Ahmed Imtiaz is a qualified barrister working as a legal counsel for a global insights platform in London. He was a candidate for Westminster Council in the May local elections.
Make America Great Again (MAGA) has been one of the most influential political movements of the 21st century.
It has reshaped the Republican Party, reordered the American right, and altered the country’s political vocabulary. Donald Trump correctly identified the frustrations of working‑class Americans and channelled them into a durable populist coalition. Trump’s control over the MAGA base and therefore over the Republican Party is stronger today than at any point in his political career.
Three recent Republican primaries illustrate this dominance. The first test came in Louisiana, where Trump sought political revenge against Senator Bill Cassidy, who had voted to convict him during the impeachment trial. Trump endorsed Representative Julia Letlow, who topped the primary field, followed by former Congressman John Fleming, another Trump ally. The message to Republican senators and representatives was unmistakable: crossing Trump carries consequences, and loyalty is rewarded.
This impression was reinforced in Kentucky, where Trump backed Ed Gallrein, a farmer and former Navy SEAL, against incumbent Congressman Thomas Massie. The race became the most expensive House primary in American history, with more than $32 million spent. Massie, a libertarian conservative, had long clashed with Trump, most notably when he attempted to force a recorded vote on the 2020 COVID relief bill. Trump denounced him as a “grandstander” and urged Republicans to “throw him out” of the party. Gallrein’s victory demonstrated that Trump can still mobilise MAGA voters to punish ideological dissent.
The most dramatic example came in Texas, where Trump endorsed State Attorney General Ken Paxton in his challenge to Senator John Cornyn. Paxton defeated Cornyn by a 28‑point margin, ending Cornyn’s 24‑year Senate career. Taken together, these contests confirm that Trump’s endorsement remains the decisive force in Republican primary politics and that the cost of crossing him is now a political career. Traditional conservatives who deviate from Trump’s line risk swift political extinction.
Yet Trump’s dominance within the United States should not be mistaken for influence over right‑leaning electorates abroad. In fact, Trump’s interventions often have the opposite effect: they weaken conservative parties, energise their opponents, and force right‑of‑centre leaders to distance themselves from him.
Australia offers the first example. After Trump’s 2024 victory, Liberal Party leader Peter Dutton praised him enthusiastically. But Trump’s subsequent tariff threats including universal tariffs that would hit Australian exports, which blindsided the Liberals. Anthony Albanese capitalised on this uncertainty, presenting Labor as the safer pair of hands in a volatile global environment. Labor went on to win a clear and decisive majority. Trump’s protectionism, far from helping the Australian right, strengthened its opponents.
Canada provides an even clearer illustration. For more than a year, the Conservative Party enjoyed a commanding 20‑point lead over the Liberals. But two developments transformed the race: the Liberals replaced Justin Trudeau with Mark Carney, and Trump began making provocative statements about Canada, including remarks about annexing it as the “51st state” and imposing new tariffs. These comments were deeply unpopular among Canadian voters, including conservatives. The result was a collapse in Conservative support and the loss of seats, including that of party leader Pierre Poilievre. Trump’s rhetoric, intended to bolster ideological allies, instead produced a backlash that helped the Liberals regain power.
The most recent example comes from Hungary. Trump and his allies openly supported Viktor Orbán, who has been in office since 2010. Vice President JD Vance travelled to Budapest to campaign for him, and Trump addressed supporters by phone. Yet none of this shifted the political landscape. Péter Magyar’s Tisza Party won by a wide margin, demonstrating that Trump’s endorsement carries little weight in European conservative politics.
Across Europe, shrewd right‑leaning leaders are learning that Trump’s appeal does not translate beyond the United States. MAGA is, by design, an America First movement. Policies such as tariffs, threats of annexation, or transactional diplomacy may resonate with Trump’s domestic base, but they are perceived as hostile by nationalists in other countries. As a result, global conservative leaders, including Kemi Badenoch, should keep Trump at arm’s length.
Two recent examples stand out. In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, a highly skilled political operator, has maintained a careful distance from Trump, particularly on issues such as Ukraine. She recognises that aligning too closely with MAGA risks alienating her own electorate and undermining Italy’s strategic position in Europe.
On the US-Israeli strikes against Iran, Meloni declared the conflict outside the framework of international law, announced that Italian territory would not be used for offensive operations, and denied US bombers transit through Sigonella. When Trump attacked Pope Leo XIV for calling for an end to hostilities, Meloni condemned his remarks as unacceptable.
In Germany, Chancellor Friedrich Merz has pushed back against Trump’s threats to withdraw from NATO’s security umbrella, urging Europe to strengthen its own defence capabilities rather than rely on American politics. Both leaders understand that Trump’s brand of nationalism is not easily exportable.
Right-leaning parties, including the Conservative Party, should take note. Trump’s influence over American conservatives is undeniable, but it does not follow that his positions should be adopted uncritically abroad. The Conservative Party should be prepared to push back openly on issues such as tariffs or any statements that undermine the UK’s interests.
Trump’s power is real, but it is also parochial. MAGA dominates the American right, yet its international reach is limited, inconsistent, and often counterproductive. Blanket deference to Trump is not the same as conservative conviction, and British voters are not MAGA voters.
A Conservative Party that shadows every Trump position on tariffs, on NATO, on the international order will find itself wrong-footed in the same way Dutton was wrong-footed in Australia, and for the same reason.
British conservatism has its own intellectual tradition, one rooted in national interest, institutional stability, and ordered liberty, and it neither needs nor benefits from an American franchise.
Ahmed Imtiaz is a qualified barrister working as a legal counsel for a global insights platform in London. He was a candidate for Westminster Council in the May local elections.
Make America Great Again (MAGA) has been one of the most influential political movements of the 21st century.
It has reshaped the Republican Party, reordered the American right, and altered the country’s political vocabulary. Donald Trump correctly identified the frustrations of working‑class Americans and channelled them into a durable populist coalition. Trump’s control over the MAGA base and therefore over the Republican Party is stronger today than at any point in his political career.
Three recent Republican primaries illustrate this dominance. The first test came in Louisiana, where Trump sought political revenge against Senator Bill Cassidy, who had voted to convict him during the impeachment trial. Trump endorsed Representative Julia Letlow, who topped the primary field, followed by former Congressman John Fleming, another Trump ally. The message to Republican senators and representatives was unmistakable: crossing Trump carries consequences, and loyalty is rewarded.
This impression was reinforced in Kentucky, where Trump backed Ed Gallrein, a farmer and former Navy SEAL, against incumbent Congressman Thomas Massie. The race became the most expensive House primary in American history, with more than $32 million spent. Massie, a libertarian conservative, had long clashed with Trump, most notably when he attempted to force a recorded vote on the 2020 COVID relief bill. Trump denounced him as a “grandstander” and urged Republicans to “throw him out” of the party. Gallrein’s victory demonstrated that Trump can still mobilise MAGA voters to punish ideological dissent.
The most dramatic example came in Texas, where Trump endorsed State Attorney General Ken Paxton in his challenge to Senator John Cornyn. Paxton defeated Cornyn by a 28‑point margin, ending Cornyn’s 24‑year Senate career. Taken together, these contests confirm that Trump’s endorsement remains the decisive force in Republican primary politics and that the cost of crossing him is now a political career. Traditional conservatives who deviate from Trump’s line risk swift political extinction.
Yet Trump’s dominance within the United States should not be mistaken for influence over right‑leaning electorates abroad. In fact, Trump’s interventions often have the opposite effect: they weaken conservative parties, energise their opponents, and force right‑of‑centre leaders to distance themselves from him.
Australia offers the first example. After Trump’s 2024 victory, Liberal Party leader Peter Dutton praised him enthusiastically. But Trump’s subsequent tariff threats including universal tariffs that would hit Australian exports, which blindsided the Liberals. Anthony Albanese capitalised on this uncertainty, presenting Labor as the safer pair of hands in a volatile global environment. Labor went on to win a clear and decisive majority. Trump’s protectionism, far from helping the Australian right, strengthened its opponents.
Canada provides an even clearer illustration. For more than a year, the Conservative Party enjoyed a commanding 20‑point lead over the Liberals. But two developments transformed the race: the Liberals replaced Justin Trudeau with Mark Carney, and Trump began making provocative statements about Canada, including remarks about annexing it as the “51st state” and imposing new tariffs. These comments were deeply unpopular among Canadian voters, including conservatives. The result was a collapse in Conservative support and the loss of seats, including that of party leader Pierre Poilievre. Trump’s rhetoric, intended to bolster ideological allies, instead produced a backlash that helped the Liberals regain power.
The most recent example comes from Hungary. Trump and his allies openly supported Viktor Orbán, who has been in office since 2010. Vice President JD Vance travelled to Budapest to campaign for him, and Trump addressed supporters by phone. Yet none of this shifted the political landscape. Péter Magyar’s Tisza Party won by a wide margin, demonstrating that Trump’s endorsement carries little weight in European conservative politics.
Across Europe, shrewd right‑leaning leaders are learning that Trump’s appeal does not translate beyond the United States. MAGA is, by design, an America First movement. Policies such as tariffs, threats of annexation, or transactional diplomacy may resonate with Trump’s domestic base, but they are perceived as hostile by nationalists in other countries. As a result, global conservative leaders, including Kemi Badenoch, should keep Trump at arm’s length.
Two recent examples stand out. In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, a highly skilled political operator, has maintained a careful distance from Trump, particularly on issues such as Ukraine. She recognises that aligning too closely with MAGA risks alienating her own electorate and undermining Italy’s strategic position in Europe.
On the US-Israeli strikes against Iran, Meloni declared the conflict outside the framework of international law, announced that Italian territory would not be used for offensive operations, and denied US bombers transit through Sigonella. When Trump attacked Pope Leo XIV for calling for an end to hostilities, Meloni condemned his remarks as unacceptable.
In Germany, Chancellor Friedrich Merz has pushed back against Trump’s threats to withdraw from NATO’s security umbrella, urging Europe to strengthen its own defence capabilities rather than rely on American politics. Both leaders understand that Trump’s brand of nationalism is not easily exportable.
Right-leaning parties, including the Conservative Party, should take note. Trump’s influence over American conservatives is undeniable, but it does not follow that his positions should be adopted uncritically abroad. The Conservative Party should be prepared to push back openly on issues such as tariffs or any statements that undermine the UK’s interests.
Trump’s power is real, but it is also parochial. MAGA dominates the American right, yet its international reach is limited, inconsistent, and often counterproductive. Blanket deference to Trump is not the same as conservative conviction, and British voters are not MAGA voters.
A Conservative Party that shadows every Trump position on tariffs, on NATO, on the international order will find itself wrong-footed in the same way Dutton was wrong-footed in Australia, and for the same reason.
British conservatism has its own intellectual tradition, one rooted in national interest, institutional stability, and ordered liberty, and it neither needs nor benefits from an American franchise.