it should be remembered that the rise of Reform guaranteed easy Liberal victories until 2003, when the Canadian Alliance (a rebranding of the Reform Party), and the remnants of the federal Progressive Conservatives, finally decided to merge, to be re-named as the Conservative Party (the original name of the party from decades ago).
I think it is an open question today whether Canada’s Conservative Party today is really “the Reform Party – Version Three”, as some alllege, or if in fact the Progressive Conservative influence (and various advancing societal velocities and trajectories) have diluted it thoroughly.
In other words, a rout for the Conservatives in the next general election might not produce results such dramatic results as some, looking at the Canadian precedent, might believe (or hope).
Mark Wegierski is a Toronto-based, Canadian writer and historical researcher. He has been published in The Hill Times (Ottawa), Calgary Herald, and Ottawa Citizen, among other publications.
On February 29 Brian Mulroney, the 18th prime minister of Canada, died. There is growing interest in the United Kingdom in the near-extinction of his Progressive Conservative Party (after winning a handsome majority at the previous election) – but what lessons does history actually have to teach the British Tories?
It had appeared, in the summer of 1987, that Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative federal government was headed for one of the worst defeats in Canadian political history. In many of the 1986 and 1987 polls, the federal PCs stood at about a quarter of committed popular support, behind both the Liberals and the New Democratic Party (NDP), Canada’s social democrats. Indeed, the NDP had temporarily surged into first place.
Despite the early hopes placed on him, and his overwhelming majority (won in 1984), Mulroney was being buffeted about almost continuously by major and minor crises and scandals, and it could be argued had failed to develop any coherent or consistent public policy. It appeared that he had alienated or offended virtually every region, province, or interest group in Canada.
Sometimes, it looked as if his only true supporters were his business pals, for whose benefit he appeared to make most of his personal exertions, and his government seemed, in many important areas, incapable of formulating and implementing serious policy decisions, let alone winning popular support for them.
In almost every area, Mulroney gave the impression of having little agenda beyond maintaining, or strengthening, the status-quo of the previous federal Liberal governments.
He did, however, appear to have a real interest in free trade. Throughout most of Canadian history, the Tories had opposed free trade with the United States, while the Liberals had championed it. In the 1980s, however, the roles were reversed.
Indeed John Turner, the Liberal contender in 1988 (who expressed considerable patriotic sentiments, and was often perceived as a “right-wing Liberal”) could be seen as, comparatively speaking, more traditionalist and conservative on this score than Mulroney.
The Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, ironically, gave Mulroney the one, perfect issue, on which to wage the election of 1988. A simple issue, appealing to a combination of people’s fear and greed, it became the centrepiece of his efforts. The prime minister was able to win a strong majority in the federal election of November 21, 1988.
Of course, it could be argued that the true time of reckoning came in 1993, when the federal PCs were reduced to just two seats. Their coalition was torn apart, caught in a pincer between the Reform Party in Western Canada and the Bloc Québécois in Quebec, whilst Ontario voted heavily for the Liberal Party.
Presumably, Mulroney did not try for a third term because he sensed that a humiliating defeat was in the offing. Kim Campbell, his successor, proved a lacklustre prime minister, whilst the country was in recession. But his own policy failures, especially on the constitution and tax, were also to blame.
In 1987, Mulroney had brokered the Meech Lake Accord, a deal with the provinces which aimed to finally break Canada’s constitutional stalemate, which had been rolling since Pierre Trudeau had passed the Constitution Act in 1982. Quebec objected to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which allegedly undermined the its collective rights to uphold Quebec as a French-speaking and culturally distinctive province.
The central statement of the Meech Lake Accord was the recognition of Quebec as “a distinct society”. In return, Quebec would accede to the Constitution Act. But after three years of debate the deal was sunk, blocked by two smaller provinces and a perceived as a groundswell of popular resistance to it in most of English-speaking Canada, which united left and right.
Following this serious setback, Mulroney negotiated the Charlottetown Agreements of 1992. However, when put to a general, countrywide referendum in late 1992, they were rejected – and the PCs foundations in Quebec fatally undermined.
Meanwhile, near the end of his second term Mulroney had brought in the Goods & Services Tax (GST), the Canadian equivalent of the VAT (value-added tax). Set at seven per cent, it was applied to virtually all economic transactions in Canadian society. The Liberal contender in the 1993 election, Jean Chretien, explicitly promised to abolish the GST. (However, he never did so, and the revenue from the GST was doubtless a major element in the federal Liberals’ ability to have huge government spending but also to eventually balance the federal budget.)
During his premiership, Mulroney was plagued by a terrible combination: he was attacked by the media as both “sleazy” and “hard right” – while actually he was mostly a small-l liberal; for example, he raised immigration to the unprecedented level of about a quarter-million persons a year.
His “strong leadership” was mainly used to suppress any small-c conservatism in the federal Progressive Conservative Party. Indeed, Mulroney once said snidely that all the ideological conservatives in Canada could easily fit into a phone-booth.
In 1993, Mulroney left office with his popularity in the single digits. However, the rise of the Reform Party and the Bloc was somewhat unexpected. In 1993, Reform won 52 seats (all but 1 from Western Canada), and the Bloc won 54 seats in Quebec, thus becoming the Official Opposition. The Liberals won a strong majority.
Commentators in the UK, suggesting that the Conservative Party will be virtually wiped out in the forthcoming general election, are starting to invite parallels with the Canadian election of 1993. There is certainly some cleverness in Nigel Farage choosing the name “Reform” for his anti-system opposition movement.
However, it should be remembered that the rise of Reform guaranteed easy Liberal victories until 2003, when the Canadian Alliance (a rebranding of the Reform Party), and the remnants of the federal Progressive Conservatives, finally decided to merge, to be re-named as the Conservative Party (the original name of the party from decades ago).
I think it is an open question today whether Canada’s Conservative Party today is really “the Reform Party – Version Three”, as some alllege, or if in fact the Progressive Conservative influence (and various advancing societal velocities and trajectories) have diluted it thoroughly.
In other words, a rout for the Conservatives in the next general election might not produce results such dramatic results as some, looking at the Canadian precedent, might believe (or hope).