That he will be in post during the Coronation in May tells an important story about change in Britain across the generations.
After a long period leading up to the EU referendum, we have now reached a quiet, post-referendum consensus among the public and the main political parties.
Party, media and online dynamics create incentives to reinforce the ‘them and us’ perspectives of one 40 per cent coalition or another. Reaching out for common ground can be risky.
The latest wave of an in-depth tracker project shows that a long-term softening of public attitudes has continued during the pandemic.
He may have been one of the greatest figures to shape the 20th century, but a simplistic deification risks losing the complexity of the man.
The framing of “facts versus feelings” won’t work for the liberal right on race any better than it has for the liberal left on immigration.
Research suggests that the public salience of immigration has fallen significantly since 2016. What does this mean for the government going forward?
Not being white remains the number one demographic predictor of not voting Tory.
Treat claims of a communalist election with suspicion. The evidence suggests that ethnic minority voters prioritise domestic issues over foreign policy ones.
Discussion of immigration is often dominated by those who are entirely ‘pro’ or ‘anti’, but most people are somewhere in between.
If the Conservatives had won 42 per cent from them too, our research projects that she would have won with a comfortable 42-seat majority.
Despite the lazy stereotypes, there’s a striking amount of common ground across partisan and referendum divides.