Joe Walker-Cousins MBE is a Middle East and defence specialist based in Riyadh.
What goes on in the Gulf does not stay in the Gulf.
The attacks on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport show that Saudi Arabia is not a passing regional story, and Britain’s relationship with the Kingdom cannot be managed through short-term reactions. Britain needs a long-term Gulf strategy and… the political leadership to deliver it.
I know King Khalid International Airport well.
I have travelled through it countless times as it has transformed into a modern gateway to Saudi Arabia and the wider world. The attacks of 10 and 11 October killed at least 14 people and injured more than 320. One of my housemates was about to fly when a missile struck the terminal. The passengers were deplaned and returned to the street with full credit to the professionalism of the Saudia staff. An attack on a major international airport threatens more than lives and infrastructure. It threatens confidence in the connectivity, security and stability on which Saudi Arabia’s economic future depends.
Saudi Arabia is not some far-off land. It sits at the crossroads between two of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints; Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb. The Houthis threaten oil and maritime traffic through the Red Sea and Suez, with consequences for trade, energy markets and the cost of living. Those consequences reach UK streets, petrol pumps and ballot boxes. British strategic interests demand not merely continued engagement with the Kingdom, but a deeper and more enduring partnership.
We should expect clear words of solidarity from the British Government. But solidarity is not measured by the warmth of a communiqué. It is measured by the practical capabilities partners are prepared to bring to bear.
Britain has a long history of understanding this. Building on a relationship whose roots reach back to pioneers like Captain William Shakespeare and Lawrence of Arabia during the First World War, Labour’s Defence Secretary Denis Healey helped deliver a Saudi-British air-defence agreement in the 1960s, involving aircraft, training and radar. Margaret Thatcher and King Fahd transformed the relationship again in the 1980s. Tony Blair later super-charged the Saudi Typhoon programme, one of Britain’s most important defence-industrial partnerships. Across party lines, governments understood that Gulf security and British interests were closely connected.
Yet, for some in Britain, Saudi Arabia can be a difficult country with which to engage. Reservations around human rights, how the Kingdom is governed and its record over the last decade should not be dismissed. But neither is Britain approaching this relationship from a position of uncomplicated moral authority. We have our own recent record to examine… from the Iraq war to increasingly bitter arguments over immigration, integration and the boundaries of free speech.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is attempting something extraordinarily difficult. It is transforming its economy and society, asserting a new regional role and navigating an increasingly unstable Middle East, while maintaining the political stability it believes is necessary to drive its Vision 2030 transformation forward. At its heart lies HRH Mohammed bin Salman; a challenging operator, and the most consequential Saudi leader for generations. Without spending time in the Kingdom, one can find it difficult to grasp the scale of that change, or the confidence and leadership Riyadh is now demonstrating not only across the Arab and Islamic worlds but globally, as it diversifies its alliances.
Today’s Britain needs to understand today’s Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and we need its confidence.
However, in the meantime, the regional balance is changing. The conflict with Iran and the Houthis has added urgency to Saudi Arabia’s relationships with other regional powers. The emerging Saudi-Pakistan-Turkey relationship is strategically significant; their challenge is, like ours, to turn political solidarity into further practical cooperation in air defence, intelligence, logistics, military coordination and deterrence.
However, there is a real danger that this conflict could become more than a contest between states and armed groups; rather a regional struggle increasingly framed in sectarian terms. That would threaten the wider Islamic world’s cohesion and stability, while creating opportunities for other powers as their rivals become consumed by conflict.
I was reminded of a conversation I had in 2017, while attending a security conference in Herzliya, Israel. I asked the former Israeli security official Amos Gilad about the prospects for rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel, given their shared concerns about Iran. He invoked the familiar maxim that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. But he then offered a more revealing observation, if two adversaries were fighting one another, Israel would wish them both success.
I have never forgotten that exchange. In the Middle East, the weakening of one rival does not necessarily strengthen its opponent alone; it can create opportunities for others. Saudi Arabia must look beyond the immediate military contest and consider the regional balance that may emerge. Preventing this conflict from hardening into a wider sectarian confrontation is not simply a matter of principle. It is a strategic imperative.
Saudi Arabia is no temporary feature of Britain’s foreign-policy calculations but a major regional power whose influence will shape the wider region’s security and prosperity. Trust established, or lost, in a crisis can shape partnerships for decades.
In 1951, as Britain struggled to bring the Malayan Emergency under control, Field Marshal Montgomery sent Colonial Secretary Sir Oliver Lyttelton a characteristically terse note: “We must have a plan. Secondly, we must have a man. When we have a plan and a man, we shall succeed: not otherwise.”
Britain faces a different strategic environment today, but the question remains: who owns our Middle East strategy, and where is the coherent plan that connects our diplomatic, military and commercial interests? We need to unify the British state’s approach to Saudi Arabia, set out where we want the relationship to be in ten years, and back that vision with action.
The 2018 memorandum of intent for a further 48 Typhoon aircraft is one example of the potential that remains unrealised. This is not about competing with America for aircraft sales or putting British troops on the ground. It is about using British military expertise, intelligence, training, maritime security and defence-industry capabilities to help stabilise the Gulf, give Riyadh strategic choice and bring investment and jobs to Britain while strengthening our own defence industry.
Beyond mealy-mouthed communiqués and craven, half-hearted soundbites, the Government must move beyond administratively diluted language designed to placate ideologically entrenched voices on the left, reflexive liberal sceptics and a civil service establishment seemingly resigned to Britain’s managed decline. It must explain why Gulf security matters to the British public, what Britain can contribute, how we will work with Saudi Arabia and other regional partners, and what enduring relationship we want with the Gulf once the immediate crisis passes.
These are strategic opportunities that may arise only once in a government’s lifetime. Britain cannot afford to become so absorbed in domestic arguments that it neglects its international interests. Global Britain requires the capacity to manage domestic pressures while investing in partnerships that will shape our security and prosperity for decades.
Britain needs a man and a plan. Stephen Doughty, the minister responsible for the Middle East, must help articulate that strategy and secure the action to deliver it. If he cannot, the Foreign Secretary, Ed Miliband, must take ownership; and if the Government as a whole cannot deliver, the Prime Minister must.
Saudi Arabia will remember who stood with it. Britain must decide what sort of partner it intends to be.
Joe Walker-Cousins MBE is a Middle East and defence specialist based in Riyadh.
What goes on in the Gulf does not stay in the Gulf.
The attacks on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport show that Saudi Arabia is not a passing regional story, and Britain’s relationship with the Kingdom cannot be managed through short-term reactions. Britain needs a long-term Gulf strategy and… the political leadership to deliver it.
I know King Khalid International Airport well.
I have travelled through it countless times as it has transformed into a modern gateway to Saudi Arabia and the wider world. The attacks of 10 and 11 October killed at least 14 people and injured more than 320. One of my housemates was about to fly when a missile struck the terminal. The passengers were deplaned and returned to the street with full credit to the professionalism of the Saudia staff. An attack on a major international airport threatens more than lives and infrastructure. It threatens confidence in the connectivity, security and stability on which Saudi Arabia’s economic future depends.
Saudi Arabia is not some far-off land. It sits at the crossroads between two of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints; Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb. The Houthis threaten oil and maritime traffic through the Red Sea and Suez, with consequences for trade, energy markets and the cost of living. Those consequences reach UK streets, petrol pumps and ballot boxes. British strategic interests demand not merely continued engagement with the Kingdom, but a deeper and more enduring partnership.
We should expect clear words of solidarity from the British Government. But solidarity is not measured by the warmth of a communiqué. It is measured by the practical capabilities partners are prepared to bring to bear.
Britain has a long history of understanding this. Building on a relationship whose roots reach back to pioneers like Captain William Shakespeare and Lawrence of Arabia during the First World War, Labour’s Defence Secretary Denis Healey helped deliver a Saudi-British air-defence agreement in the 1960s, involving aircraft, training and radar. Margaret Thatcher and King Fahd transformed the relationship again in the 1980s. Tony Blair later super-charged the Saudi Typhoon programme, one of Britain’s most important defence-industrial partnerships. Across party lines, governments understood that Gulf security and British interests were closely connected.
Yet, for some in Britain, Saudi Arabia can be a difficult country with which to engage. Reservations around human rights, how the Kingdom is governed and its record over the last decade should not be dismissed. But neither is Britain approaching this relationship from a position of uncomplicated moral authority. We have our own recent record to examine… from the Iraq war to increasingly bitter arguments over immigration, integration and the boundaries of free speech.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is attempting something extraordinarily difficult. It is transforming its economy and society, asserting a new regional role and navigating an increasingly unstable Middle East, while maintaining the political stability it believes is necessary to drive its Vision 2030 transformation forward. At its heart lies HRH Mohammed bin Salman; a challenging operator, and the most consequential Saudi leader for generations. Without spending time in the Kingdom, one can find it difficult to grasp the scale of that change, or the confidence and leadership Riyadh is now demonstrating not only across the Arab and Islamic worlds but globally, as it diversifies its alliances.
Today’s Britain needs to understand today’s Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and we need its confidence.
However, in the meantime, the regional balance is changing. The conflict with Iran and the Houthis has added urgency to Saudi Arabia’s relationships with other regional powers. The emerging Saudi-Pakistan-Turkey relationship is strategically significant; their challenge is, like ours, to turn political solidarity into further practical cooperation in air defence, intelligence, logistics, military coordination and deterrence.
However, there is a real danger that this conflict could become more than a contest between states and armed groups; rather a regional struggle increasingly framed in sectarian terms. That would threaten the wider Islamic world’s cohesion and stability, while creating opportunities for other powers as their rivals become consumed by conflict.
I was reminded of a conversation I had in 2017, while attending a security conference in Herzliya, Israel. I asked the former Israeli security official Amos Gilad about the prospects for rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel, given their shared concerns about Iran. He invoked the familiar maxim that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. But he then offered a more revealing observation, if two adversaries were fighting one another, Israel would wish them both success.
I have never forgotten that exchange. In the Middle East, the weakening of one rival does not necessarily strengthen its opponent alone; it can create opportunities for others. Saudi Arabia must look beyond the immediate military contest and consider the regional balance that may emerge. Preventing this conflict from hardening into a wider sectarian confrontation is not simply a matter of principle. It is a strategic imperative.
Saudi Arabia is no temporary feature of Britain’s foreign-policy calculations but a major regional power whose influence will shape the wider region’s security and prosperity. Trust established, or lost, in a crisis can shape partnerships for decades.
In 1951, as Britain struggled to bring the Malayan Emergency under control, Field Marshal Montgomery sent Colonial Secretary Sir Oliver Lyttelton a characteristically terse note: “We must have a plan. Secondly, we must have a man. When we have a plan and a man, we shall succeed: not otherwise.”
Britain faces a different strategic environment today, but the question remains: who owns our Middle East strategy, and where is the coherent plan that connects our diplomatic, military and commercial interests? We need to unify the British state’s approach to Saudi Arabia, set out where we want the relationship to be in ten years, and back that vision with action.
The 2018 memorandum of intent for a further 48 Typhoon aircraft is one example of the potential that remains unrealised. This is not about competing with America for aircraft sales or putting British troops on the ground. It is about using British military expertise, intelligence, training, maritime security and defence-industry capabilities to help stabilise the Gulf, give Riyadh strategic choice and bring investment and jobs to Britain while strengthening our own defence industry.
Beyond mealy-mouthed communiqués and craven, half-hearted soundbites, the Government must move beyond administratively diluted language designed to placate ideologically entrenched voices on the left, reflexive liberal sceptics and a civil service establishment seemingly resigned to Britain’s managed decline. It must explain why Gulf security matters to the British public, what Britain can contribute, how we will work with Saudi Arabia and other regional partners, and what enduring relationship we want with the Gulf once the immediate crisis passes.
These are strategic opportunities that may arise only once in a government’s lifetime. Britain cannot afford to become so absorbed in domestic arguments that it neglects its international interests. Global Britain requires the capacity to manage domestic pressures while investing in partnerships that will shape our security and prosperity for decades.
Britain needs a man and a plan. Stephen Doughty, the minister responsible for the Middle East, must help articulate that strategy and secure the action to deliver it. If he cannot, the Foreign Secretary, Ed Miliband, must take ownership; and if the Government as a whole cannot deliver, the Prime Minister must.
Saudi Arabia will remember who stood with it. Britain must decide what sort of partner it intends to be.