James Weston is an investor relations professional based in Paris. He studied Economics and Politics at the University of Sheffield and previously worked in the City of London.
After discussing my decision to vote to leave the European Union in 2016 with a friend, he asked whether I regretted it.
Before that point, I hadn’t properly considered the question and had no answer for him. I returned home that evening determined that the next time he asked I would have a clear and assured response.
I began by examining my original reasons for voting to leave the EU, before moving on to assess whether these aims have been achieved post-Brexit. I then ended up with a definitive answer to the question of regret.
I voted to leave the EU primarily because I believed that the EU’s institutional structure constrained Parliamentary sovereignty. Its structures limited Parliament’s ability to freely legislate across the UK, impacting key policy areas and the lives of everyone in Britain. In my view, the only way to return Parliament to its position as the UK’s supreme lawmaking authority was to leave.
I start with Absolute Parliamentary sovereignty. This is when there is no higher source of authority in the land than Parliament, with all other branches of the state subordinate. The UK is a unique case where the constitution is unwritten and therefore the authority of Parliament never officially codified. As a result, its position can be up to interpretation. While I am not nadvocating for the strict doctrine of Absolute Parliamentary sovereignty in the UK. I do believe the British Parliament should be the sole sovereign law making body within the UK, with other devolved institutions playing a subordinate role.
When the UK joined the European Community (EC) in 1973, the British Parliament accepted a significant change to its position. In the modern European Union, the process of legislating is no longer conducted exclusively by Parliaments. Instead, it is performed between national Parliaments and EU institutions, within the agreed policy areas. By signing the Treaty of Accession and enacting the European Communities Act (ECA) in 1972, the UK incorporated European Community laws and accepted that future EU laws would apply in Britain.
In doing so, the UK also accepted the principle of primacy of EU law. This established that, when there was conflict between national law and European Community law, European Community law took precedence. The principle was established in 1964 and is laid out in the Treaty of Lisbon.
A landmark legal case exemplifying the primacy of EU law in the UK and the significant change to Parliament’s position was the outcome of the House of Lords ’judgment in Factortame. In this case UK law was disapplied when it was found to be in conflict with EU law. Therefore, in practice, EU institutions were able to adopt legislation that applied in the UK and required domestic courts to set aside national provisions.
Ultimately, in key policy areas, British Parliamentary sovereignty was steadily eroded, with the meaningful authority shifting to Europe.
One caveat to acknowledge is that Parliament did not lose sovereignty across the whole of the legislative agenda. The EU’s authority applied mainly to key areas such as trade, immigration and energy, whereas Parliament retained control over most other aspects of policy.
However, I am not trying to argue that EU laws that were incorporated by the ECA and subsequent ones, exclusively negatively impacted British citizens. Through the EU, a minimum holiday entitlement and a limited working week was introduced, mutual recognition of professional qualifications and the single market with its standardised regulations of goods made trade across the continent simple and easy.
The UK undoubtedly benefited from these measures which facilitated trade and professional mobility across Europe.
I am instead making the case that within the UK, the Parliament should be the supreme law-making body, not EU institutions, which lack proper democratic representation. This idea has been coined by David Marquand as a “democratic deficit”.
Within the EU’s law-making process, you have three separate institutions which represent differentgroups and interests; There is the European Parliament that is elected by, and represents EU citizens, the Council of the European Union (The Council) represents member states’ governments, made up of national ministers from each EU country and the European Commission, which is the politically independent executive arm.
These institutions have different powers; the Commission is the only institution that can formally initiate legislation, granting it significant power to set the EU agenda. It also manages EU policies, allocates EU funding and represents the EU internationally. The Council co-legislates with the European Parliament, adopts the EU budget, concludes international agreements and develops the EU’s foreign policy.
The European Parliament elects the President and approves the makeup of the Commission and legislation. The Council and the European Parliament must agree together to adopt proposals from the European Commission before any law is approved.
Of the three the European Parliament is the only one, directly elected by European citizens. However, its power is limited. It cannot initiate legislation, instead voting on proposals from the Commission. Neither does it have control over the makeup of the Commission. The European Council nominates the President who then allocates portfolios to the Commissioners, who are proposed by national governments.
My aim here is not to exaggerate the power of the Commission. Instead, I am highlighting the power imbalance between the different institutions only one of them is directly elected by European citizens, whilst the Commission, a non-elected institution, sets and initiates the legislative agenda.
This is where the lack of proper democratic representation lies within the EU. European citizens can choose the makeup of the Parliament, but this institution is kept at arm’s length from the real decision making. In practice, without having the ability to directly or indirectly choose the President or the makeup of the Commission, European citizens have little influence over the EU’s strategic direction.
There is a disconnect between the voters and the decisions taken on their behalf. The European Commission does not represent the people of Europe, neither can they hold it directly to account. This is the essence of its democratic deficit.
This democratic deficit, inevitably permeated into the British system. By increasing the distance between the voters and law makers, it reduced the degree to which voters could hold decision-makers directly accountable. As a result, the United Kingdom was less democratic inside the EU than it was outside it.
Overall, my argument is that the British Parliament should be the ultimate legislative authority in the UK and subordinate to none. This was not how it functioned within the EU, with EU institutions exercising significant legislative authority in key policy areas. I am not arguing that the British Parliament is inherently better at legislating than the EU institutions, rather that, it does not suffer from the same “democratic deficit” that the EU Parliament does. Law makers within the British system are directly elected by and accountable to the voters, that is the key difference, and this is what legitimizes their law making power.
Furthermore, the loss of Parliamentary sovereignty directly impacted policy areas such as trade, immigration, energy and agriculture. Therefore, decisions taken by EU institutions had a real and significant impact on the United Kingdom.
Regarding trade, there is no doubt that British businesses and the economy as a whole broadly benefited from access to the single market and its 450 million consumers. It was a strong argument for staying in the EU and one that I struggled with when deciding which way to vote. The EU was, and still is, the UK’s largest trading partner and a key market for many businesses.
However, single market access came with trade-offs. Certain restrictive regulations increased the cost and complexity to do business in the UK. In addition, the EU’s Common External Tariff (CET) and its “one-size-fits-all” policy approach protected some continental industries often at the expense of either British businesses or consumers. Crucially, EU membership meant that Britain was unable to negotiate its own bilateral trade deals and stopped it pursuing an independent trade policy.
A prime example of a European “one-size-fits-all” policy is the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This operated alongside the CET which placed tariffs on imported food, with quotas, subsidies and income support to create a framework to protect European agricultural industries.
This policy disproportionately benefited continental Europe and its agricultural industries. Sheltering them from the global market, with UK consumers and taxpayers ultimately bearing the cost.
British consumers were left paying higher prices, with tariffs placed on goods from around the world, including from the Commonwealth. With reports estimating that between 1970-90, food prices in the
UK were 10-20 per cent higher due to these policies.
Furthermore, Britain’s agricultural sector makes up a far smaller percentage of the economy than in continental Europe. The sector accounts for only 0.5-0.6% of the UK’s GDP compared with 1.6-1.8 per cent of France’s. Therefore, CAP naturally directed a larger share of its budget and consequently its benefits to continental economies.
On average in the mid-2010s, it cost the British taxpayer around £1.5bn per year net, to fund the CAP budget. The British people were having to subsidise European agriculture and also pay higher food bills.
British politicians saw these problems, and successive UK governments looked to change the policy. From the 1970s up to 2016 amendments were made including, reducing the CAP budget in 2013 and shifting towards environmental payments. However fundamental reform to the policy remained elusive, with the UK ultimately remaining a net contributor and British consumers continuing to face higher food prices.
My aim here is not to simply highlight specific flaws in the CAP, but to illustrate the real-life impact the loss of Parliamentary sovereignty had on the British people. The inability of successive UK governments to reform CAP demonstrates the limits of government influence over European policymaking. Crucially, it shows the loss of Parliamentary sovereignty is not some abstract constitutional issue, rather it had direct negative consequences for the British people.
Before assessing whether Parliamentary sovereignty was restored post-Brexit. It is necessary to outline the key parts of the post-Brexit agreements, and their impact on sovereignty.
that involves the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 (Act) but also other agreements. The Act established the terms of the UK’s orderly withdrawal from the EU and brought legal certainty to key areas such as the application of EU law, Parliamentary sovereignty itself and Northern Ireland.
Section 38 of the Withdrawal Agreement, asserted the sovereignty of Parliament within the UK and that the application of the Act as a whole, did not derogate from the sovereignty of the British Parliament. Its inclusion was symbolic but had limited real impact on Parliamentary sovereignty.
It merely reasserted Parliament’s position within the UK’s constitutional framework but did not create any new legal powers or protections for its position. Rather it was included to reassure MPs of Parliament’s continuing sovereignty post-Brexit. By signing the Withdrawal Agreement, the UK was agreeing to international binding legal obligations that Parliament would not be able to override, and in some agreed areas the agreement would take precedence over domestic law.
Far more importantly, provisions were made to remove the supremacy of EU law.
Section 1 of the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 repealed the ECA, and would take effect on “Exit Day”. Section 5 of the 2018 Act removed the supremacy of EU law over future acts of Parliament although retained EU law could still take precedence over earlier UK legislation where necessary to maintain legal continuity.
Clause 5 of the 2020 Act served a different purpose. It ensured that the Agreement’s provisions take precedence over conflicting UK legislation, which is enforceable by the courts. This bound the UK within the Withdrawal Agreement, thus creating a treaty specific exempt area to the restoration of Parliamentary sovereignty. It is normal for international agreements to take precedence over domestic provisions and therefore does not undermine the broader return of Parliamentary sovereignty.
These sections and clauses were pivotal in returning Parliamentary sovereignty. No longer was domestic legislation constrained by EU law. Parliament had been returned to the highest authority in the land.
Finally, the Northern Ireland Protocol aimed to ensure that there was no hard border in Ireland. It did this by applying relevant EU Single Market and customs rules for goods in Northern Ireland. Within this arrangement the ECJ retained its power to interpret EU law, pertaining to the Protocol, in Northern Ireland. With regard to the Northern Ireland Assembly, it was given the right to vote at set intervals, whether to keep the core Articles of the Protocol.
The Protocol was subsequently renegotiated, with significant changes made by the Windsor Framework. This reduced trade friction for goods destined to stay in Northern Ireland and it introduced the “Stormont Brake”. This gave the Northern Ireland Assembly power, only in exceptional circumstances, to object to the application of significant new EU goods rules. If the Northern Ireland Assembly wishes to use the Stormont Brake, the UK government has the ability to prevent the updated or amended EU law applying in the territory.
From the above description, it is clear that Northern Ireland is neither in a situation equivalent to EU membership, nor to full integration with the UK. Instead, there are mechanisms in place to allow objection or blocking of updated, amended or new laws, tilting the balance of authority between the UK and EU with regards to Northern Ireland.
These mechanisms have elevated Parliament’s position but do not give it parity with the EU. The Protocol limits the ability of Parliament and the devolved administration to legislate in the territory, not legally but in practice through its consequences. For example, the EU can proceed with “remedial measures” if Northern Ireland begins to diverge from EU goods rules.
Furthermore, the EU retains its power of oversight and implementation of EU law. The Protocol leaves Northern Ireland in an ambiguous space, between the UK and the single market, and impedes and constrains Parliament from taking back full practical sovereignty over Northern Ireland, and therefore over the United Kingdom.
However, I understand the Protocol was a response to the unique challenge of the island of Ireland.
No solution was going to be perfect or able to completely satisfy both sides. The Protocol and the subsequent Windsor Framework delivered a workable solution and also delivered Brexit.
After analysing the key parts of the Withdrawal Agreement, I can now conclude this part of the essay by assessing whether Parliamentary sovereignty was in fact restored post Brexit.
Taken together the post-Brexit legal framework, restored Parliamentary sovereignty in most areas. It removed the legal rights EU institutions had to impose laws or regulations on the UK. It made it clear that retained EU law was not supreme to domestic law, whilst also removing the Principle of the Primacy of EU law.
Parliament once again had full constitutional control over the legislative process within Great Britain.
Unfortunately, it is not that simple. The final settlement on Northern Ireland adds a layer of complexity and challenges the argument that Parliamentary sovereignty was restored across the United Kingdom. In Northern Ireland, EU institutions have retained their legal authority to oversee and implement certain single market laws and may even take “remedial measures” if the territory starts to diverge.
Therefore, Parliament does not exercise complete legislative control in Northern Ireland and remains constrained, in practice, by EU law. Constitutional Parliamentary sovereignty was restored across Great Britain but stopped at the Irish Sea.
Even though, as discussed above, Parliamentary sovereignty has not been fully returned to the whole of the United Kingdom, I do not regret voting to leave back in 2016. The current arrangement and murky dual alignment in Northern Ireland are not ideal, but they reflect a political compromise to a uniquely complex challenge, that provides a working situation in the territory while still delivering Brexit.
What matters is that ultimately, the EU is no longer able to exercise legal power in the UK or constrain Parliament’s decisions. In the constitutional sense, Parliamentary sovereignty and its legal supremacy has been restored, even if in practice it remains shaped by the ongoing political realities facing the United Kingdom.
James Weston is an investor relations professional based in Paris. He studied Economics and Politics at the University of Sheffield and previously worked in the City of London.
After discussing my decision to vote to leave the European Union in 2016 with a friend, he asked whether I regretted it.
Before that point, I hadn’t properly considered the question and had no answer for him. I returned home that evening determined that the next time he asked I would have a clear and assured response.
I began by examining my original reasons for voting to leave the EU, before moving on to assess whether these aims have been achieved post-Brexit. I then ended up with a definitive answer to the question of regret.
I voted to leave the EU primarily because I believed that the EU’s institutional structure constrained Parliamentary sovereignty. Its structures limited Parliament’s ability to freely legislate across the UK, impacting key policy areas and the lives of everyone in Britain. In my view, the only way to return Parliament to its position as the UK’s supreme lawmaking authority was to leave.
I start with Absolute Parliamentary sovereignty. This is when there is no higher source of authority in the land than Parliament, with all other branches of the state subordinate. The UK is a unique case where the constitution is unwritten and therefore the authority of Parliament never officially codified. As a result, its position can be up to interpretation. While I am not nadvocating for the strict doctrine of Absolute Parliamentary sovereignty in the UK. I do believe the British Parliament should be the sole sovereign law making body within the UK, with other devolved institutions playing a subordinate role.
When the UK joined the European Community (EC) in 1973, the British Parliament accepted a significant change to its position. In the modern European Union, the process of legislating is no longer conducted exclusively by Parliaments. Instead, it is performed between national Parliaments and EU institutions, within the agreed policy areas. By signing the Treaty of Accession and enacting the European Communities Act (ECA) in 1972, the UK incorporated European Community laws and accepted that future EU laws would apply in Britain.
In doing so, the UK also accepted the principle of primacy of EU law. This established that, when there was conflict between national law and European Community law, European Community law took precedence. The principle was established in 1964 and is laid out in the Treaty of Lisbon.
A landmark legal case exemplifying the primacy of EU law in the UK and the significant change to Parliament’s position was the outcome of the House of Lords ’judgment in Factortame. In this case UK law was disapplied when it was found to be in conflict with EU law. Therefore, in practice, EU institutions were able to adopt legislation that applied in the UK and required domestic courts to set aside national provisions.
Ultimately, in key policy areas, British Parliamentary sovereignty was steadily eroded, with the meaningful authority shifting to Europe.
One caveat to acknowledge is that Parliament did not lose sovereignty across the whole of the legislative agenda. The EU’s authority applied mainly to key areas such as trade, immigration and energy, whereas Parliament retained control over most other aspects of policy.
However, I am not trying to argue that EU laws that were incorporated by the ECA and subsequent ones, exclusively negatively impacted British citizens. Through the EU, a minimum holiday entitlement and a limited working week was introduced, mutual recognition of professional qualifications and the single market with its standardised regulations of goods made trade across the continent simple and easy.
The UK undoubtedly benefited from these measures which facilitated trade and professional mobility across Europe.
I am instead making the case that within the UK, the Parliament should be the supreme law-making body, not EU institutions, which lack proper democratic representation. This idea has been coined by David Marquand as a “democratic deficit”.
Within the EU’s law-making process, you have three separate institutions which represent differentgroups and interests; There is the European Parliament that is elected by, and represents EU citizens, the Council of the European Union (The Council) represents member states’ governments, made up of national ministers from each EU country and the European Commission, which is the politically independent executive arm.
These institutions have different powers; the Commission is the only institution that can formally initiate legislation, granting it significant power to set the EU agenda. It also manages EU policies, allocates EU funding and represents the EU internationally. The Council co-legislates with the European Parliament, adopts the EU budget, concludes international agreements and develops the EU’s foreign policy.
The European Parliament elects the President and approves the makeup of the Commission and legislation. The Council and the European Parliament must agree together to adopt proposals from the European Commission before any law is approved.
Of the three the European Parliament is the only one, directly elected by European citizens. However, its power is limited. It cannot initiate legislation, instead voting on proposals from the Commission. Neither does it have control over the makeup of the Commission. The European Council nominates the President who then allocates portfolios to the Commissioners, who are proposed by national governments.
My aim here is not to exaggerate the power of the Commission. Instead, I am highlighting the power imbalance between the different institutions only one of them is directly elected by European citizens, whilst the Commission, a non-elected institution, sets and initiates the legislative agenda.
This is where the lack of proper democratic representation lies within the EU. European citizens can choose the makeup of the Parliament, but this institution is kept at arm’s length from the real decision making. In practice, without having the ability to directly or indirectly choose the President or the makeup of the Commission, European citizens have little influence over the EU’s strategic direction.
There is a disconnect between the voters and the decisions taken on their behalf. The European Commission does not represent the people of Europe, neither can they hold it directly to account. This is the essence of its democratic deficit.
This democratic deficit, inevitably permeated into the British system. By increasing the distance between the voters and law makers, it reduced the degree to which voters could hold decision-makers directly accountable. As a result, the United Kingdom was less democratic inside the EU than it was outside it.
Overall, my argument is that the British Parliament should be the ultimate legislative authority in the UK and subordinate to none. This was not how it functioned within the EU, with EU institutions exercising significant legislative authority in key policy areas. I am not arguing that the British Parliament is inherently better at legislating than the EU institutions, rather that, it does not suffer from the same “democratic deficit” that the EU Parliament does. Law makers within the British system are directly elected by and accountable to the voters, that is the key difference, and this is what legitimizes their law making power.
Furthermore, the loss of Parliamentary sovereignty directly impacted policy areas such as trade, immigration, energy and agriculture. Therefore, decisions taken by EU institutions had a real and significant impact on the United Kingdom.
Regarding trade, there is no doubt that British businesses and the economy as a whole broadly benefited from access to the single market and its 450 million consumers. It was a strong argument for staying in the EU and one that I struggled with when deciding which way to vote. The EU was, and still is, the UK’s largest trading partner and a key market for many businesses.
However, single market access came with trade-offs. Certain restrictive regulations increased the cost and complexity to do business in the UK. In addition, the EU’s Common External Tariff (CET) and its “one-size-fits-all” policy approach protected some continental industries often at the expense of either British businesses or consumers. Crucially, EU membership meant that Britain was unable to negotiate its own bilateral trade deals and stopped it pursuing an independent trade policy.
A prime example of a European “one-size-fits-all” policy is the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This operated alongside the CET which placed tariffs on imported food, with quotas, subsidies and income support to create a framework to protect European agricultural industries.
This policy disproportionately benefited continental Europe and its agricultural industries. Sheltering them from the global market, with UK consumers and taxpayers ultimately bearing the cost.
British consumers were left paying higher prices, with tariffs placed on goods from around the world, including from the Commonwealth. With reports estimating that between 1970-90, food prices in the
UK were 10-20 per cent higher due to these policies.
Furthermore, Britain’s agricultural sector makes up a far smaller percentage of the economy than in continental Europe. The sector accounts for only 0.5-0.6% of the UK’s GDP compared with 1.6-1.8 per cent of France’s. Therefore, CAP naturally directed a larger share of its budget and consequently its benefits to continental economies.
On average in the mid-2010s, it cost the British taxpayer around £1.5bn per year net, to fund the CAP budget. The British people were having to subsidise European agriculture and also pay higher food bills.
British politicians saw these problems, and successive UK governments looked to change the policy. From the 1970s up to 2016 amendments were made including, reducing the CAP budget in 2013 and shifting towards environmental payments. However fundamental reform to the policy remained elusive, with the UK ultimately remaining a net contributor and British consumers continuing to face higher food prices.
My aim here is not to simply highlight specific flaws in the CAP, but to illustrate the real-life impact the loss of Parliamentary sovereignty had on the British people. The inability of successive UK governments to reform CAP demonstrates the limits of government influence over European policymaking. Crucially, it shows the loss of Parliamentary sovereignty is not some abstract constitutional issue, rather it had direct negative consequences for the British people.
Before assessing whether Parliamentary sovereignty was restored post-Brexit. It is necessary to outline the key parts of the post-Brexit agreements, and their impact on sovereignty.
that involves the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 (Act) but also other agreements. The Act established the terms of the UK’s orderly withdrawal from the EU and brought legal certainty to key areas such as the application of EU law, Parliamentary sovereignty itself and Northern Ireland.
Section 38 of the Withdrawal Agreement, asserted the sovereignty of Parliament within the UK and that the application of the Act as a whole, did not derogate from the sovereignty of the British Parliament. Its inclusion was symbolic but had limited real impact on Parliamentary sovereignty.
It merely reasserted Parliament’s position within the UK’s constitutional framework but did not create any new legal powers or protections for its position. Rather it was included to reassure MPs of Parliament’s continuing sovereignty post-Brexit. By signing the Withdrawal Agreement, the UK was agreeing to international binding legal obligations that Parliament would not be able to override, and in some agreed areas the agreement would take precedence over domestic law.
Far more importantly, provisions were made to remove the supremacy of EU law.
Section 1 of the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 repealed the ECA, and would take effect on “Exit Day”. Section 5 of the 2018 Act removed the supremacy of EU law over future acts of Parliament although retained EU law could still take precedence over earlier UK legislation where necessary to maintain legal continuity.
Clause 5 of the 2020 Act served a different purpose. It ensured that the Agreement’s provisions take precedence over conflicting UK legislation, which is enforceable by the courts. This bound the UK within the Withdrawal Agreement, thus creating a treaty specific exempt area to the restoration of Parliamentary sovereignty. It is normal for international agreements to take precedence over domestic provisions and therefore does not undermine the broader return of Parliamentary sovereignty.
These sections and clauses were pivotal in returning Parliamentary sovereignty. No longer was domestic legislation constrained by EU law. Parliament had been returned to the highest authority in the land.
Finally, the Northern Ireland Protocol aimed to ensure that there was no hard border in Ireland. It did this by applying relevant EU Single Market and customs rules for goods in Northern Ireland. Within this arrangement the ECJ retained its power to interpret EU law, pertaining to the Protocol, in Northern Ireland. With regard to the Northern Ireland Assembly, it was given the right to vote at set intervals, whether to keep the core Articles of the Protocol.
The Protocol was subsequently renegotiated, with significant changes made by the Windsor Framework. This reduced trade friction for goods destined to stay in Northern Ireland and it introduced the “Stormont Brake”. This gave the Northern Ireland Assembly power, only in exceptional circumstances, to object to the application of significant new EU goods rules. If the Northern Ireland Assembly wishes to use the Stormont Brake, the UK government has the ability to prevent the updated or amended EU law applying in the territory.
From the above description, it is clear that Northern Ireland is neither in a situation equivalent to EU membership, nor to full integration with the UK. Instead, there are mechanisms in place to allow objection or blocking of updated, amended or new laws, tilting the balance of authority between the UK and EU with regards to Northern Ireland.
These mechanisms have elevated Parliament’s position but do not give it parity with the EU. The Protocol limits the ability of Parliament and the devolved administration to legislate in the territory, not legally but in practice through its consequences. For example, the EU can proceed with “remedial measures” if Northern Ireland begins to diverge from EU goods rules.
Furthermore, the EU retains its power of oversight and implementation of EU law. The Protocol leaves Northern Ireland in an ambiguous space, between the UK and the single market, and impedes and constrains Parliament from taking back full practical sovereignty over Northern Ireland, and therefore over the United Kingdom.
However, I understand the Protocol was a response to the unique challenge of the island of Ireland.
No solution was going to be perfect or able to completely satisfy both sides. The Protocol and the subsequent Windsor Framework delivered a workable solution and also delivered Brexit.
After analysing the key parts of the Withdrawal Agreement, I can now conclude this part of the essay by assessing whether Parliamentary sovereignty was in fact restored post Brexit.
Taken together the post-Brexit legal framework, restored Parliamentary sovereignty in most areas. It removed the legal rights EU institutions had to impose laws or regulations on the UK. It made it clear that retained EU law was not supreme to domestic law, whilst also removing the Principle of the Primacy of EU law.
Parliament once again had full constitutional control over the legislative process within Great Britain.
Unfortunately, it is not that simple. The final settlement on Northern Ireland adds a layer of complexity and challenges the argument that Parliamentary sovereignty was restored across the United Kingdom. In Northern Ireland, EU institutions have retained their legal authority to oversee and implement certain single market laws and may even take “remedial measures” if the territory starts to diverge.
Therefore, Parliament does not exercise complete legislative control in Northern Ireland and remains constrained, in practice, by EU law. Constitutional Parliamentary sovereignty was restored across Great Britain but stopped at the Irish Sea.
Even though, as discussed above, Parliamentary sovereignty has not been fully returned to the whole of the United Kingdom, I do not regret voting to leave back in 2016. The current arrangement and murky dual alignment in Northern Ireland are not ideal, but they reflect a political compromise to a uniquely complex challenge, that provides a working situation in the territory while still delivering Brexit.
What matters is that ultimately, the EU is no longer able to exercise legal power in the UK or constrain Parliament’s decisions. In the constitutional sense, Parliamentary sovereignty and its legal supremacy has been restored, even if in practice it remains shaped by the ongoing political realities facing the United Kingdom.