Cai Hughes is a Student at the University of York and a Young Conservative.
In 2025, the United Kingdom spent approximately 2.3 per cent of its GDP on defence – around £66 billion. The government has since committed to raising that figure to 2.5 per cent by 2027, with a longer-term ambition to reach 3.5 per cent by 2035. Few serious analysts dispute the need for greater investment. The question that too often goes unasked, however, is not how much we spend, but how wisely.
Britain faces its most challenging geopolitical environment since the Cold War. The war in Ukraine has redrawn Europe’s security calculus, and instability across the Middle East continues to threaten critical trade routes. Defence spending has fallen dramatically from the heights of the mid-1950s, when it peaked at seven per cent of GDP. The case for reversing that decline is clear. But a larger budget, without a coherent strategy to direct it, risks repeating the inefficiencies of the past.
Membership of NATO remains the bedrock of British security. The alliance’s collective defence guarantee has ensured that no member state has faced direct military aggression since its founding. NATO continues to expand, and its fundamental logic – that an attack on one is an attack on all – remains one of the most effective deterrents in modern history. Yet that very stability can breed complacency. As former NATO Secretary General George Robertson has warned, there is a ‘corrosive complacency’ around defence funding that no alliance membership can fully excuse.
In an era of rapid technological change, advanced weaponry, and sophisticated cyber warfare, Britain must continually equip its forces with cutting-edge capabilities to counter evolving threats. Any slowdown or pause in improvement and investment would be dangerous: our adversaries will not wait.
The question of how to fund an increase in defence spending demands honesty. Historically, major ramp-ups – including in the run-up to the Second World War — have been financed through a combination of higher taxes, reduced spending in other sectors, and accumulated debt. In the short term, borrowing offers the most immediate flexibility. Over the longer term, however, a sustainable level of defence spending must be underpinned by tax revenues and disciplined reallocation of public expenditure.
Kemi Badenoch has proposed reinstating the two-child benefit cap to free up funds for defence. An approach that not only offers fiscal credibility but strengthens work incentives, recognising that long-term child outcomes depend more on family stability, education and aspiration than on unconditional transfers.
What is beyond dispute is that defence spending, when directed effectively, can be a genuine driver of economic growth. Defence investment has historically accelerated research and innovation in ways that benefit the broader economy. Radar technology, developed and refined during the Second World War, is among the most cited examples. As Dr Hillary Briffa, Senior Lecturer in National Security Studies at King’s College London, argues, high defence spending and economic growth are not mutually exclusive. “When approached strategically and sustainably,” she notes, “defence investment can drive innovation, create high-skilled jobs and enhance national competitiveness.”
The Chancellor, Rachel Reeves, has spoken of Britain becoming a ‘defence industrial superpower’, and the economic case is not without substance. Meeting the government’s spending targets could add an estimated 0.8 per cent to GDP and generate £30 billion in annual economic activity. The caveat, of course, is that resources allocated to defence are resources not allocated elsewhere. Growth in one sector does not automatically translate into net economic gains if it displaces productive investment in others. That is precisely why strategic direction matters.
On nuclear deterrence, Britain’s position is already formidable. The United Kingdom holds approximately 225 nuclear warheads. Across the three NATO nuclear powers – the United States, the United Kingdom, and France – the combined stockpile stands at over 5,600 warheads. That arsenal constitutes an overwhelming and credible deterrent. Calls for further nuclear expansion must therefore be weighed against the principle of sufficiency: the question is not whether we have enough warheads to deter, but whether additional investment in nuclear capability delivers proportionate strategic benefit, or simply additional cost.
The most pressing need is not a larger budget in the abstract, but a clearer framework for how that budget is spent. That means conducting a rigorous assessment of the principal threats facing Britain today – cyber-attacks, hostile state interference, conventional military risk, and disruption to critical infrastructure – and allocating resources in proportion to the severity and likelihood of each. It means making hard choices about where capability gaps are greatest and resisting the temptation to spread investment too thinly across legacy platforms and institutions.
What we need to focus on is thinking more clearly about what that spending is meant to achieve. In an era of constrained resources and expanding threats, to ensure money is being used correctly I believe that all money allocated has to have a minister accountable for its spending. This ensures that money is spent efficiently.
Ultimately, the debate about defence spending cannot be separated from the debate about what British defence is for.
A 2.5 per cent commitment is a floor, not a strategy. If the government is serious about meeting the threats of the coming decade – and the case for doing so has never been stronger – it must pair its spending ambitions with an equally serious and publicly articulated plan for how that money will be used. A well-directed defence budget will always outperform a larger but unfocused one.
The Conservative tradition at its best has always understood that fiscal responsibility and national security are not competing values. In this case, they demand the same thing: a strategy worthy of the investment.
Cai Hughes is a Student at the University of York and a Young Conservative.
In 2025, the United Kingdom spent approximately 2.3 per cent of its GDP on defence – around £66 billion. The government has since committed to raising that figure to 2.5 per cent by 2027, with a longer-term ambition to reach 3.5 per cent by 2035. Few serious analysts dispute the need for greater investment. The question that too often goes unasked, however, is not how much we spend, but how wisely.
Britain faces its most challenging geopolitical environment since the Cold War. The war in Ukraine has redrawn Europe’s security calculus, and instability across the Middle East continues to threaten critical trade routes. Defence spending has fallen dramatically from the heights of the mid-1950s, when it peaked at seven per cent of GDP. The case for reversing that decline is clear. But a larger budget, without a coherent strategy to direct it, risks repeating the inefficiencies of the past.
Membership of NATO remains the bedrock of British security. The alliance’s collective defence guarantee has ensured that no member state has faced direct military aggression since its founding. NATO continues to expand, and its fundamental logic – that an attack on one is an attack on all – remains one of the most effective deterrents in modern history. Yet that very stability can breed complacency. As former NATO Secretary General George Robertson has warned, there is a ‘corrosive complacency’ around defence funding that no alliance membership can fully excuse.
In an era of rapid technological change, advanced weaponry, and sophisticated cyber warfare, Britain must continually equip its forces with cutting-edge capabilities to counter evolving threats. Any slowdown or pause in improvement and investment would be dangerous: our adversaries will not wait.
The question of how to fund an increase in defence spending demands honesty. Historically, major ramp-ups – including in the run-up to the Second World War — have been financed through a combination of higher taxes, reduced spending in other sectors, and accumulated debt. In the short term, borrowing offers the most immediate flexibility. Over the longer term, however, a sustainable level of defence spending must be underpinned by tax revenues and disciplined reallocation of public expenditure.
Kemi Badenoch has proposed reinstating the two-child benefit cap to free up funds for defence. An approach that not only offers fiscal credibility but strengthens work incentives, recognising that long-term child outcomes depend more on family stability, education and aspiration than on unconditional transfers.
What is beyond dispute is that defence spending, when directed effectively, can be a genuine driver of economic growth. Defence investment has historically accelerated research and innovation in ways that benefit the broader economy. Radar technology, developed and refined during the Second World War, is among the most cited examples. As Dr Hillary Briffa, Senior Lecturer in National Security Studies at King’s College London, argues, high defence spending and economic growth are not mutually exclusive. “When approached strategically and sustainably,” she notes, “defence investment can drive innovation, create high-skilled jobs and enhance national competitiveness.”
The Chancellor, Rachel Reeves, has spoken of Britain becoming a ‘defence industrial superpower’, and the economic case is not without substance. Meeting the government’s spending targets could add an estimated 0.8 per cent to GDP and generate £30 billion in annual economic activity. The caveat, of course, is that resources allocated to defence are resources not allocated elsewhere. Growth in one sector does not automatically translate into net economic gains if it displaces productive investment in others. That is precisely why strategic direction matters.
On nuclear deterrence, Britain’s position is already formidable. The United Kingdom holds approximately 225 nuclear warheads. Across the three NATO nuclear powers – the United States, the United Kingdom, and France – the combined stockpile stands at over 5,600 warheads. That arsenal constitutes an overwhelming and credible deterrent. Calls for further nuclear expansion must therefore be weighed against the principle of sufficiency: the question is not whether we have enough warheads to deter, but whether additional investment in nuclear capability delivers proportionate strategic benefit, or simply additional cost.
The most pressing need is not a larger budget in the abstract, but a clearer framework for how that budget is spent. That means conducting a rigorous assessment of the principal threats facing Britain today – cyber-attacks, hostile state interference, conventional military risk, and disruption to critical infrastructure – and allocating resources in proportion to the severity and likelihood of each. It means making hard choices about where capability gaps are greatest and resisting the temptation to spread investment too thinly across legacy platforms and institutions.
What we need to focus on is thinking more clearly about what that spending is meant to achieve. In an era of constrained resources and expanding threats, to ensure money is being used correctly I believe that all money allocated has to have a minister accountable for its spending. This ensures that money is spent efficiently.
Ultimately, the debate about defence spending cannot be separated from the debate about what British defence is for.
A 2.5 per cent commitment is a floor, not a strategy. If the government is serious about meeting the threats of the coming decade – and the case for doing so has never been stronger – it must pair its spending ambitions with an equally serious and publicly articulated plan for how that money will be used. A well-directed defence budget will always outperform a larger but unfocused one.
The Conservative tradition at its best has always understood that fiscal responsibility and national security are not competing values. In this case, they demand the same thing: a strategy worthy of the investment.