Malcolm Gooderham is the founder of Elgin Advisory, and a former Conservative Party adviser.
Reducing and stopping undocumented migrants crossing the channel has rightly been prioritised by this Government. However, as is often the case, the right thing to do is not always politically expedient.
As Team Sunak enters the final six months of this parliament, why do they remain on the back-foot with this issue and what options do they have?
The decision to pledge to ‘stop the boats’ is loaded with challenges, not least the fact that the Government is at the mercy of actors beyond its direct control. Perhaps the lowest profile are the most pivotal: the French government.
A year has now passed since Rishi Sunak and Emmanuel Macron met at the UK-France Summit in Paris. Alongside defence and security issues, the two Leaders agreed a plan to address the rise in the trafficking of asylum seekers across the channel.
Macron accepted limited responsibility and required the UK to step-in and shore-up French efforts. Under the terms of the deal, the UK Government promised to subsidise French efforts to the tune of half a billion pounds over three years: €140 million in 2023-24; €190 million in 2024-25; and €200 million in 2025-26.
Reportedly to fund a new detention centre in Dunkirk, a new Franco-British command centre, an extra 500 law enforcement officers on French beaches, better technology for patrols, including more drones and surveillance aircraft. Plus, a new permanent French mobile policing unit to tackle small boats, to be overseen by a new zonal coordination centre (with British liaison officers based alongside French counterparts).
While the politics and economics of the UK decision are debatable, neither should obscure the need to hold the French authorities accountable for the boats leaving their shares and the gangs operating on their soil.
The early signs of the reinvigorated operation were promising. The crossings from France were approximately 8,500 in 2020; 28,500 in 2021; 46,000 in 2022; and declined to under 30,000 in 2023. So while the number was three times the figure from three years ago, it fell by a third from the highpoint in 2022.
However, in the first quarter of this year we’ve seen a new surge that outweighs the numbers crossing in early 2023. In January there were 150 more (1,335 in total), February saw a dip and in March there were almost 2,000 more (2,378 in total) asylum seekers making the crossing than last year.
It is important, both in terms of efficiency and value for money, for British ministers to shine a light on the successes and failures of their French counterparts (as they are prone to do with the Albanian agreement).
While the chain of events originates outside France, before asylum seekers arrive in British waters, it is very much the responsibility of the Macron Government to deal with them and the gangs who exploit and facilitate people leaving French shores in French vessels.
However, the Government (and thus, the Conservatives) owns the problem – even if it doesn’t, in reality, define it. Domestic critics pressure ministers for a solution to a multi-faceted problem, driven by factors and people beyond their control.
This dynamic has pushed a series of ministers to test domestic political thresholds and disrupt party politics. Rather than test relationships with external parties, notably but not exclusively, with the French.
This parliament may not mark the summit of either main party’s internal debate and strife driven by migration and asylum matters. On the left, if some Labour MPs feel their constituents are uneasy about the impact on social cohesion and welfare; on the Right, if some Conservative MPs feel the UK’s membership of the ECHR is very much part of the problem, to the extent that it prevents an effective deterrence policy of deportations to a third country.
So, British politics is tied to French politics. The level and impact of the national debate will be linked to the performance of French ministers and officials: the more ineffective the French police and border operation, the more salient the issue of asylum will be in the UK.
The French authorities are, however, only the penultimate link in a long chain. While they could reduce the flow of asylum seekers coming to this country, the main drivers are despotic regimes that displace their own people. Working, by default (or maybe by design), with people-trafficking gangs.
On both fronts, the UK’s ability to tackle the real drivers of the problem is extremely limited. So what can Team Sunak do before we enter the summer months when crossing typically increase?
The legislative route is all but exhausted for this parliament. So the key lever is the power of the prime minister’s office. Rethinking and resetting how to deal with the French government is key: reviewing targets, transparency and payment by results would be a good start.
Malcolm Gooderham is the founder of Elgin Advisory, and a former Conservative Party adviser.
Reducing and stopping undocumented migrants crossing the channel has rightly been prioritised by this Government. However, as is often the case, the right thing to do is not always politically expedient.
As Team Sunak enters the final six months of this parliament, why do they remain on the back-foot with this issue and what options do they have?
The decision to pledge to ‘stop the boats’ is loaded with challenges, not least the fact that the Government is at the mercy of actors beyond its direct control. Perhaps the lowest profile are the most pivotal: the French government.
A year has now passed since Rishi Sunak and Emmanuel Macron met at the UK-France Summit in Paris. Alongside defence and security issues, the two Leaders agreed a plan to address the rise in the trafficking of asylum seekers across the channel.
Macron accepted limited responsibility and required the UK to step-in and shore-up French efforts. Under the terms of the deal, the UK Government promised to subsidise French efforts to the tune of half a billion pounds over three years: €140 million in 2023-24; €190 million in 2024-25; and €200 million in 2025-26.
Reportedly to fund a new detention centre in Dunkirk, a new Franco-British command centre, an extra 500 law enforcement officers on French beaches, better technology for patrols, including more drones and surveillance aircraft. Plus, a new permanent French mobile policing unit to tackle small boats, to be overseen by a new zonal coordination centre (with British liaison officers based alongside French counterparts).
While the politics and economics of the UK decision are debatable, neither should obscure the need to hold the French authorities accountable for the boats leaving their shares and the gangs operating on their soil.
The early signs of the reinvigorated operation were promising. The crossings from France were approximately 8,500 in 2020; 28,500 in 2021; 46,000 in 2022; and declined to under 30,000 in 2023. So while the number was three times the figure from three years ago, it fell by a third from the highpoint in 2022.
However, in the first quarter of this year we’ve seen a new surge that outweighs the numbers crossing in early 2023. In January there were 150 more (1,335 in total), February saw a dip and in March there were almost 2,000 more (2,378 in total) asylum seekers making the crossing than last year.
It is important, both in terms of efficiency and value for money, for British ministers to shine a light on the successes and failures of their French counterparts (as they are prone to do with the Albanian agreement).
While the chain of events originates outside France, before asylum seekers arrive in British waters, it is very much the responsibility of the Macron Government to deal with them and the gangs who exploit and facilitate people leaving French shores in French vessels.
However, the Government (and thus, the Conservatives) owns the problem – even if it doesn’t, in reality, define it. Domestic critics pressure ministers for a solution to a multi-faceted problem, driven by factors and people beyond their control.
This dynamic has pushed a series of ministers to test domestic political thresholds and disrupt party politics. Rather than test relationships with external parties, notably but not exclusively, with the French.
This parliament may not mark the summit of either main party’s internal debate and strife driven by migration and asylum matters. On the left, if some Labour MPs feel their constituents are uneasy about the impact on social cohesion and welfare; on the Right, if some Conservative MPs feel the UK’s membership of the ECHR is very much part of the problem, to the extent that it prevents an effective deterrence policy of deportations to a third country.
So, British politics is tied to French politics. The level and impact of the national debate will be linked to the performance of French ministers and officials: the more ineffective the French police and border operation, the more salient the issue of asylum will be in the UK.
The French authorities are, however, only the penultimate link in a long chain. While they could reduce the flow of asylum seekers coming to this country, the main drivers are despotic regimes that displace their own people. Working, by default (or maybe by design), with people-trafficking gangs.
On both fronts, the UK’s ability to tackle the real drivers of the problem is extremely limited. So what can Team Sunak do before we enter the summer months when crossing typically increase?
The legislative route is all but exhausted for this parliament. So the key lever is the power of the prime minister’s office. Rethinking and resetting how to deal with the French government is key: reviewing targets, transparency and payment by results would be a good start.