Lord Ashcroft KCMG PC is an international businessman, philanthropist, author and pollster. For more information on his work, visit lordashcroft.com
Today Somaliland celebrates the anniversary of its independence declaration from Somalia in 1991. A former British protectorate, Somaliland has spent more than three decades building something exceptionally rare in the Horn of Africa: relative stability, functioning democratic institutions, and security in one of the world’s most volatile regions. While much of the international community still treats it as a legal fiction, the reality on the ground tells a very different story.
Recently, Somaliland has found itself back in the international spotlight. The reported recognition of Somaliland by Israel – unexpected perhaps even to Somalilanders themselves – has triggered renewed diplomatic interest in the territory. International delegations have increased. The United States is reportedly exploring deeper engagement, encouraged in part through informal channels connected to the orbit of Eric Trump. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates, Greece and Argentina have all intensified diplomatic contacts. Yet Somaliland’s eagerness for recognition has at times exceeded diplomatic caution. Attempts to curry favour with Buenos Aires through comments touching upon the sovereignty dispute over the Falkland Islands have understandably gone down badly in Britain – a reminder that aspiring states must learn quickly that international diplomacy leaves little room for unforced errors.
Curious to see matters for myself, I travelled to Somaliland this month. Ironically, my first encounter with Somaliland’s unresolved status came before I had even landed. Somalia denied the aircraft access to its airspace en route to Hargeisa. Though Somaliland governs itself entirely independently, Somalia still formally controls the surrounding airspace. It was a sharp illustration of one of the central dilemmas facing Somaliland today – independence proclaimed is not always independence exercised.
What struck me most upon arrival was not merely Somaliland’s ambition, but the extent to which it has already built the architecture of a functioning state. In conversations with senior ministers, officials repeatedly pointed to the country’s peaceful transfers of power, its elected parliament, and the security structures painstakingly assembled since the devastation of the civil war, which destroyed Hargeisa and claimed over 200,000 lives. Somaliland today maintains its own army, coast guard, police, intelligence services and custodial corps. Unlike much of southern Somalia, it has not become fertile ground for Islamist extremism.
The contrast with Somalia itself is difficult to ignore. While billions in international aid continue to flow through Mogadishu, Somaliland has largely been left to fend for itself. Yet it has still managed to establish relative order and maintain security not only internally, but along Ethiopia’s frontier, helping to contain terrorist movements operating across the region. There is a quiet frustration among Somaliland’s leadership towards Britain. Having once granted Somaliland independence in 1960 before it voluntarily united with Somalia days later, many Somalilanders believe the UK, of all countries, should better understand their historical case.
There are, moreover, growing strategic reasons for the West to pay closer attention. Somaliland occupies a critical position along the Gulf of Aden and the approaches to the Red Sea at a moment when maritime security is rapidly deteriorating. The Houthi threat in Yemen, piracy, arms trafficking and Chinese expansionism are transforming the Horn of Africa into a major geopolitical theatre. The port of Berbera – where the UAE already maintains a military facility and has financed infrastructure connecting Somaliland to Ethiopia – could become strategically indispensable. Officials suggested to me that Berbera has the potential to develop into a major regional logistics hub, including for humanitarian grain exports to famine-affected regions.
What is increasingly clear is that Somaliland’s importance now extends far beyond the question of self-determination alone. Conversations with Taiwanese representatives in Hargeisa revealed an emerging alignment built around resisting Chinese coercion and securing strategic supply chains. Taiwan has invested heavily in Somaliland through development projects, election support, healthcare initiatives and maritime security cooperation. Taiwanese officials described Somaliland as an “indispensable partner” in preserving a free and open Red Sea, while Somaliland sees Taiwan as proof that international partnerships do not need to come tied to debt traps or political subordination.
The relationship also points to a wider geopolitical reality that Western policymakers are beginning to appreciate. Somaliland sits at the intersection of several increasingly urgent strategic concerns: Red Sea security, Chinese influence in Africa, critical mineral access, counterterrorism and maritime trade protection. Somaliland officials openly discussed untapped reserves of lithium, platinum and other rare earth minerals, while emphasising the country’s value as a reliable regional security partner for the US, the UK and their allies.
None of this means formal recognition is imminent. Far from it. Many countries remain wary of opening separatist precedents elsewhere in Africa, while Somalia continues to lobby aggressively against Somaliland’s recognition with support from actors including Turkey, China and Qatar. Yet even if full independence remains distant, Britain and its allies should not ignore what Somaliland has quietly achieved.
At the very least, Somaliland deserves significantly deeper engagement from the UK and the wider West. Security cooperation, investment partnerships, maritime coordination and development support are all firmly in Britain’s interests. There may also be creative ways to deepen Somaliland’s relationship with the Commonwealth short of outright recognition. Somaliland’s leaders speak repeatedly not only of independence, but of democratic accountability, partnership with the West, and regional stability – values that are increasingly scarce in this part of the continent.
For Britain in particular, Somaliland poses an uncomfortable but important question. If we genuinely wish to support stable, democratic and pro-Western partners in strategically vital regions, how long can we continue treating one of the few functioning success stories in the Horn of Africa as though it does not exist?
Lord Ashcroft KCMG PC is an international businessman, philanthropist, author and pollster. For more information on his work, visit lordashcroft.com
Today Somaliland celebrates the anniversary of its independence declaration from Somalia in 1991. A former British protectorate, Somaliland has spent more than three decades building something exceptionally rare in the Horn of Africa: relative stability, functioning democratic institutions, and security in one of the world’s most volatile regions. While much of the international community still treats it as a legal fiction, the reality on the ground tells a very different story.
Recently, Somaliland has found itself back in the international spotlight. The reported recognition of Somaliland by Israel – unexpected perhaps even to Somalilanders themselves – has triggered renewed diplomatic interest in the territory. International delegations have increased. The United States is reportedly exploring deeper engagement, encouraged in part through informal channels connected to the orbit of Eric Trump. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates, Greece and Argentina have all intensified diplomatic contacts. Yet Somaliland’s eagerness for recognition has at times exceeded diplomatic caution. Attempts to curry favour with Buenos Aires through comments touching upon the sovereignty dispute over the Falkland Islands have understandably gone down badly in Britain – a reminder that aspiring states must learn quickly that international diplomacy leaves little room for unforced errors.
Curious to see matters for myself, I travelled to Somaliland this month. Ironically, my first encounter with Somaliland’s unresolved status came before I had even landed. Somalia denied the aircraft access to its airspace en route to Hargeisa. Though Somaliland governs itself entirely independently, Somalia still formally controls the surrounding airspace. It was a sharp illustration of one of the central dilemmas facing Somaliland today – independence proclaimed is not always independence exercised.
What struck me most upon arrival was not merely Somaliland’s ambition, but the extent to which it has already built the architecture of a functioning state. In conversations with senior ministers, officials repeatedly pointed to the country’s peaceful transfers of power, its elected parliament, and the security structures painstakingly assembled since the devastation of the civil war, which destroyed Hargeisa and claimed over 200,000 lives. Somaliland today maintains its own army, coast guard, police, intelligence services and custodial corps. Unlike much of southern Somalia, it has not become fertile ground for Islamist extremism.
The contrast with Somalia itself is difficult to ignore. While billions in international aid continue to flow through Mogadishu, Somaliland has largely been left to fend for itself. Yet it has still managed to establish relative order and maintain security not only internally, but along Ethiopia’s frontier, helping to contain terrorist movements operating across the region. There is a quiet frustration among Somaliland’s leadership towards Britain. Having once granted Somaliland independence in 1960 before it voluntarily united with Somalia days later, many Somalilanders believe the UK, of all countries, should better understand their historical case.
There are, moreover, growing strategic reasons for the West to pay closer attention. Somaliland occupies a critical position along the Gulf of Aden and the approaches to the Red Sea at a moment when maritime security is rapidly deteriorating. The Houthi threat in Yemen, piracy, arms trafficking and Chinese expansionism are transforming the Horn of Africa into a major geopolitical theatre. The port of Berbera – where the UAE already maintains a military facility and has financed infrastructure connecting Somaliland to Ethiopia – could become strategically indispensable. Officials suggested to me that Berbera has the potential to develop into a major regional logistics hub, including for humanitarian grain exports to famine-affected regions.
What is increasingly clear is that Somaliland’s importance now extends far beyond the question of self-determination alone. Conversations with Taiwanese representatives in Hargeisa revealed an emerging alignment built around resisting Chinese coercion and securing strategic supply chains. Taiwan has invested heavily in Somaliland through development projects, election support, healthcare initiatives and maritime security cooperation. Taiwanese officials described Somaliland as an “indispensable partner” in preserving a free and open Red Sea, while Somaliland sees Taiwan as proof that international partnerships do not need to come tied to debt traps or political subordination.
The relationship also points to a wider geopolitical reality that Western policymakers are beginning to appreciate. Somaliland sits at the intersection of several increasingly urgent strategic concerns: Red Sea security, Chinese influence in Africa, critical mineral access, counterterrorism and maritime trade protection. Somaliland officials openly discussed untapped reserves of lithium, platinum and other rare earth minerals, while emphasising the country’s value as a reliable regional security partner for the US, the UK and their allies.
None of this means formal recognition is imminent. Far from it. Many countries remain wary of opening separatist precedents elsewhere in Africa, while Somalia continues to lobby aggressively against Somaliland’s recognition with support from actors including Turkey, China and Qatar. Yet even if full independence remains distant, Britain and its allies should not ignore what Somaliland has quietly achieved.
At the very least, Somaliland deserves significantly deeper engagement from the UK and the wider West. Security cooperation, investment partnerships, maritime coordination and development support are all firmly in Britain’s interests. There may also be creative ways to deepen Somaliland’s relationship with the Commonwealth short of outright recognition. Somaliland’s leaders speak repeatedly not only of independence, but of democratic accountability, partnership with the West, and regional stability – values that are increasingly scarce in this part of the continent.
For Britain in particular, Somaliland poses an uncomfortable but important question. If we genuinely wish to support stable, democratic and pro-Western partners in strategically vital regions, how long can we continue treating one of the few functioning success stories in the Horn of Africa as though it does not exist?