Kieran O’Meara is a PhD Candidate in International Relations at the University of St Andrews.
With the overall loss of 251 seats, Labour’s ‘loveless landslide’, Rishi Sunak berated by even The Telegraph for deserting D-Day commemorations, ‘gamblegate’, and more, one might think the Conservative MPs who stood down before this election prophesised the writing on the wall.
Undeniably, many argued that the 79 Conservative MPs who stepped down, elected as Tories in 2019 or later crossing the floor, did so due to the likelihood of defeat. Numerous outlets from The Daily Mirror, Sky, BBC News to The Daily Mail suggested that this ‘record exodus’ was driven by fears of 1997-style wipeout. Similarly, notable psephologists like Alia Middleton in The Conversation, highlight electoral vulnerability as the principal factor mechanising this phenomenon.
Given the Conservative Party’s worst electoral collapse in modern history, confirmation bias will begin to dictate that vulnerability was indeed the key motivator prompting Conservative MPs to step down. It is therefore important to assess why so many stood down at this election before an inductive logic retroactively exculpates the consensus.
We must test the hypothesis that Conservative MPs stepped down due to the likelihood of loss, examining select data for these parliamentarians and their constituencies. Ultimately, regression analysis found no significant causal or correlative relationship between the tested variables for the group as a whole.
Nonetheless, four key causal factors were identifiable: (a) personal circumstances, (b) age or years in service, (c) low likelihood of success, and (d) boundary changes. Consequently, as multiple factors were identified without any overarching relationship between the variables, the hypothesis must be rejected in favour of a more pluralistic explanation. What did the data reveal?
Firstly, regardless of the political milieu, our humanism should not be neglected. Countless MPs retire due to age, length of service, or personal circumstances; each case is particularly private and cannot be deduced from data alone.
Regarding personal circumstances, some stand down due to illness. In 2024, David Duguid was de-selected for Banff and Buchan following a spinal ailment and Bishop Auckland’s Dehenna Davison cited chronic migraines. Here, medical conditions restricted their ability to function effectively as parliamentarians, prompting retirement. Although accounting for fewer than five instances, it would be unempathetic to overlook such circumstances in these cases. Personally, this would outweigh electoral vulnerability.
Secondly, for some, years of service or age were chief motivating factors. The average tenure of the group was 16.1 years service, with a mean age of 57.2. Although lower than cohorts since 2010, on both counts, this was not of any statistical significance.
Nonetheless, 28 (35 per cent) of those standing down served for at least 19 years or were above the ‘retirement age’ of 66, including Theresa May and Eleanor Laing. Interestingly, some held majorities far higher than average. Gordon Henderson, Phillip Dunne and Sir Greg Knight were three examples here that already held a majority greater than one standard deviation from the 2019 Conservative average, and with boundary changes increasing notional majorities in five cases.
With majorities in mind, 14 of these 28 held above-average, growing, or absolute majorities. Given the lack of a statistical correlative or causal relationship between the variables, we can assume age and years of service prompted some to step down despite their majorities, rather than the likelihood of loss. This brings us to the claim of the hypothesis.
Given pre-election polling, it is plausible to assume that Conservative MPs stood down due to electoral vulnerability, especially those in marginal areas like Blue or Red Wall constituencies. Seven held Red Wall seats (as categorised by Kanagasooriam and Simon) and 14 were in the Blue Wall (identified by Redfield and Wilton, 2024) – just above 25 per cent overall.
Nonetheless, only 20 per cent of the cohort won in 2019 with a majority of fewer than 5,000 votes, and just 11 of these in the Blue or Red Wall. Those Conservatives standing down held an average majority of over 12,800 votes, which is consistent with the mean 2019 Tory majority and slightly higher than the overall cross-party average.
Additionally, as part of the hypothesis, some figures would have diminished the party’s l chances of success locally, following scandal or incompetence. Notable examples included Kwasi Kwarteng, Dominic Raab, or Matt Hancock, whose West Suffolk seat remained blue – unlikely if Hancock had indeed stood, given growing unpopularity in the constituency following his I’m a Celebrity appearance. At most, eight fell into this category.
We cannot deny that some stepping-down in Blue or Red Wall seats with slim majorities were likely to lose. Excluding those abolished, not one of these ‘Red’ or ‘Blue’ Wall seats remained Conservative on the morning of July 5th. This accounts for only a handful nonetheless. Here we should include James Grundy, Nickie Aiken, Stephen Hammond, Steve Brine, and Jo Gideon.
However, purging ourselves of retroactive bias confirmation, without a statistically significant relationship between the variables this is not a claim that can be generalised for the entire cohort, but a nuanced observation concerning specific seats.
Finally, boundary changes altered the status quo somewhat. To assess how these changes impact the likelihood of individual loss, we can apply an ‘index of change’ to each seat. This permits measurement of the extent a constituency has adapted due to boundary revisions. Fortunately, the eminent Michael Rallings and Colin Thrasher have calculated this index for each seat already, providing employable data.
Rallings and Thrasher claim overall that ‘boundary changes [nationally] resulted in a modest benefit for the Conservatives’, notionally gaining seven seats. Utilising their data for our investigation, the average index of change for the cohort rests at 18.45, far lower than that for England, Scotland, or Wales.
Saliently, 15 Conservative MPs had their constituencies abolished with the new boundaries, including long-standing parliamentarians like Bill Cash and John Redwood. Enduring would require them to establish a new MP-constituency link with a different community. In Cash’s case, this link was cultivated over a 40-year tenure representing Stone, making it difficult to replicate in another constituency instantaneously.
Using the index of change, we can adjust the 2019 results to match the new boundaries. 26 constituencies saw increased majorities, 24 decreased, and 12 now held majorities of under 5000 votes. Steve Brine’s Winchester seat and Jonathan Djanogly’s Huntingdon constituency, fell into the latter, with scores far above the average.
Excluding abolished constituencies, 13 of those standing down lost over 1 per cent of their vote share, with six badly affected. Two seats lost absolute majorities; Michael Ellis’ Northampton North seat for example reduced from a 53.2 per cent majority to a 49.8 per cent plurality.
Although some of our constituencies became increasingly marginal, 50 still held absolute majorities. Yes, boundary changes increased the vulnerability of some constituencies and erased 15, but the overall impact is mixed. The average index of change is much lower than the national standard and the average majority was only slightly reduced, remaining within one standard deviation of the 2019 mean.
To conclude, returning to the aims of this study overall, the analysis found no significant causal or correlative relationship among the variables of the cohort. As no single overarching determinant was found, the hypothesis must be rejected in favour of a more pluralistic explanation. Four key factors were identified: (a) personal circumstances, (b) age or years in service, (c) low likelihood of victory, and (d) boundary changes.
Finally, of the constituencies investigated here, 47 were lost to other parties and over 25 per cent remained Conservatives. Nonetheless, the findings of this investigation suggest that it would be false to claim that electoral vulnerability was the sole factor driving Conservatives to stand down overall, irrespective of the final result. A nuanced, multifaceted explanation is rather more appropriate.
Kieran O’Meara is a PhD Candidate in International Relations at the University of St Andrews.
With the overall loss of 251 seats, Labour’s ‘loveless landslide’, Rishi Sunak berated by even The Telegraph for deserting D-Day commemorations, ‘gamblegate’, and more, one might think the Conservative MPs who stood down before this election prophesised the writing on the wall.
Undeniably, many argued that the 79 Conservative MPs who stepped down, elected as Tories in 2019 or later crossing the floor, did so due to the likelihood of defeat. Numerous outlets from The Daily Mirror, Sky, BBC News to The Daily Mail suggested that this ‘record exodus’ was driven by fears of 1997-style wipeout. Similarly, notable psephologists like Alia Middleton in The Conversation, highlight electoral vulnerability as the principal factor mechanising this phenomenon.
Given the Conservative Party’s worst electoral collapse in modern history, confirmation bias will begin to dictate that vulnerability was indeed the key motivator prompting Conservative MPs to step down. It is therefore important to assess why so many stood down at this election before an inductive logic retroactively exculpates the consensus.
We must test the hypothesis that Conservative MPs stepped down due to the likelihood of loss, examining select data for these parliamentarians and their constituencies. Ultimately, regression analysis found no significant causal or correlative relationship between the tested variables for the group as a whole.
Nonetheless, four key causal factors were identifiable: (a) personal circumstances, (b) age or years in service, (c) low likelihood of success, and (d) boundary changes. Consequently, as multiple factors were identified without any overarching relationship between the variables, the hypothesis must be rejected in favour of a more pluralistic explanation. What did the data reveal?
Firstly, regardless of the political milieu, our humanism should not be neglected. Countless MPs retire due to age, length of service, or personal circumstances; each case is particularly private and cannot be deduced from data alone.
Regarding personal circumstances, some stand down due to illness. In 2024, David Duguid was de-selected for Banff and Buchan following a spinal ailment and Bishop Auckland’s Dehenna Davison cited chronic migraines. Here, medical conditions restricted their ability to function effectively as parliamentarians, prompting retirement. Although accounting for fewer than five instances, it would be unempathetic to overlook such circumstances in these cases. Personally, this would outweigh electoral vulnerability.
Secondly, for some, years of service or age were chief motivating factors. The average tenure of the group was 16.1 years service, with a mean age of 57.2. Although lower than cohorts since 2010, on both counts, this was not of any statistical significance.
Nonetheless, 28 (35 per cent) of those standing down served for at least 19 years or were above the ‘retirement age’ of 66, including Theresa May and Eleanor Laing. Interestingly, some held majorities far higher than average. Gordon Henderson, Phillip Dunne and Sir Greg Knight were three examples here that already held a majority greater than one standard deviation from the 2019 Conservative average, and with boundary changes increasing notional majorities in five cases.
With majorities in mind, 14 of these 28 held above-average, growing, or absolute majorities. Given the lack of a statistical correlative or causal relationship between the variables, we can assume age and years of service prompted some to step down despite their majorities, rather than the likelihood of loss. This brings us to the claim of the hypothesis.
Given pre-election polling, it is plausible to assume that Conservative MPs stood down due to electoral vulnerability, especially those in marginal areas like Blue or Red Wall constituencies. Seven held Red Wall seats (as categorised by Kanagasooriam and Simon) and 14 were in the Blue Wall (identified by Redfield and Wilton, 2024) – just above 25 per cent overall.
Nonetheless, only 20 per cent of the cohort won in 2019 with a majority of fewer than 5,000 votes, and just 11 of these in the Blue or Red Wall. Those Conservatives standing down held an average majority of over 12,800 votes, which is consistent with the mean 2019 Tory majority and slightly higher than the overall cross-party average.
Additionally, as part of the hypothesis, some figures would have diminished the party’s l chances of success locally, following scandal or incompetence. Notable examples included Kwasi Kwarteng, Dominic Raab, or Matt Hancock, whose West Suffolk seat remained blue – unlikely if Hancock had indeed stood, given growing unpopularity in the constituency following his I’m a Celebrity appearance. At most, eight fell into this category.
We cannot deny that some stepping-down in Blue or Red Wall seats with slim majorities were likely to lose. Excluding those abolished, not one of these ‘Red’ or ‘Blue’ Wall seats remained Conservative on the morning of July 5th. This accounts for only a handful nonetheless. Here we should include James Grundy, Nickie Aiken, Stephen Hammond, Steve Brine, and Jo Gideon.
However, purging ourselves of retroactive bias confirmation, without a statistically significant relationship between the variables this is not a claim that can be generalised for the entire cohort, but a nuanced observation concerning specific seats.
Finally, boundary changes altered the status quo somewhat. To assess how these changes impact the likelihood of individual loss, we can apply an ‘index of change’ to each seat. This permits measurement of the extent a constituency has adapted due to boundary revisions. Fortunately, the eminent Michael Rallings and Colin Thrasher have calculated this index for each seat already, providing employable data.
Rallings and Thrasher claim overall that ‘boundary changes [nationally] resulted in a modest benefit for the Conservatives’, notionally gaining seven seats. Utilising their data for our investigation, the average index of change for the cohort rests at 18.45, far lower than that for England, Scotland, or Wales.
Saliently, 15 Conservative MPs had their constituencies abolished with the new boundaries, including long-standing parliamentarians like Bill Cash and John Redwood. Enduring would require them to establish a new MP-constituency link with a different community. In Cash’s case, this link was cultivated over a 40-year tenure representing Stone, making it difficult to replicate in another constituency instantaneously.
Using the index of change, we can adjust the 2019 results to match the new boundaries. 26 constituencies saw increased majorities, 24 decreased, and 12 now held majorities of under 5000 votes. Steve Brine’s Winchester seat and Jonathan Djanogly’s Huntingdon constituency, fell into the latter, with scores far above the average.
Excluding abolished constituencies, 13 of those standing down lost over 1 per cent of their vote share, with six badly affected. Two seats lost absolute majorities; Michael Ellis’ Northampton North seat for example reduced from a 53.2 per cent majority to a 49.8 per cent plurality.
Although some of our constituencies became increasingly marginal, 50 still held absolute majorities. Yes, boundary changes increased the vulnerability of some constituencies and erased 15, but the overall impact is mixed. The average index of change is much lower than the national standard and the average majority was only slightly reduced, remaining within one standard deviation of the 2019 mean.
To conclude, returning to the aims of this study overall, the analysis found no significant causal or correlative relationship among the variables of the cohort. As no single overarching determinant was found, the hypothesis must be rejected in favour of a more pluralistic explanation. Four key factors were identified: (a) personal circumstances, (b) age or years in service, (c) low likelihood of victory, and (d) boundary changes.
Finally, of the constituencies investigated here, 47 were lost to other parties and over 25 per cent remained Conservatives. Nonetheless, the findings of this investigation suggest that it would be false to claim that electoral vulnerability was the sole factor driving Conservatives to stand down overall, irrespective of the final result. A nuanced, multifaceted explanation is rather more appropriate.