Garvan Walshe is a former national and international security policy adviser to the Conservative Party.
It’s time to dispense with the adjectives prepended to Russian aggression. Terms like “hybrid”, “unconventional” are still useful in technical discussion, but cloud political communication. Russia ended 2024 with what by any conventional definition would be an act of war against Finland and Estonia.
The Eagle S, a ship, registered in the Cook Islands was found to have damaged an electricity link between Finland and Estonia and was apparently on its way to sever another cable too. Had it done so, electricity prices in both countries would have spiked, causing hardship, and Russia hoped, political instability. Even as countries have weaned themselves off Russian energy, Russia has found ways to attack their interdependence and resilience.
Because as well as the main front in Ukraine, and behind-the-lines subversion in Germany and France, Russia has two subordinate theatres where it directs significant resources. To its south-west, it spent tens of millions trying to influence elections in Moldova and Romania, and supplied an oligarch to try and control Georgia behind the scenes. On its north-western border, Finland and the Baltic states have more cohesive societies — but their position on the Baltic sea makes them vulnerable to sabotage. A major outage on Finland’s railways followed Finland’s operation against Russia’s cable-destroying boat, in which the ship was boarded and its crew arrested and charged.
This was the latest effort in a campaign of aggression that has been running at least since 2007 when Estonia suffered a large scale cyberattack on its government, parliament and major banks.
Conscious of the threat, the Nordic and Baltic countries have responded to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with major rearmament. By 2030, they, with 32 million people between them, will have defence budgets amounting to £33 billion. Poland, with just under 40 million people, will also soon spend £50 billion a year on defence.
But while £83 billion is a significant sum, the Russian budget of around £120 billion still outmatches by half, and Russia’s lower costs mean Moscow can stretch it further. And though Russia has other interests to defend across its frontiers, as well as a war to fight in Ukraine, should the front there be stabilised as a result of a Turmp-induced ceasefire, it would, after regrouping for a few years be able to pose a threat to these NATO members, and even call the credibility of the alliance into question.
Yet it is these NATO members — together with Ukraine of course — that are now leading European resistance to Russian expansionism, but, as the United States becomes increasingly unpredictable under Trump’s second administration, they deserve more support from the big four European countries than they have so far received.
Under Olaf Scholz, Germany held back Western support for Ukraine, contributing to its precarious battlefield position and the increased threat in the Baltic. France toughened its rhetoric considerably, but has struggled to increase defence production, amid a 6% deficit and domestic political instability. Italy’s Meloni has suprised with her trenchant support for Ukraine’s fight for freedom, but must deal with a foreign policy establishment that would, like the German, rather appease Russia than fight it.
This leaves the UK, which started strong under Johnson, but lost focus under Sunak who lacked the appetite to fight the treasury for greater defence spending. Though Starmer appears similarly disinclined to fight the officials working for Rachel Reeves, the latest incident in the Baltic sea should concentrate minds.
The Ministry of Defence is currently leading a defence review sometimes presented as divided over whether to prioritise air and maritime forces or focus more on the land based Russian threat.
But Russian aggression in the Baltic and Arctic should call this framing into question for reasons of geography and comparative advantage. Geography because the most acute threats to British interests are in its immediate region. Maritime security has become a matter of helping the defence of allies in Northern Europe as well as contributing to anti-piracy missions in the Gulf, freedom of navigation in the Taiwan strait, and grand strategy through AUKUS. Comparative advantage because though the UK has capable ground forces, and should continue to field them, other allies, most obviously Poland and Ukraine, but also Romania, and at least in industrial production, if not necessarily yet in strategic culture, Germany, are better placed to contend with Russia.
Our Nordic and Baltic allies need British solidarity as Russia continues to raise the temperature. Russia will ignore supportive words (which are still necessary, because it will exploit their absence) but allocating resources to defend northern European waters would be a signal of British resolve that can contribute to giving Moscow pause.