Anne-Marie Trevelyan was Minister for Defence Procurement 2019-20 and Minister for the Indo-Pacific 2022-24.
Every day on my bus to work I see Admiral Nelson looking across London from his great column in Trafalgar Square – so named after his great victory over the French at the Battle of Trafalgar. British sailors today come in and out of the Plymouth Sound and look up at Plymouth Hoe from whence Sir Francis Drake oversaw victory against the Spanish. Every day, as the Prime Minister’s car turns into Parliament, they can look out of the window to see Churchill towering, stooped, over the passing tourists – another great British leader who declared on behalf of his nation “Not on my watch are our enemies going to win.”
So when John Healey, our former Defence Secretary, felt he had no option but to resign, calling out his Prime Minister and Chancellor as unable and unwilling to do all that was necessary to protect our country, we should all have been really concerned about where that core principle has gone.
Why have recent PMs spoken punchy but with a smaller stick? Why have we allowed ourselves to ignore the increasing threats coming at us, from disinformation campaigns and dissent through TikTok to Russian submarines circumnavigating UK waters and mapping our Critical National Infrastructure? This cannot continue and the NATO summit will be the moment when a harsh light is shone on the inadequate funding so far allocated this week to the UK’s defence budget.
The Summit in Ankara comes at a pivotal moment for the Alliance. The last four years have shaken our assumed security, bringing profound geopolitical upheaval from the Eastern European flank with Russia’s continuing war in Ukraine, to the flare-ups in the Middle East, and growing global competition which reminds us here in leafy peaceful Western Europe that the Euro‑Atlantic and Indo‑Pacific’s security are indivisible.
Against this backdrop, and the firm demand from the USA (who have been spending over 75 per cent of total NATO budgets for decades) that everyone else up their spending and commitments, the summit will test NATO’s unity, ambition, and credibility. For the UK, long regarded as one of the Alliance’s leading military powers, the meeting presents both an opportunity to shape NATO’s future direction and a challenge to maintain our influence in an increasingly competitive and fast‑moving alliance.
The summit in Ankara will focus on reviewing progress since the last year and to set the roadmap for delivering NATO’s core strategic objectives. These objectives will revolve around three central pillars: increased defence investment, strengthened defence industrial capacity, and sustained support for Ukraine.
The scale of ambition is unprecedented. Last year NATO allies collectively agreed to a new benchmark of 5 per cent of GDP on defence and domestic security spending by 2035 – more than doubling the long-standing 2 per cent target. This pledge reflects the shared recognition that the Alliance faces its most dangerous security environment since the Cold War. Russia remains the most immediate threat to NATO nations, from hybrid attacks and cyber warfare to pressure on critical infrastructure which demand expansion of the scope of deterrence needed.
At Ankara, therefore, the focus will not be on setting new ambitions but on implementation: turning pledges into credible capabilities. As Secretary General Mark Rutte has framed it, the task is to ensure that Allies are “not only investing more but investing in the right capabilities.”
Ukraine will remain central to the summit’s agenda. NATO allies have already committed vast military assistance – amounting to tens of billions annually in financial support as well as bombs and bullets – and will seek to demonstrate continued unity in sustaining Kyiv’s war effort. The challenge is both political and practical. We must maintain that long-term support because the incredibly brave Ukrainians are literally defending democracy alongside their own survival.
But NATO’s agenda is not confined to Europe. Indo‑Pacific partners such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand are all recognising that security challenges are interconnected across regions. Our mutual and collective security is dependent on free and open waterways, safe airspace, and cross-border management of people. The deepening alignment between China, Russia, and North Korea has forced us to confront these realities.
The issue set to dominate discussions in Ankara will be that spending number. The 3.5 per cent target for hard power investment represents a shift in expectations and now exposes significant disparities among allies. Eastern European states, who can see the whites of the eyes of Russian soldiers peering across their borders, from Poland to the Baltics – are now spending well above 3 per cent of GDP, with Poland exceeding 4 per cent and leading the Alliance. The United States continues to spend over 3 per cent, maintaining its dominant contribution in absolute terms.
By contrast, many Western European states are only just above the previous 2 per cent baseline, and progress toward the new benchmark is uneven. We don’t seem to feel the threat as we should yet. This divergence risks creating a two‑tier alliance and a lack of trust in each other which would be viewed as a great success for Putin. My great worry is that within this context the UK’s position is worsening.
We have historically been one of NATO’s leading military powers, combining significant defence spending with high‑end capabilities and global reach. We remain one of the largest contributors in absolute terms and play a leading role as the provider of the nuclear deterrence umbrella for Europe with our Continuous At Sea Deterrent, world leading intelligence, and expeditionary operations across the Nordics and with troops forward deployed from Cyprus to Estonia.
In relative terms however, the UK’s position has shifted. The latest announcement speaks to a 2.7 per cent commitment, which whilst being a small but real cash increase, now places the UK only modestly above the NATO average – and well behind the most ambitious allies. What was once a leadership position has become middle‑ranking. In the emerging debate over meeting the 5 per cent target, the UK is right now closer to those struggling to scale up investment than to those setting the pace.
In an Alliance where relative effort matters, the UK risks being seen not as a driver of ambition but as a laggard. That perception has implications for influence: credibility in NATO is closely tied to demonstrable commitment, and spending levels remain the most visible metric of that commitment. The 1.5 per cent balance ask to get to the new 5 per cent target comes from domestic resilience. If we are not able to protect our critical national infrastructure then every power station, hospital, reservoir and subsea cable are targets for those who wish us harm.
Despite these challenges, the UK remains a leader within NATO. We bring a full-spectrum military capability, including nuclear forces, advanced air and maritime platforms, and a globally deployable force structure to NATO’s service. We are embedded in NATO’s command structures and play a leading role in shaping operational planning.
The Ankara summit will be less about grand declarations than about credibility. NATO has already set an ambitious direction; the challenge now is delivery. For the UK, the stakes are particularly high. Success will be dependent on whether we can align resources with those ambitions. If we can articulate a credible funding pathway for the spending needed alongside our continuing military leadership, we will remain central to NATO’s future. If not, we risk an erosion of influence within the Alliance. The 2026 NATO Summit is not only about the future of the Alliance – it will be a referendum on the UK’s place within it.