Peter Franklin is an Associate Editor of UnHerd.
Andy Burnham is a lucky man.
A decade ago, when he got bulldozered by Jeremy Corbyn, he could have sunk without trace like Owen Smith (remember him?). Instead, Burnham got to be the mayor of Greater Manchester — a serious political job, but far away from Westminster. Perhaps one day he’ll thank the Conservatives who created the role and reversed the suffocating centralisation of the Brown years.
On a less positive note, he should also thank the Tories who wasted the general election victory of 2019 — and, of course, Keir Starmer for doing the same after 2024. Without those episodes of staggering ineptitude, Burnham wouldn’t have had a power vacuum to step into.
Another stroke of good luck: the fact that a Greater Manchester seat came free so soon after Labour’s local election disaster in May. Don’t believe the spin that Burnham “chose” Makerfield. He tried to engineer by-elections elsewhere, but it was here that the stars happened to align — and he took his chance. Even then, it might not have worked out for him had Reform run a remotely competent campaign. But evidently, they decided not to go for that.
As a result, Burnham’s victory was so overwhelming that it propelled him not only back to Westminster, but all the way — we must assume — to Downing Street. The traps that Starmer had waiting for him were instantly obliterated — and, the same appears to be true of any rival bids for the leadership. It’s possible that Al Carns will stand or even Angela Rayner (who’s yet to fully bend the knee). But, barring mishaps, a coronation is the likeliest outcome.
Friedrich Nietzsche once defined happiness as the “the feeling that power is growing, that resistance is overcome.” If that’s true, then Burnham ought to be ecstatic. And yet, at some point soon, he’s going to have to choose a path down which to direct his momentum. Specifically, he’s got two crucial decisions to make — and they’re not easy ones.
The first is whether or not to call an early general election. The case for doing so is that he could win a personal mandate — plus a chance to dump the unwanted baggage of he Starmer years. The case against is that he’d be sacrificing the guarantee of a triple-figure Commons majority for the next two to three years.
The second big decision is whether or not to shift Labour to the left. It seems like a bad dream now, but in 2017 Jeremy Corbyn came alarmingly close to winning a general election. Labour’s 40 per cent vote share was the highest for the party in any general election since 2001. Furthermore, he pulled it off not because the Conservatives fell back (Theresa May actually increased our vote share by more than five points) but by uniting the left. The smaller leftwing parties — principally the Greens and the SNP — lost votes to Labour. Corbyn also motivated left-leaning non-voters to turn out in the hope of change.
Note that Burnham’s unite-the-left strategy doesn’t need to get anywhere close to 40 per cent.
In a fragmented party system, not much more than 30 per cent could be enough for a majority (as it was for Keir Starmer in 2024). And even if Burnham falls short, he’s always got the option of a coalition with the Lib Dems — who might prove easier to manage than his own backbenchers.
If Burnham does choose to pursue this course, what might his policies look like? Well, they wouldn’t be as radical as either of the Corbyn manifestos — but, compared to Starmer, we’d see a commitment towards higher spending and higher borrowing — with a looser set of fiscal rules to match. There’d be one or more wealth taxes plus some language (probably quite vague) around taking utilities back into public ownership. Immigration controls would be loosened too, along with some further concessions to woke activists on trans issues. There’d be a doubling-down on Ed Miliband’s energy policies, a move towards electoral reform and the promise of much closer alignment with the European Union. All-in-all, a bit of a nightmare.
But it’s a testament to Burnham’s chameleon-like qualities that a very different platform aimed at winning back Reform voters is also plausible. This would entail some Blue Labour vibes, though not the full substance. There’d be an emphasis on investment in infrastructure and job creation — and a fully-funded defence policy would be prioritised over welfare spending (at least in theory). Add to that some tough talk on controlling our borders — and the rejection of Starmer’s least patriotic policies, like the Chagos surrender. As for leftwing voters, Burnham wouldn’t spurn their support, but his main message to them would be: it’s either me or Farage.
So which strategy will he choose: unite-the-left or Makerfield writ large?
The signals so far are mixed — and it’s in Burnham’s nature to have it both ways for as long as he can. Nevertheless, he’ll be forced to show his hand when he appoints his first Cabinet.
His choice of Chancellor will be especially telling.
If the new Prime Minister is mad enough to opt for Ed Miliband or Louise Haigh, then a lurch to the left will surely follow. If, on the other hand, the Treasury goes to someone like Wes Streeting or Pat McFadden, then that’ll mean Burnham’s jumped the other way. Keep a watch on the Home Office too. If Shabana Mahmood remains in place along with her comparatively tough line on immigration (not withstanding her latest sop to the left), then that’s a sign that a macro-Makerfield strategy is in play. If, however, she’s replaced with an immigration liberal, that will indicate that Corbynism-lite has won out.
A key point about the two strategic decisions facing Burnham — i.e. whether to call a snap election or not and whether to lurch to the left or not — is that they’re independent of one another. Therefore, leaving aside the possibility that Burnham fails to make his mind up, four crocodilian scenarios present themselves: 1) snap and lurch, 2) snap but don’t lurch, 3) lurch but don’t snap, and 4) neither lurch nor snap.
How good or bad are each of these for Conservative strategy? As I’ve argued elsewhere, Kemi Badenoch has the most to lose of all the party leaders from an early general election. She’s playing the long game, betting that a) the cracks in Reform start to show, b) Labour comes unstuck economically and c) memories of the last Conservative government fade away. Therefore both the snap scenarios would be bad news.
But of the two, an early election combined with a Labour lurch to left would be the most disruptive. In recent weeks, Badenoch has gone out of her way to reject any deal with Reform. Her exact words on the possibility are “no, no, no, no, no, no, no”. This really doesn’t look like a mere delaying tactic. Indeed, I’d suggest it’s an integral part of a survival plan for an early general election.
Back in November, I argued that tactical support from left-leaning voters could prove crucial in Conservative/Reform marginals (i.e. most of the seats that we currently hold). Perhaps CCHQ has come to the same conclusion. Certainly, Badenoch’s antipathy to Farage and all his works appears calculated to maximise tactical votes from the anyone-but-Reform tendency. I look forward to the “Labour/Lib Dems/Greens can’t win here” leaflets.
Badenoch can expect some pushback on this positioning. In fact, it’s already started with Edward Leigh and other MPs calling for a deal with Reform instead. Those calls would become much harder to resist if Burnham combines an early election with a unite-the-left strategy. If the polls show non-Labour leftwingers flocking to Burnham’s banner, then a unite-the-right counter-strategy will become irresistible. Badenoch would have to perform a u-turn or face a full-scale party rebellion — not a good look just before an election campaign.
The two no-snap scenarios are more promising.
For instance, if Burnham lurches to the left without seeking a fresh mandate he’d be vulnerable on several fronts — not least to a financial crisis of confidence that could split the Labour Party in two. Even better is the other no-snap scenario in which Burnham prioritises winning back Reform supporters. Either he’d succeed, in which case Reform would be plunged into crisis (good for us) or he’d fail — most likely because he wouldn’t be able to act tough on immigration or cut the welfare bill without Conservative help (also good for us).
The last time that Labour chose a new Prime Minister by acclamation was 2007. What followed was fevered speculation that a snap election was imminent — but, infamously, Gordon Brown bottled it. We can only hope that history repeats itself.