Geoff Williams is a former RAF Tornado GR4 pilot with operational service experience over Iraq, Afghanistan, and parts of Africa.
After 12 years’ service as an RAF Fighter pilot, it’s fair to say I was delighted that the Conservative Party put the issue of UK Air Defence front and centre of their party conference.
Whatever the political arguments over the Britannia Shield policy announcement, it should be welcome to all who care about Defence that we are now having a serious debate about how to protect ourselves from the new age of drone and missile threats.
As the story broke, some commentators focused on whether Britannia Shield is comparable to Israel’s ‘Iron Dome’, surely the world’s most famous missile defence system. For me, this question misses the point.
My abiding memory of flying over Israel is just how small it is.
For years, RAF Tornados (and later Typhoons) would transit from RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus to combat operations over Iraqi airspace. By night the twinkling lights of shipping in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea gave way to the vibrant glow of this wealthy, densely inhabited land, before abruptly plunging back into the darkness of the Dead Sea and the Jordanian desert. The over-flight took 8 minutes.
Israel’s small size, population density and probability of attack make an Iron Dome sensible. For Britain, the calculus is different.
The vast sum of money required to provide an equivalent UK system would be much better spent elsewhere. Instead, the Conservatives propose a flexible, multilayered surface-to-air system designed to protect our airbases, navy dockyards and other strategic assets. This will enable effective military operations to continue if Britain were to come under attack.
Remarkably, right now, that ability to continue to operate is highly questionable.
The British public are most likely unaware to extent to which our skies are undefended from coordinated attack. Annual flypasts over London to celebrate the King’s birthday proudly display the fleet combined with the professionalism and skill of those who fly them. These patriotic events hide the fact that the RAF is not as potent as it appears, despite the continued excellence of our personnel.
Typhoon fighters have legacy radars – effectively their eyes-in-the-sky – which hold back their capability to track, target and destroy enemy aircraft or missiles. F35 aircraft have been in UK service for over a decade but still lack an effective suite of air to ground weapons. But whilst these capability gaps require urgent attention, their impact is an order of magnitude below the detriment which would result if the RAF’s basing and infrastructure were successfully targeted by an adversary.
Decades of overseas operations saw defence of our UK bases cease to be a priority. With no credible airfield air defences, RAF doctrine has turned to how operations might continue from other locations if main bases were destroyed. Recent exercises have seen Typhoon test-pilots land and take off successfully from roads and ice-runways. Other tests have seen aircraft deploy to remote airfields and attempt to launch repeated training missions from an austere environment. They’ve highlighted just how difficult that is.
These exquisite aircraft require a lot of specialised equipment to keep them going. Formula 1 teams have perfected the art of delivering world class performance out of a fleet of lorries that tour the world – the British military hasn’t got there yet, but it is learning fast.
Vulnerability of UK airbases was exposed last year with spray painting and vandalism of A330 Voyager aircraft at RAF Brize Norton by Palestine Action. Just this month America decided to pull back B1 bombers from RAF Fairford deemed at risk from drone attack. These deniable actions may fit into what is known as the grey zone and, despite their simplicity, can have disproportionate effects.
Further along the conflict scale actions become attributable.
It is inconceivable that Russian military intelligence do not already have a database of precise coordinates for key targets on RAF bases that would make it hard for fast-jets to operate effectively, or even get airborne. If Russia calculate that they can neuter the RAF without even entering an airborne battle then the deterrent value of our extremely expensive fast-jet assets reduces to near zero. At the present time there is little we could do to defend against a multi-axis simultaneously timed cruise missile attack.
And this is the crux of Britannia Shield concept. It is not to destroy all missile directed towards us, but to keep our air bases, Naval dockyards and other key strategic assets operational in the event of attack. If Russia knows that pre-emptive strikes on our bases are likely to fail, they are less likely to try. The concept sees a multi-layer of defence using different weapons each suited to different threats.
From everything we heard at Conference, it’s clear that Britannia Shield forms just one strand of Conservative defence thinking along a consistent theme – deterrence matters. Russia would know that we could defend ourselves from an attack, and preserve our ability to retaliate.
We must be robust, resilient and determined enough to stay in – and win – the fight.
Geoff Williams is a former RAF Tornado GR4 pilot with operational service experience over Iraq, Afghanistan, and parts of Africa.
After 12 years’ service as an RAF Fighter pilot, it’s fair to say I was delighted that the Conservative Party put the issue of UK Air Defence front and centre of their party conference.
Whatever the political arguments over the Britannia Shield policy announcement, it should be welcome to all who care about Defence that we are now having a serious debate about how to protect ourselves from the new age of drone and missile threats.
As the story broke, some commentators focused on whether Britannia Shield is comparable to Israel’s ‘Iron Dome’, surely the world’s most famous missile defence system. For me, this question misses the point.
My abiding memory of flying over Israel is just how small it is.
For years, RAF Tornados (and later Typhoons) would transit from RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus to combat operations over Iraqi airspace. By night the twinkling lights of shipping in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea gave way to the vibrant glow of this wealthy, densely inhabited land, before abruptly plunging back into the darkness of the Dead Sea and the Jordanian desert. The over-flight took 8 minutes.
Israel’s small size, population density and probability of attack make an Iron Dome sensible. For Britain, the calculus is different.
The vast sum of money required to provide an equivalent UK system would be much better spent elsewhere. Instead, the Conservatives propose a flexible, multilayered surface-to-air system designed to protect our airbases, navy dockyards and other strategic assets. This will enable effective military operations to continue if Britain were to come under attack.
Remarkably, right now, that ability to continue to operate is highly questionable.
The British public are most likely unaware to extent to which our skies are undefended from coordinated attack. Annual flypasts over London to celebrate the King’s birthday proudly display the fleet combined with the professionalism and skill of those who fly them. These patriotic events hide the fact that the RAF is not as potent as it appears, despite the continued excellence of our personnel.
Typhoon fighters have legacy radars – effectively their eyes-in-the-sky – which hold back their capability to track, target and destroy enemy aircraft or missiles. F35 aircraft have been in UK service for over a decade but still lack an effective suite of air to ground weapons. But whilst these capability gaps require urgent attention, their impact is an order of magnitude below the detriment which would result if the RAF’s basing and infrastructure were successfully targeted by an adversary.
Decades of overseas operations saw defence of our UK bases cease to be a priority. With no credible airfield air defences, RAF doctrine has turned to how operations might continue from other locations if main bases were destroyed. Recent exercises have seen Typhoon test-pilots land and take off successfully from roads and ice-runways. Other tests have seen aircraft deploy to remote airfields and attempt to launch repeated training missions from an austere environment. They’ve highlighted just how difficult that is.
These exquisite aircraft require a lot of specialised equipment to keep them going. Formula 1 teams have perfected the art of delivering world class performance out of a fleet of lorries that tour the world – the British military hasn’t got there yet, but it is learning fast.
Vulnerability of UK airbases was exposed last year with spray painting and vandalism of A330 Voyager aircraft at RAF Brize Norton by Palestine Action. Just this month America decided to pull back B1 bombers from RAF Fairford deemed at risk from drone attack. These deniable actions may fit into what is known as the grey zone and, despite their simplicity, can have disproportionate effects.
Further along the conflict scale actions become attributable.
It is inconceivable that Russian military intelligence do not already have a database of precise coordinates for key targets on RAF bases that would make it hard for fast-jets to operate effectively, or even get airborne. If Russia calculate that they can neuter the RAF without even entering an airborne battle then the deterrent value of our extremely expensive fast-jet assets reduces to near zero. At the present time there is little we could do to defend against a multi-axis simultaneously timed cruise missile attack.
And this is the crux of Britannia Shield concept. It is not to destroy all missile directed towards us, but to keep our air bases, Naval dockyards and other key strategic assets operational in the event of attack. If Russia knows that pre-emptive strikes on our bases are likely to fail, they are less likely to try. The concept sees a multi-layer of defence using different weapons each suited to different threats.
From everything we heard at Conference, it’s clear that Britannia Shield forms just one strand of Conservative defence thinking along a consistent theme – deterrence matters. Russia would know that we could defend ourselves from an attack, and preserve our ability to retaliate.
We must be robust, resilient and determined enough to stay in – and win – the fight.