Xander West is an independent writer and author of the Grumbling Times substack.
In late 1923, Stanley Baldwin abruptly called a general election on the question of implementing protectionism, in the process throwing away the solid Conservative majority achieved just a year prior and leading to the first Labour government.
Whilst the circumstances of that blunder alone could constitute its own article, the deftness with which Baldwin adjusted to the defeat deserves attention for its contribution to the complete reversal in Conservative fortunes within a year. This entailed considerable changes to the party’s machinery, approach and policies, yet granted it a readiness to take advantage of Labour’s mistakes and the fading mirage of Liberal revival. Although the party-political conditions of the time were quite unique, it represents an arguably textbook recovery for the Conservatives amidst a realigning party system.
In February, ConservativeHome columnist and academic Daniel Pitt set out concisely the components of party renewal: “replenishing the party’s ideational stance; reorganising the party machinery; updating policy; rethinking presentation and party branding; updating personnel and recruiting new candidates.” In Baldwin’s case, the first and most pressing issue was policy. Although the Conservatives remained the largest party after the 1923 election, Labour and the briefly reinvigorated Liberals composed a pro-free trade majority in the House of Commons. Given the election’s referendal basis, an anti-socialist alliance with the latter could not materialise, not to mention Baldwin’s deep suspicion of former Prime Minister David Lloyd George’s potential to split the Conservatives by recreating his postwar coalition. Baldwin’s government duly resigned in January 1924 following defeat at the King’s Speech and Labour formed a ministry under Ramsay MacDonald with informal Liberal support. Fortuitously, there was no clear or immediate challenger to the Conservative leadership, hence recovery proceeded apace. In February, within three weeks of entering opposition, the party abandoned protectionism, which had at least definitively bound the ex-coalition grandees to Baldwin over Lloyd George. Instead, a campaign of anti-socialist propaganda intended to make the Conservative Party the better option of the two opposition parties to challenge Labour.
Baldwin was particularly attentive to the party’s organisation and presentation.
In April, he established a formalised and regularised Consultative Committee of ex-ministers, with policy-forming sub-committees modelled after government practice to perform detailed work between meetings, all serviced by a small policy secretariat under Baldwin’s authority. Historians regard this as the first modern Shadow Cabinet, though the term had been in use for several decades prior, rendering the Official Opposition more coherent as an alternative government and focussed on discrete policy areas to more efficiently shadow the work of ministers.
Elsewhere, he encouraged the expansion of the 1922 Committee, catalysing its evolution from glorified dining club to by 1926 the caucus for all Conservative MPs, as well as the reforming of constituency parties and selection committees to be less sceptical about prospective candidates who were unable to make heavy financial contributions. This internal restructuring culminated in the policy statement Aims and Principles, agreed by the putative Shadow Cabinet at the beginning of May 1924 and published in June as Looking Ahead. Since the ostensible purpose of Baldwin’s protectionist policy was to reduce structural unemployment, a different proactive plan was required alongside anti-socialist rhetoric.
Social reform had been identified as a major policy gap since before the 1923 election, so Neville Chamberlain, as one of the party’s leading authorities on social policy, largely shaped the response to this weakness versus Labour. This included, amongst other ideas, agricultural subsidies in place of tariffs, more housebuilding, improved pensions provision and aid for veterans. The development of Looking Ahead was complemented in May and June by a major speaking tour in which Baldwin articulated the ‘New Conservatism’, a refreshed national image and branding for the party he somewhat personified himself, essentially the inception of the one-nation conservatism that defined his subsequent premierships. Altogether, the changes the Conservatives undertook demonstrated a sensitivity to the new electorate enfranchised in 1918 and the simple fact of Labour attaining government, which understandably altered attitudes throughout the politics of the time.
Thus, only five months after losing office and six since the election, the Conservative Party was prepared to retake power. This was a practical necessity given the minority Labour government depended on finite Liberal acquiescence for its survival; indeed, it could have collapsed before the summer. In the event, it was brought down in early October by the Campbell Case, the botched prosecution of a communist journalist perceived to have been withdrawn under pressure from the Labour left.
Amidst bungled and unpopular treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union, this played perfectly into Conservative attacks on Labour as dangerous and untrustworthy in government. Looking Ahead formed the foundation of the 1924 Conservative manifesto, producing far more clarity amongst activists and voters alike than the protectionist policy sprung at the outset of the previous campaign. Conservative victory, ultimately a landslide, was greatly assisted by the Liberal Party’s abject failure to capitalise on its kingmaker status and prompt return to its by then typical schismatic state. It was effectively part of Conservative strategy to squeeze the Liberals out of the postwar three-party system, knowing it was more likely to receive the lion’s share of the seats in monopolising the anti-Labour vote.
Of course, the political conditions today are rather different. A multi-party system has re-emerged, but more as a looming threat than yet a parliamentary reality. Despite sometimes acting otherwise, Labour possesses the security of a huge majority and can call the next general election whenever it chooses, whereas the Conservative Party is a very distant second in seats.
What has not changed, however, is the need for a party to renew itself following a long spell in office. Whilst the specifics might not be as relevant today, the broad areas of focus and speed at which Conservatives conducted these efforts could serve as a timeless model for recovery. Baldwin’s actions directly disprove the notion that a substantial reformatting of ideas or policies must occur on a timeline approaching years. Just because the next election is remote, albeit nearly two years have elapsed already, should not engender a relative passivity nor timidity around key decisions.
Evidence suggests the present Conservative leadership has taken a different path, the eventual outcome of which remains to be seen.
Xander West is an independent writer and author of the Grumbling Times substack.
In late 1923, Stanley Baldwin abruptly called a general election on the question of implementing protectionism, in the process throwing away the solid Conservative majority achieved just a year prior and leading to the first Labour government.
Whilst the circumstances of that blunder alone could constitute its own article, the deftness with which Baldwin adjusted to the defeat deserves attention for its contribution to the complete reversal in Conservative fortunes within a year. This entailed considerable changes to the party’s machinery, approach and policies, yet granted it a readiness to take advantage of Labour’s mistakes and the fading mirage of Liberal revival. Although the party-political conditions of the time were quite unique, it represents an arguably textbook recovery for the Conservatives amidst a realigning party system.
In February, ConservativeHome columnist and academic Daniel Pitt set out concisely the components of party renewal: “replenishing the party’s ideational stance; reorganising the party machinery; updating policy; rethinking presentation and party branding; updating personnel and recruiting new candidates.” In Baldwin’s case, the first and most pressing issue was policy. Although the Conservatives remained the largest party after the 1923 election, Labour and the briefly reinvigorated Liberals composed a pro-free trade majority in the House of Commons. Given the election’s referendal basis, an anti-socialist alliance with the latter could not materialise, not to mention Baldwin’s deep suspicion of former Prime Minister David Lloyd George’s potential to split the Conservatives by recreating his postwar coalition. Baldwin’s government duly resigned in January 1924 following defeat at the King’s Speech and Labour formed a ministry under Ramsay MacDonald with informal Liberal support. Fortuitously, there was no clear or immediate challenger to the Conservative leadership, hence recovery proceeded apace. In February, within three weeks of entering opposition, the party abandoned protectionism, which had at least definitively bound the ex-coalition grandees to Baldwin over Lloyd George. Instead, a campaign of anti-socialist propaganda intended to make the Conservative Party the better option of the two opposition parties to challenge Labour.
Baldwin was particularly attentive to the party’s organisation and presentation.
In April, he established a formalised and regularised Consultative Committee of ex-ministers, with policy-forming sub-committees modelled after government practice to perform detailed work between meetings, all serviced by a small policy secretariat under Baldwin’s authority. Historians regard this as the first modern Shadow Cabinet, though the term had been in use for several decades prior, rendering the Official Opposition more coherent as an alternative government and focussed on discrete policy areas to more efficiently shadow the work of ministers.
Elsewhere, he encouraged the expansion of the 1922 Committee, catalysing its evolution from glorified dining club to by 1926 the caucus for all Conservative MPs, as well as the reforming of constituency parties and selection committees to be less sceptical about prospective candidates who were unable to make heavy financial contributions. This internal restructuring culminated in the policy statement Aims and Principles, agreed by the putative Shadow Cabinet at the beginning of May 1924 and published in June as Looking Ahead. Since the ostensible purpose of Baldwin’s protectionist policy was to reduce structural unemployment, a different proactive plan was required alongside anti-socialist rhetoric.
Social reform had been identified as a major policy gap since before the 1923 election, so Neville Chamberlain, as one of the party’s leading authorities on social policy, largely shaped the response to this weakness versus Labour. This included, amongst other ideas, agricultural subsidies in place of tariffs, more housebuilding, improved pensions provision and aid for veterans. The development of Looking Ahead was complemented in May and June by a major speaking tour in which Baldwin articulated the ‘New Conservatism’, a refreshed national image and branding for the party he somewhat personified himself, essentially the inception of the one-nation conservatism that defined his subsequent premierships. Altogether, the changes the Conservatives undertook demonstrated a sensitivity to the new electorate enfranchised in 1918 and the simple fact of Labour attaining government, which understandably altered attitudes throughout the politics of the time.
Thus, only five months after losing office and six since the election, the Conservative Party was prepared to retake power. This was a practical necessity given the minority Labour government depended on finite Liberal acquiescence for its survival; indeed, it could have collapsed before the summer. In the event, it was brought down in early October by the Campbell Case, the botched prosecution of a communist journalist perceived to have been withdrawn under pressure from the Labour left.
Amidst bungled and unpopular treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union, this played perfectly into Conservative attacks on Labour as dangerous and untrustworthy in government. Looking Ahead formed the foundation of the 1924 Conservative manifesto, producing far more clarity amongst activists and voters alike than the protectionist policy sprung at the outset of the previous campaign. Conservative victory, ultimately a landslide, was greatly assisted by the Liberal Party’s abject failure to capitalise on its kingmaker status and prompt return to its by then typical schismatic state. It was effectively part of Conservative strategy to squeeze the Liberals out of the postwar three-party system, knowing it was more likely to receive the lion’s share of the seats in monopolising the anti-Labour vote.
Of course, the political conditions today are rather different. A multi-party system has re-emerged, but more as a looming threat than yet a parliamentary reality. Despite sometimes acting otherwise, Labour possesses the security of a huge majority and can call the next general election whenever it chooses, whereas the Conservative Party is a very distant second in seats.
What has not changed, however, is the need for a party to renew itself following a long spell in office. Whilst the specifics might not be as relevant today, the broad areas of focus and speed at which Conservatives conducted these efforts could serve as a timeless model for recovery. Baldwin’s actions directly disprove the notion that a substantial reformatting of ideas or policies must occur on a timeline approaching years. Just because the next election is remote, albeit nearly two years have elapsed already, should not engender a relative passivity nor timidity around key decisions.
Evidence suggests the present Conservative leadership has taken a different path, the eventual outcome of which remains to be seen.