Lee Reynolds is a former Special Adviser to Arlene Foster, then First Minister of Northern Ireland, and was previously Director of Policy for the Democratic Unionist Party.
Since 1998 Northern Ireland’s political process has been an instrumental one, namely agreements reached are limited not comprehensive. The theory of this approach is the delivery of the agreement leads to relationships and goodwill that allows the unaddressed issues to be dealt with.
This should explain why Northern Ireland comes to some new agreement every few years, though in truth it is more because the theory was wrong; the multiplicity of deals has been more driven by the lack of relationships and goodwill.
There was certainly poor relationships and little goodwill between Unionism and the Government after the under-delivery and over-selling of the Windsor Framework.
The key post-Agreement DUP strategist was Peter Robinson. He seemed to have learned much from the actions and treatment of David Trimble. Robinson’s ‘art of the deal’ was to negotiate before, during and after any deal. After – its interpretation and implementation – is the most crucial dimension, and where Trimble often failed.
The Safeguarding the Union (StU) Command Paper follows in this instrumental tradition. It was by no means all Unionism had wanted or deserved, but more than what the Windsor Framework (WF) had offered.
While it did not end the application of European Union law to Northern Ireland’s trade, it promised to remove the practical effect of that law on its trade within the UK’s internal market. This practical effect was to be removed in stages and safeguarding structures such as Intertrade UK. ‘After’ is built into its DNA.
In its early selling, however, Sir Jeffrey Donaldson went further than he should. He presented its end state as the new reality. What should have been ‘much done more to do’ slipped into ‘much done’. (Notably Gavin Robinson, the new interim Democratic Unionist leader, has consistently emphasised emphasised the need for good faith implementation and recognises there is more to do: on the night of the party vote, in subsequent interviews, and in his new role.)
While Unionism has fascinated on the sea border elements, it played less attention to what could be called the fourth strand: intra-UK relationships.
The Belfast Agreement was constructed round the Irish separatist analysis of three strands of relationships: within Northern Ireland, between Northern Ireland and Ireland, and between the British and Irish governments. The relationships within the UK were ignored, or reduced to little more than a Joint Ministerial Council.
Intertrade UK, the East-West Council (and its proposed areas of work on the day to day and non-governmental relationships in the UK), etc. are the first real recognition of this fourth strand. It was these elements that led the SDLP and some pro-Sinn Féin commentators to condemn the deal.
While some dismiss it as not substantial enough, it is something to build upon. Labour should take it seriously too, rather than throw more powers at everyone (again) as the solution to separatism.
Why did Unionism take less than it wanted or deserved? A friend who organised buses to anti-Protocol rallies summed it up: “We’ve ran out of road, and no one is coming to help us.”
The Windsor Framework had had a demoralising effect on the average Unionist voter in Northern Ireland. Separatists outpolled Unionists in the 2023 local government elections, not driven by an uplift in their vote but a drop in Unionist turnout, particularly working-class turnout.
The average Unionist voter wanted something more than the Windsor Framework, but had priced in it would not be all. The DUP negotiated the something. It was never going to be greeted with a chorus of hosannas, but there have been few brickbats with little tide of public anger and anti-protocol events failing to attract past levels of support. Surly acceptance, rather than outrage, was the norm.
Those on the Tory benches who had tried to fight the good fight alongside the DUP offered the alternative of another heave against Sunak. Whatever their sincerity or necessity of such moves, the malaise of the backbenches and debilitating factionalism of the right meant that Godot was likelier to arrive sooner than a new Conservative prime minister.
So how is the implementation going? The DUP have been meeting regularly with the Cabinet Office to progress the deal’s implementation. Gavin, a protégé of Peter, gets the importance of ‘after’.
Steady but slow would be a kind description, both on the sea border measures and fourth strand elements.
What is behind the slowness? The Government agreed both the Windsor Framework and Safeguarding the Union. There are differences between the two, but the Government approach appears more to be find ways of reconciling the two even where they cannot be; perhaps they hope to earn Framework brownie points to deliver on its greater StU commitments (e.g. veterinary medicines) and on occasion opting for counter-productive administrative games on blocking information.
However, the Achilles’ heel of the process is what it did not deal with, the applicability of EU law including rights law. The Assembly has rejected and accepted some new EU regulations. Others happened because the Cabinet Office didn’t tell anyone, and proposed bans threaten to end NI NHS dentistry.
The Government’s defeat at the High Court on the Rwanda Act – this is despite the clear statement from the government in the Command Paper that it was fully applicable across the UK – has attracted the most attention.
The DUP were always sceptical about this, which is why they had presented amendments in parliament. With 20 alleged drug dealers taking action under the same rights’ provisions it is a problem that will not be going away, and require firm government action now and in the future.
Chris Heaton-Harris, the Secretary of State, commented he had learned much about Unionism in the negotiations. He will have no doubt learned of the deep and justified distrust. If the well of distrust is to be drained then full, prompt, and proper implementation of what was agreed is the bare minimum.
Colin Powell once commented that America had to fix Iraq as they broke it. You make the problem you own it. The Protocol, the Windsor Framework, the Command paper… the Government made them all and own them all. It has little else to do in its remaining time – so needs to act swiftly with its promised repairs.
Lee Reynolds is a former Special Adviser to Arlene Foster, then First Minister of Northern Ireland, and was previously Director of Policy for the Democratic Unionist Party.
Since 1998 Northern Ireland’s political process has been an instrumental one, namely agreements reached are limited not comprehensive. The theory of this approach is the delivery of the agreement leads to relationships and goodwill that allows the unaddressed issues to be dealt with.
This should explain why Northern Ireland comes to some new agreement every few years, though in truth it is more because the theory was wrong; the multiplicity of deals has been more driven by the lack of relationships and goodwill.
There was certainly poor relationships and little goodwill between Unionism and the Government after the under-delivery and over-selling of the Windsor Framework.
The key post-Agreement DUP strategist was Peter Robinson. He seemed to have learned much from the actions and treatment of David Trimble. Robinson’s ‘art of the deal’ was to negotiate before, during and after any deal. After – its interpretation and implementation – is the most crucial dimension, and where Trimble often failed.
The Safeguarding the Union (StU) Command Paper follows in this instrumental tradition. It was by no means all Unionism had wanted or deserved, but more than what the Windsor Framework (WF) had offered.
While it did not end the application of European Union law to Northern Ireland’s trade, it promised to remove the practical effect of that law on its trade within the UK’s internal market. This practical effect was to be removed in stages and safeguarding structures such as Intertrade UK. ‘After’ is built into its DNA.
In its early selling, however, Sir Jeffrey Donaldson went further than he should. He presented its end state as the new reality. What should have been ‘much done more to do’ slipped into ‘much done’. (Notably Gavin Robinson, the new interim Democratic Unionist leader, has consistently emphasised emphasised the need for good faith implementation and recognises there is more to do: on the night of the party vote, in subsequent interviews, and in his new role.)
While Unionism has fascinated on the sea border elements, it played less attention to what could be called the fourth strand: intra-UK relationships.
The Belfast Agreement was constructed round the Irish separatist analysis of three strands of relationships: within Northern Ireland, between Northern Ireland and Ireland, and between the British and Irish governments. The relationships within the UK were ignored, or reduced to little more than a Joint Ministerial Council.
Intertrade UK, the East-West Council (and its proposed areas of work on the day to day and non-governmental relationships in the UK), etc. are the first real recognition of this fourth strand. It was these elements that led the SDLP and some pro-Sinn Féin commentators to condemn the deal.
While some dismiss it as not substantial enough, it is something to build upon. Labour should take it seriously too, rather than throw more powers at everyone (again) as the solution to separatism.
Why did Unionism take less than it wanted or deserved? A friend who organised buses to anti-Protocol rallies summed it up: “We’ve ran out of road, and no one is coming to help us.”
The Windsor Framework had had a demoralising effect on the average Unionist voter in Northern Ireland. Separatists outpolled Unionists in the 2023 local government elections, not driven by an uplift in their vote but a drop in Unionist turnout, particularly working-class turnout.
The average Unionist voter wanted something more than the Windsor Framework, but had priced in it would not be all. The DUP negotiated the something. It was never going to be greeted with a chorus of hosannas, but there have been few brickbats with little tide of public anger and anti-protocol events failing to attract past levels of support. Surly acceptance, rather than outrage, was the norm.
Those on the Tory benches who had tried to fight the good fight alongside the DUP offered the alternative of another heave against Sunak. Whatever their sincerity or necessity of such moves, the malaise of the backbenches and debilitating factionalism of the right meant that Godot was likelier to arrive sooner than a new Conservative prime minister.
So how is the implementation going? The DUP have been meeting regularly with the Cabinet Office to progress the deal’s implementation. Gavin, a protégé of Peter, gets the importance of ‘after’.
Steady but slow would be a kind description, both on the sea border measures and fourth strand elements.
What is behind the slowness? The Government agreed both the Windsor Framework and Safeguarding the Union. There are differences between the two, but the Government approach appears more to be find ways of reconciling the two even where they cannot be; perhaps they hope to earn Framework brownie points to deliver on its greater StU commitments (e.g. veterinary medicines) and on occasion opting for counter-productive administrative games on blocking information.
However, the Achilles’ heel of the process is what it did not deal with, the applicability of EU law including rights law. The Assembly has rejected and accepted some new EU regulations. Others happened because the Cabinet Office didn’t tell anyone, and proposed bans threaten to end NI NHS dentistry.
The Government’s defeat at the High Court on the Rwanda Act – this is despite the clear statement from the government in the Command Paper that it was fully applicable across the UK – has attracted the most attention.
The DUP were always sceptical about this, which is why they had presented amendments in parliament. With 20 alleged drug dealers taking action under the same rights’ provisions it is a problem that will not be going away, and require firm government action now and in the future.
Chris Heaton-Harris, the Secretary of State, commented he had learned much about Unionism in the negotiations. He will have no doubt learned of the deep and justified distrust. If the well of distrust is to be drained then full, prompt, and proper implementation of what was agreed is the bare minimum.
Colin Powell once commented that America had to fix Iraq as they broke it. You make the problem you own it. The Protocol, the Windsor Framework, the Command paper… the Government made them all and own them all. It has little else to do in its remaining time – so needs to act swiftly with its promised repairs.