Cody Butler is the former Chair of the One Nation Conservative Network, a grassroots organisation dedicated to advancing pragmatic and compassionate conservatism.
I am something of an outlier among Tories. To borrow from a Guardian journalist, I am no camp young fogey nursing a kitsch obsession with the Iron Lady. Quite the reverse: I am a wet to the core, with an ever-deepening fascination with Gilmour, Heseltine, Macmillan, Hailsham and that entire gallery of supposed traitors to the Party. I am a young graduate, a soon-to-be NEET, who wants a home one day, cares about the environment, and wants a better relationship with Europe and a good economy.
And yet, I have left the Tory Party.
The decision was not easy, but I have a point to make and I mean to stand upon it, even if my parents lament the choice as one more obstacle to graduate employment.
I am a One Nation Tory whose conservative disposition runs almost opposite to the Keminisation of the Party, and I think nuance is increasingly undervalued in our political culture. Enemies are preferred and convenient targets are often found: CCHQ one day, a faction the next, or some distant figure branded a liberal. The online attention economy rewards that which is punchy and immediate. So the old style of politics, to the dismay of the old Etonians, is hopelessly swallowed up by labels and that oh-so-misunderstood term, populism.
When I resigned, quite publicly and intentionally so, I confess I received a fair bit of negativity; not that I care much, because it was free publicity. The more they engaged, the more I will have the last laugh.
But it raises a broader question about double standards, political culture, and the choice my remaining wet, damp and dry friends have to make – the damp denoting the opportunistic class who trade only in ambiguity and convictionless power.
First, consider Jacob Rees-Mogg. He appeared at the Reform UK Conference in 2025 and even spoke at it. Contrast that with the treatment of Sir David Gauke, a man who has been criticised on this very site.
Secondly, look at the political language used by the leadership. Reform supporters are cast as a misguided flock of sheep, who have been led astray by malignant shepherds. Centrists, by comparison, are ignored, labelled deranged zealots, liberals or fake Conservatives, declared wrong about everything, and even held responsible for the 2024 defeat.
The rhetoric of unity and the invocation of an “existential threat” to justify heavy-handed measures in defence of “Toryism” is a thin veil. What it conceals is a one-sided arrangement: a single hard-line faction runs the Tory party, and you are now only allowed to conform to its direction.
Simply put, the party is an unwelcoming space for people of a ‘centrist temperament.’ The consequence is the slow eradication of political traditions from the party, the loss of voters who feel familiar with and reassured by moderates, and a sense that the Conservatives have abandoned them.
It is not even a stretch to conclude that Badenoch has implied, rhetorically, that ‘centrist ideas are no longer wanted.’ She has purged Gavin Barwell and Grant Shapps, might even reject Penny Mordaunt, and has consistently shown a willingness, sometimes even an encouragement, to let people leave.
It is worth caveating this by noting that the wets have typically been a minority within the Conservative Party. The 2005 leadership election illustrates this well: among Cameron’s parliamentary supporters, 51 were socially conservative against 22 socially liberal; 65 economically dry against 21 economically wet; and 78 Eurosceptic against just five Europhiles.
Yet the current direction risks losing centrist, liberal-leaning voters. Look at Lord Ashcroft’s 2005 election research: it showed that support for some Conservative policies did not translate into automatic support for the Conservatives because the party’s brand was tarnished, a problem that subsequently informed David Cameron’s modernisation efforts. These voters hold completely different political and psychological dispositions from the party membership and thus require a separate offering to coax them.
More in Common’s ‘Established Liberals’, for example, are socially liberal but economically right-leaning, and are characterised by institutional trust, optimism, compromise and internationalism. Onward’s Breaking Blue similarly identifies ‘Right Liberals’ as economically right-wing but culturally liberal, finding that Conservative support among them increased from 44 per cent in 2010 to 53 per cent in 2015, during a period in which the party pursued socially liberal policies such as same-sex marriage.
For them, feeling that a party is socially acceptable, moderate, liberal and respectful of people like themselves can be part of what makes it electorally acceptable in the first place. However, the well of reasons for these voters to support the Conservatives is running dry. Tax cuts will not compensate indefinitely for a perception that the party is morally or culturally objectionable.
The same applies to environmental policy and Europe. If the party defines environmental policy primarily through what it opposes, such as net zero, while failing to cultivate any positive association with environmental responsibility, it risks making itself increasingly unattractive to liberal-leaning voters for whom environmental concern is part of their broader political identity.
Likewise, if polling suggests that around 55 per cent of the electorate would now support rejoining the European Union, maintaining an increasingly binary position within the party will simply alienate those voters.
There is also a generational problem. NatCen’s 2024 analysis of British Social Attitudes data directly tested whether younger generations would “grow out of” their liberalism. It found that generations’ average attitudes change remarkably little as they age, with Gen Z and Millennials remaining more liberal than previous generations were at the same age. This cohort will only continue to grow.
This is becoming an increasingly potent question, and it is not just me saying this. In a recent Times article, several high-profile sources within the party expressed concern that no serious effort was being made to appeal to Labour or Liberal Democrat voters.
The consequence, if left unattended, is clear. If you institutionally remove representatives, create a culture of mocking and scapegoating, and design policies that appeal primarily to one wing of the electorate, you lose the moderates.
Cody Butler is the former Chair of the One Nation Conservative Network, a grassroots organisation dedicated to advancing pragmatic and compassionate conservatism.
I am something of an outlier among Tories. To borrow from a Guardian journalist, I am no camp young fogey nursing a kitsch obsession with the Iron Lady. Quite the reverse: I am a wet to the core, with an ever-deepening fascination with Gilmour, Heseltine, Macmillan, Hailsham and that entire gallery of supposed traitors to the Party. I am a young graduate, a soon-to-be NEET, who wants a home one day, cares about the environment, and wants a better relationship with Europe and a good economy.
And yet, I have left the Tory Party.
The decision was not easy, but I have a point to make and I mean to stand upon it, even if my parents lament the choice as one more obstacle to graduate employment.
I am a One Nation Tory whose conservative disposition runs almost opposite to the Keminisation of the Party, and I think nuance is increasingly undervalued in our political culture. Enemies are preferred and convenient targets are often found: CCHQ one day, a faction the next, or some distant figure branded a liberal. The online attention economy rewards that which is punchy and immediate. So the old style of politics, to the dismay of the old Etonians, is hopelessly swallowed up by labels and that oh-so-misunderstood term, populism.
When I resigned, quite publicly and intentionally so, I confess I received a fair bit of negativity; not that I care much, because it was free publicity. The more they engaged, the more I will have the last laugh.
But it raises a broader question about double standards, political culture, and the choice my remaining wet, damp and dry friends have to make – the damp denoting the opportunistic class who trade only in ambiguity and convictionless power.
First, consider Jacob Rees-Mogg. He appeared at the Reform UK Conference in 2025 and even spoke at it. Contrast that with the treatment of Sir David Gauke, a man who has been criticised on this very site.
Secondly, look at the political language used by the leadership. Reform supporters are cast as a misguided flock of sheep, who have been led astray by malignant shepherds. Centrists, by comparison, are ignored, labelled deranged zealots, liberals or fake Conservatives, declared wrong about everything, and even held responsible for the 2024 defeat.
The rhetoric of unity and the invocation of an “existential threat” to justify heavy-handed measures in defence of “Toryism” is a thin veil. What it conceals is a one-sided arrangement: a single hard-line faction runs the Tory party, and you are now only allowed to conform to its direction.
Simply put, the party is an unwelcoming space for people of a ‘centrist temperament.’ The consequence is the slow eradication of political traditions from the party, the loss of voters who feel familiar with and reassured by moderates, and a sense that the Conservatives have abandoned them.
It is not even a stretch to conclude that Badenoch has implied, rhetorically, that ‘centrist ideas are no longer wanted.’ She has purged Gavin Barwell and Grant Shapps, might even reject Penny Mordaunt, and has consistently shown a willingness, sometimes even an encouragement, to let people leave.
It is worth caveating this by noting that the wets have typically been a minority within the Conservative Party. The 2005 leadership election illustrates this well: among Cameron’s parliamentary supporters, 51 were socially conservative against 22 socially liberal; 65 economically dry against 21 economically wet; and 78 Eurosceptic against just five Europhiles.
Yet the current direction risks losing centrist, liberal-leaning voters. Look at Lord Ashcroft’s 2005 election research: it showed that support for some Conservative policies did not translate into automatic support for the Conservatives because the party’s brand was tarnished, a problem that subsequently informed David Cameron’s modernisation efforts. These voters hold completely different political and psychological dispositions from the party membership and thus require a separate offering to coax them.
More in Common’s ‘Established Liberals’, for example, are socially liberal but economically right-leaning, and are characterised by institutional trust, optimism, compromise and internationalism. Onward’s Breaking Blue similarly identifies ‘Right Liberals’ as economically right-wing but culturally liberal, finding that Conservative support among them increased from 44 per cent in 2010 to 53 per cent in 2015, during a period in which the party pursued socially liberal policies such as same-sex marriage.
For them, feeling that a party is socially acceptable, moderate, liberal and respectful of people like themselves can be part of what makes it electorally acceptable in the first place. However, the well of reasons for these voters to support the Conservatives is running dry. Tax cuts will not compensate indefinitely for a perception that the party is morally or culturally objectionable.
The same applies to environmental policy and Europe. If the party defines environmental policy primarily through what it opposes, such as net zero, while failing to cultivate any positive association with environmental responsibility, it risks making itself increasingly unattractive to liberal-leaning voters for whom environmental concern is part of their broader political identity.
Likewise, if polling suggests that around 55 per cent of the electorate would now support rejoining the European Union, maintaining an increasingly binary position within the party will simply alienate those voters.
There is also a generational problem. NatCen’s 2024 analysis of British Social Attitudes data directly tested whether younger generations would “grow out of” their liberalism. It found that generations’ average attitudes change remarkably little as they age, with Gen Z and Millennials remaining more liberal than previous generations were at the same age. This cohort will only continue to grow.
This is becoming an increasingly potent question, and it is not just me saying this. In a recent Times article, several high-profile sources within the party expressed concern that no serious effort was being made to appeal to Labour or Liberal Democrat voters.
The consequence, if left unattended, is clear. If you institutionally remove representatives, create a culture of mocking and scapegoating, and design policies that appeal primarily to one wing of the electorate, you lose the moderates.